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CHAPTER I
IWrRODUCTION

One of Newman's favorite images was that of a traveler lost in a strange land or city who, because he has no
map of the streets, mounts to some hill nearby to reconnoiter the area and so get a "view."

Before getting on with

the body of this analysis of the Idea, I should like, in
what will be an extended introductory chapter, to give the
reader a "view" of the scope of this paper and to provide
some guidelines indispensable to the reader's finding his
way through its area with some benefit from the passage.
will do so by considering:

I

(1) the relevance of the Idea

to our day; (2) Newman's quest in the Idea for a principle
of unity; (J) the relevance of this search to the Greek
philosophical problem of the one and the many; (4) the fundamental problems to which this study addresses itself; (5)
a review of critical literature relevant to these problems;

(6) the importance of Aristotle, especially his doctrine of
equivocity by reference, to this study; (7) the "mechanism,.
of my interpretation and some technical vocabulary to be
employed; (8) my purpose in brief.
John Henry Cardinal Newman's Idea of a University
is the work for which Newman is best remembered today.
1

2

More to our purpose, it is generally regarded as one of the
most significant statements formulated on the nature of university education, perhaps the most important written in
the last one hundred and twenty-five years. 1 Its influence
on university educational theory has been enormous, and,
sooner or later, anyone interested in the subject must come
to terms with the issues it raises.

They include philoso-

phy and theology, science and religion, humanism and Christianity, reason and Revelation, nature and Grace, conscience and commandment, philosophical habit and moral
training, worldly gentleman and Christian gentleman, Liberal Knowledge and utilitarian instruction, dogma and skepticism, Faith and infidelity, to

na~e

but a few.

Although these are issues attractive in any age,
they hold a special fascination and relevance for the man
of faith, the Christian educator, and even the non-sectarian educator of our day.

First, Newman's Idea and the is-

sues dealt with therein appeal strongly to the twentiethcentury Christian believer.

For during an age in which he

observes organized religion attacked from without and racked by fratricidal strife from within; when he perceives
contemporary man caught up in a vortex uf defiance of all
religious authority; when he sees, on the one hand, the

1

rn John henry Newman (London, 1956), p. 25, J. I',l.
Cameron points out "that modern thinking on University education is a series of footnotes to Newman's lectures and
essays."

J
loss of respect for traditional orthodox tenets, and representatives of the Church sometimes exceeding

a~d

abusin6

their authority, on the other; and when this same believer
sees his theological underpinnings being swept away, and
the fabric of his traditional religious beliefs becoming
unravelled, :r..e might well wonder that he has any faith at
all.

3ut then with this experience before him, he ap-

...oroaches

the witness of a brilliant nineteenth-century

Anglican turned Roman Catholic clergyman.
ers a loyal and devoted son of the Church.

There he discovThere he ob-

serves a strong sense of dogma and respect for primitive
Christian beliefs blended with a personal and highly intellectualized quest for the foundations of those religious
beliefs.

Above all, he finds in Nevnnan's witness, vlith its

sense of doc;ma, doctrine, and fidelity, a fundamental and
_;;Jerenially sound Christianity that reconciles the needs of
conscience with the demands of a divinely inspired Church
body.
If

:~ewman

in the scope of his concern for the. foun-

dations of religious truth confronts the contemporary
Christian, even more so he challene;es the twentieth-century
Christian educator who may examine r·.:ewrnan 's witness and
relevance in the licht of a few questions.

:,ihat does an

intellectually bold, progressive, yet faithful exponent of
the tenets of orthodox Christianity do when he finds himself called upon to deliver a series of lectures to a

~ass

fr~m

the

~ai~strea~

~any

ways, to be economically self-serving, socially heart-

of a society which reveals itself, in

fact, the course of this society it

sho~ld

ttsir ,:hristian heri taz;e to alter?

.!hat, moreover, does a

be the charge of

loyal son of the Church do who is ma::1dated to lecture or. university education in an atmosphere of national distrust,
episcopal opposition, lay apathy, and clerical indiffere~ce,

not to

mentio~

in a world of coreligionists who, in

their overbearing zeal to protect the central authority of
the RomaYl 8atLolic ,:;hurch in any conflict between human a..l'ld
divine knowledge, feel only deep
icism of thelr

reli~ion

about any crit-

misgivin~s

and extreme reserve toward any in-

'
,, t .~n t e_11 ec t ua l researc,h or
G.epena.en

.
t'-"'
sc~en
l.L~C

.
.
?
1nqu~ry?-

The answers to these questions sound fro:n each pa6e
of the Idea.

'l'here,

;gins by pointinG

Lt~)

~~ev,rman,

courat?;eous and resolute, be-

one thin:dn,; :r.an' s search for the es-

sential intellectual spirit of man regarding the purpose of
a university and makes it everyman 1 s, using reason, a tool
he feels best suited to the expression of mankinct•s noblest
as~irations

from a temporal

•

Vl

ewpOl.:Tt.
•

<

includes :nan's

quest for a more meaningful life that also reflects his es-

2...,::;ee .....
.., •.•
. ' c:...ra
~
th1.1., ·'
. . t~v;~:a..v;.. ' s .:..;J"~~
. . ".rersli,.;~i:
. ....

- '
1c1ea

1

2..tlCI.

1
..:<ea __
..

ity (London, 1951), for an excellent historical account of
the foundin.; of i\ ewrnan 's Cni versi "cy, th.e fon:;runr.er of today's ~ational University.
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s entially religious nature.

In the process,

i·~

ev;man does

not Ilorify out of bounds the efficacy of reason, a

h~~an

faculty whose overemphasis is, in part, responsible for the
i~fidelity of his age, but rather weighs in t~e balance its

In his educational ideal,

claims against those of faith.

he does not postulate themes for a rationalistic world he
now cynically believes to be beyond any type of redemptive
behavior or values.

~/hat i. Iewman

does is affirm the value

of a quest in· which faith and reason are allied.

,{hat he

does is confirm the validity of an educational probran designed to meet ma::1's temporal and eternal aspirations.
I~ewman

envelops the university, the locale of this search,

with intellectual and spiritual pro!!lise and with temporal
an.d eternal possibilities, not with cynicism and futility.

In the end, he makes true intellectual culture distinguishable from academic illusion, separates truly idealistic
university e;oals from false "liberal" hopes, a."ld dra.:natically proclaims the inherent spiritual
nobility of man.

a.~d

intellectual

These are answers to be treasured in any

age, not the least of all by Christian educators in our
own.
1."inally, there is

~\ewman

's appeal to the modern ed-

ucator, regardless of his religious persuasion.

i~ewman

ap-

proached the founding of his university like an explorer of
new educational lands.

·.rhe opportunity offered him the ex-

.citement of an educational adventure in which he had long

)

been interested.

6

It also conferred the fresh wonder of

revolutionary academic discoveries.
tional theory or practice -- and

Revolutions in educa-

r~ewma.'1.' s

was a revolution

in the sense that he urged man to develop or regain a more
comprehensive view of knowledge and of life -- are always
inspired by the conviction that

so~e

significant aspect of

current educational thinking is dead or outmoded.

Such

revolutions usually take the form of exploring new ways to
revitalize the educational thought or to modify the academic practice.
Nev~a'1.

began his educational lectures in Ireland at

the beginning of an era of technology and professionalism.
It was an age chara·cterized by a trend toward. specialization.

It was a period marked by an

increas~

in knowledge

coupled with a different view of the purpose of kmowledge.
'i/hat began to matter now was not so much knowledge for its
own sake as knowledge for the sake of its usefulness and
the means to its most effective use.

This trend caused

Newman deep concern because he saw in its effects the certain fragmentation of the wholeness of knowledge and the
loss of man's integrated view of reality.

Another trend of

the day he found almost equally abhorrent was one toward
"viewiness," whereby •nan comes to know a 11 ttle about everything but not much of a substantive nature about anything.
Newman viewed this superficial kind of knowledge as another
evil that marked the decline of the humanistic tradition in

7
education.

Against both trends Newman was not alone in

open revolt, but he was at the forefront in pointing out
their dangers and pitfalls for the future state of university education.
In his view, the majestic vision of education found
in the Middle Ages and embodied in the universities of
Paris, Bologna, and Oxford was no longer in evidence.
Nineteenth-century man had lost his sense of ''philosophical
comprehensiveness," "orderly expansiveness," and "elastic
contructiveness," and he did not know why.3
plained why in the Idea:

Newman ex-

Nineteenth-century man had lost

his sense of unity.

This loss Newman saw evidence of in
the Church, in the state, and in the schoo1. 4 As. his major
purpose in the Idea, Newman s&t about to rediscover a principle of unity as it would apply to the wholeness of a university education and to the integrity of the human product
of that education.
Still another challenge facing Newman in the nineteenth century was the task of educating a man whose status
had been or was in the process of becoming sharply reduced.
Scientific discoveries were moving in the direction of

3The two foregoing statements are paraphrased from a
quotation cited in A. D. Culler, The Imperial Intellect, A
Study of Newman's Educational Ideal Ult"ew haven, 1955), p.
174. The quotation, in turn, is drawn from the Discourses
(1852), pp. 139-40, 142.
4

Culler, p. 174.

8

pushing back the history of the earth, of locating the
earth as a mere speck in the universe, and of assigning man
a sharply diminished role among the animals.
~aintained

Man still

some relative superiority over the rest, but the

image of man made in the likeness of God was fast disappearing.

What remained was a highly modified version of

that humanistic view of man found in the Ivliddle Ages.
~ewman

counters this position with a strong reaffirmation

in the Idea that the end of knowledge and of education is
the human being himself and the intellectual and spiritual
perfectio~

of his nature.

The problems that challenged Newman's educational
programs in the nineteenth century have their counterpart
in the problems facing educators in the twentieth.

In an

age notable for the proliferation of knowledge, the explosion of nuclear and space technology, professional overspecialization, and scholarly territorialism, modern educators
find man's status further diminished and his view of himself even more fragmented.

In the drift from what might be

called a humanistic to a dehumanized view of himself, modern man finds himself unable to discover the meaning of the
scientific and technological advances which characterize
his age.

He is at a loss to find his place in them, much

less to chart their direction.

The wealth of scientific

and technological know-how at his fingertips tells him how
to do but not why or what to do.

As a result, man appears

9
unable to shape his life or to control the scientific forces he has loosed.

Ee is left a pawn moved by external

and internal forces seemingly beyond his control.
ues become barren.

His val-

Ee dramatizes his pessimism over the

loss of values, for he sees in the loss the possible failure of civilization itself.

3ut while his attempts to dra-

matize the fraudulent aspects of modern life may shock man
into

awareness of his plight, one wonders if they do

~~

much to rid him of it.
Twentieth-century man needs an educational ideal
that would encompass the fundamental meanings he needs to
survive.

He has, perhaps even more so than his nineteenth-

century counterpart, lost his sense of unity -- a comprehensive, unifi-ed view of man, reality and the knowledge
that reflects reality.
things as one.

He has lost his capacity to see

He has allowed himself and his world to be

fragmented, his disciplines to be compartmentalized, and
his professional territories to be too rigidly assigned.
This brings us to the challenge facing modern educators.
It should be their responsibility to develop persons who
will do more than bemoan their fate and dramatize their
pessimism over their shrunken fragmented state.

It is the

challenge of contemporary educators to cultivate students
who will return a chaotic world into order and who will attempt to rediscover a principle of unity for the multiplicity of modern life.

In short, twentieth-century students

10
must be reeducated in the possibilities of a more humanistic form of education.

The effects of such an education

will be most evident in the students' desire to seek knowledge in a broader context and to see life with a more comprehensive view.
Although some may consider Newman's educational ideal too visionary, his theme of the interrelated nature of
knowledge and his call for an interdisciplinary 5rasp of
the sciences in pursuit of truth appear as

me~~ingful

today

as when they were first expressed one hundred and twentyfive years ago.

There are few vestiges of an ordered world

left in the twentieth century.

If modern man is to sur-

vive, perhaps he will have to impose his vision of oneness
on the multiple chaos of this century using a method similar to that Newman proposes in the Idea.

For Newman, order

is the law of the universe and unity is the law of man's
educational pursuits, not chaos.

Even if a modern educator

cannot subscribe to Newman's alliance of faith and reason,
he will do well, at least, to heed Newman's search for unity and call for order.
This quest for unity is the keynote of Newman's
~·

Its presence is indicated from the very beginning of

the discourses but may be lost to the reader in the variety
of Newman's topics and treatments.

Nev~an's

quest pursues

a principle of unity among a multiplicity of elements in
his educational scheme.

It embraces the oneness of the

11

fact of reality, the

fund~~entally

interdependent nature of

the sciences that reflect reality, and an interdisciplinary
grasp of those sciences.

Ultimately, the search pursues

the development of a man whose unified view of the sciences
leads him back to God as the Source and End of truth.
Faith and reason are allied in this joint venture.

In ad-

vancing this view of university education, Newman has much
to say on the relation of Faith and reason, Liberal Knowledge and utilitarian instruction, philosophical habit and
moral training, worldly gentleman and Christian

gentlema~,

and he says it in many ways, always seeking that one which
best conveys his primary meaning.

In spite of the variety

of expression, there is one purpose underlying all:

to

show the interrelated nature of Faith and knowledge and the
university-educated man's need to reflect that relation in
his own more comprehensive view of this life and the next.
Earlier, I pointed out that the relevance of Newman's search for unity extends forward even to our day, an
age very much in need of a synthesis not unlike

Nev~an's

for dealing with its educational and spiritual ills.

New-

man's quest is also one whose implications extend back to
the time of the early Greek philosophers and one of their
central problems, the One and the Many.

Around the end of

the seventh century, 3.C., the Greeks turned their efforts
away from poetry and mythology and laid the foundation of
that discipline we call philosophy.

Their concern was a

12

logical explanation of reality.

Their efforts centered on

coming to grips with the problem of the One and the Many, a
fundamental question that, over the years, has confronted
thoughtful men, and one long considered especially relevant
to beginning philosophical studies.

How does one explain

the static and the dynamic, the permanent and the changeable, the unified and the diverse?

How can the multiplic-

ity of things be explained in reference to one principle of
unity?

Correspondingly, how can one nature, form, or thing

be explained in view of its plural

ad~ptation?

This has

long been a root philosophical problem, any dispute over
the terminology employed to describe it notwithstanding,
that faces any thinking man who would find a key to unlock
the door to the mystery of reality.

It was a major problem

for the early Greek thinkers, and it was a central intellectual problem for Newman as well.
As Frederick Copleston points out, it was to this
problem of a principle of unity for the ever-changing multiplicity of things that the early Ionian philosophers began to address themselves.5

They were much concerned with

the obvious changes of birth and growth, decay and death.
They were equally aware of seasonal variations, other natural

ch~~ges,

man himself.

and especially, significant alterations in
Yet they perceived something permanent that

5F. Copleston, A history of Philosophy (Westminster,
Md., 1955), 1, PP• 13-17.

13
underwent these transitions.

In their attempts to define

that permanent element, they advanced various postulates.
The important thing to note here is not what they advanced
as the basic element, but rather, that they were concerned
with the problem of unity in difference in their search for
the ultimate nature of things.

Later, of course, Aristotle

would propose a coherent solution to the problem, one in
which the Stagirite would concern himself not so much with
how the "one" can be many, as how a "many" can be one. 6
From his temporary home in uublin in 1852, it was
not inappropriate that Newman in the Idea should confront
across the centuries those early Greek scholars and their
funda~ental

question.

The implications of the problem

dealt with by them appear not at all a matter of indifference to Newman when one considers his total concern for
some principles of unity among a multiplicity of intellectual, educational, and spiritual interests.

His whole life

provides examples of this, of which his search for a central spiritual authority, for an integrated spiritual life,
and for a unified educational ideal are most notable.

~ven

while it overlaps the others, our focus here, however, is

6According to J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in The
Aristotelian 'Metaphysics' 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1963), p. 437,
"The Aristotelian approach is the reverse of the ?armenidean. Parmenides sees being as one, and asks how could it
be many. Aristotle sees beings as manifold. He asks:
"How could any one nature account for their differences?''
Also, see Owens, pp. 459-460.

14

on how Newman confronts the early Greek philosophers, at
least indirectly, in the scope of his concern for a unifying educational basis.

At its core, the quest for unity in

the Idea might be said to come to grips with the problem of
the One and the

r.~any.

For when Newman asserts that all re-

ality is one, that all sciences are interconnected, that
the view of these sciences must be interdisciplinary, and
that the person who holds such a view must be one in whom
?aith and intellectual culture are combined, he is, in effect, responding to the problem of how many segments of reality can be one, of how many branches of knowledge can be
one, of how many views of knowledge can be joined in one
integrated view, and of how many intellectual and spiritual
capacities can be actualized in one university-educated
person.

These questions appear as no more than variations

of that fundamental question raised by those early Greek
seekers of truth.
There is, however, another aspect of Newman's concern for a unified educational ideal, a concern most important to the scope of this study, that also lends itself to
comparison with that

funda~ental

antinomy of Greek philoso-

phy, and that is his multiple treatment of the university
issue, grounds, theme, and gentleman in the Idea.

There,

l'!ewman discusses the nature of a Catholic university and a
university considered apart from religious principle.
approaches his subject on theological and philosophical

He

15
grounds.

Ee advances a view that has temporal as well as

eternal overtones.

he addresses his efforts to the worldly

human product of the university, even while he advocates a
~ore

Christian gentlemanly ideal.

The questions arise of

just how the Catholic and university issues, theological
and philosophical grounds, natural
disciplinary views, secular and

~~d

supernatural inter-

Christi~"l

be unified and reconciled in s·ome measure.

gentlemen are to
Each element of

the contrasting pairs appears the same in some ways yet
different.

They are things said in many ways, but they do

possess a certain unity by reference.
pears to speak with two voices.

Newman, then, ap-

Eis manifold voice is re-

flected in his dual presentation of the university issue,
grounds, theme, and gentlema.'1..

Although some critics ac-

knowledge this multiple presentation, they do not explain
it.

I contend that if the integrity of Newman's education-

al ideal and its presentation in

the~

are to be under-

stood, there will have to be found some unifying means
whereby Newman's dual treatment of these issues can be :nore
adequately explained and h.i.s two voices reconciled.

three of which are probably the most

This study of the Idea addresses itself to a number
of basic problems,

important in view of the controversy they have aroused.
First, there is the question of the nature of Newman's
Gatholic university.

Second, there is the issue of the na-

ture of Hewman's university considered apart from the

16
Church.

Third, there is the problem of the nature of

Newman's gentleman.

The first question will be viewed in

this study as the primary or fundamental issue of the

~·

The second and third questions will be approached as more
important secondary issues.

This study, however, will also

devote itself to several other secondary questions.
the problem of Newman's grounds.

One is

How do the supernatural

or theological lines of the inquiry stand in relation to
the natural or philosophical ones?
of theme.

Another is the matter

What is the relationship between a temporal

interdisciplinary grasp of knowledge for its own sake and
a supernatural interconnected view of knowledge for the
sake of something more?

.

Moreover, does the wholeness ·of

structure in the I£!! complement its thematic integrity in

some way?

Still another secondary issue is the relation

of the religion of reason found in the man of philosophic
habit to the religion of Faith present in the Newman's
Christian gentleman.

Finally, there is the question of

what makes Newman's idea of a university to be what it

is -- what is its cause and principle of Being.
The questions raised and the relationships drawn
have been addressed by critics in varying degrees and under
a variety of headings.

These headings include Newman's al-

leged severance of intellect from virtue in the Idea, a
conflict between humanistic and religious elements in the
work, and the seriousness of Newman's statement on the na-

17
ture of the gentleman.

All of the issues cited above ap-

pear closely knit, and the resolution of one may very well
enable the reader to clarify the problem and to understand
better the solution of the others.
As I indicated earlier, one of the major obstacles
to understanding the nature and interrelation of the university issues, grounds, the wholeness of theme and structure, and the types of gentlemen Newman sets forth in the
Idea is his multiple treatment of them.

If the content of

Newman's larger educational philosophy is to be understood,
there will have to be found some unifying principle whereby
Newman's dual treatment of various elements in the Idea can
be reconciled.

As I also pointed out, although his presen-

tation of the Idea's material and formal elements has been
discussed in some detail by the critics, their efforts have
not, so far as I can determine, gone far enough in establishing and in applying a principle that would insure the
unity of his treatment and the integrity of his educational
aims, leaving him less open to accusations of ambivalence,
ambiguity or worse.

So too, while critical discussion of

the problems of "severance" and the seriousness of Newman's
gentleman have oftentimes been provocative, these discussions have, I fear, sometimes cast needless doubts on the
wholeness of the work, and even worse, the integrity of the
educational doctrine it advances.

A suitable key for uni-

fying the Idea's form, and to some extent its content,

18

would help render these doubts unworthy of further consideration.
That Newman does treat the university issue, grounds,
theme, and gentleman with more than one voice appears evident.from the text.

Regarding the nature of his universi-

ty, he speaks of it as a place for the advancement of liberal knowledge apart from any reference to religion; yet he
maintains Christianity as the root principle of education.
The grounds of his inquiry concerning the nature of university education provide a second example.

Even while he

declares "human reason" to underlie his appr.oach, he conducts his inquiry under the sanction of the Church and he
concedes that his subject matter does admit "of a Catholic
treatment,"

Then, too, regarding theme, Newman tells his

audience, on the one hand, that knowledge sought for its
own sake is an admirable pursuit, but he even more vigorously asserts that intellectual cultivation is not a sufficient end in a university that purports to educate the
whole man.

Accordingly, even though Newman appears to em-

phasize the importance of the man of cultivated intellect
as the foremost product of university education, he stresses the spiritual deficiencies of such a man and intellectual state left to themselves.

In the matter of' religious

assumptions, we may find a fourth example.

Newman dis-

claims "superp.atural discernment," "divine illumination,"
or a "connection with Revelation" as his starting point.

19
Yet he makes the existence of a personal God, as the Source
and End of the wholeness of knowledge and the interrelated
view by which it is to be grasped, an indispensable point
of departure.

Correspondingly, Newman's view of the reli-

gion of reason differs markedly from what he considers true
religion.

The former type he makes characteristic of the

man of philosophic habit, an element in his educational ideal.

A fifth example of Newman's two voices is to be

found in his gentlemen.

Notwithstanding the fact that New-

man proposes as the ideal human product of the university a
man of cultivated intellect whose appeal lies chiefly in
.

his comprehensive view, he undercuts the integrity of this
ideal product by assigning him a host of spiritual deficiencies.

Newman seems to demand of him a spiritual per-

fection that lies beyond his earthly capacities.
That critics recognize Newman's multiple treatment,
that their controversies center on problems relating to
this treatment, and that they have not yet found a key sufficient to explain them is evident from their commentaries.
The scholarly controversy in the wake of the alleged con-

.

flict between humanistic and religious elements in the Idea
points to Newman's multiple treatment of the university
issue, the first of the basic problems on which we said
this study will focus.

Is Newman's fundamental issue the

nature of a university considered in the abstract or the
nature of a Catholic university viewed in the concrete?
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Although the problem between humanistic and religious elements can be stated in other terms, e.g., a conflict between philosophy and theology, Liberal Arts and theology,
science and theology, knowledge and virtue, or sectarian
and nonsectarian education, fundamentally, as it emerges in
critical discussion, the problem centers on whether Newman's university is a place for the humanistic or Christian
development of man.

Newman leaves little room to doubt

that it is a place for one or other type of
ment.

h~~an

develop-

But should the university be viewed primarily as a

humanistic center in which knowledge for its own sake is
set up as an independent and self-sufficient goal?

Or

rather, should it be considereq a place designed primarily
for the advancement of one's Faith and the fostering of
one's virtue, along with intellectual cultivation?
education promoted there

h~~anistic

or Christian and sectarian?

Is the

and nondenominational

Is nature or Grace the prin-

ciple of the university's educational thrust?

Does the

true spirit of the place emerge from its stamp of Faith or
from its mark of Reason?

Does

Nev~an

place man or a God-

like man as the focus of the development it offers?

Back

of these queries is the more fundamental question of the
primary nature of Newman's university.

Is Newman's basic

concern a university in the abstract that with its humanistic education makes all things subject to man in his far -ranging view, or is it a Catholic University which with its
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supernatural orientation makes man capable of viewing himself and all things as subject to God?
Critical commentary on the conflict between religious and humanistic elements in the Idea supports both
claims.

It indicates critics have not yet found a princi-

ple sufficient to explain whether Newman's twofold treatment points primarily to a Catholic University or a university in its essence.

T. Corcoran argues that Newman's Idea

is marked by a philosophy of "severance" between intellect
and virtue that contrasts sharply with -the traditional
doctrine of Christian Europe" that characterized the. 1854
Brief of Pius IX on the founding of a Catholic university.?
According to Corcoran, Newman severs the link between intellect and virtue to such an extent that he renders impossible the university's becoming an instrument of the Church
at all.
~iise

Fernande Tardivel, rvrichael Tierney, and John

challenge that position.

z.

Wise, for example, counters

that when Newman affirms knowledge as an end in itself, he

?corcoran's argument and the quotation cited are
presented by Martin Svaglic in Victorian Prose: A Guide to
Research, ed. David J. DeLaura 0\lew York, 1973), p. 136.
Svagl~c draws these materials from "Liberal studies and
Moral Aims: A Critical Study of Newman's Position"
(Thought, 1926). In reference to the former work, I should
point out that Charles Stephen Dessain's guide to research
on Newman's philosophy and theology and Martin J. Svaglic's
presentation on Newman the man and humanist are indispensable guides for the student interested in Newman's philosophical, theological, and educational thought and development. Hereafter, the work will be referred to as Victorian
Prose.
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is speaking of the formal object of a university.

'dise

adds that Newman does recognize the dangers of mere intellectual cultivation and that he is aware of the universi8
ty's need of the Church to maintain its integrity.
C. F.
Harrold insists that Newman is no more than following his
humanistic theory to its logical conclusiono 9 In support,
Earrold quotes Newman to the effect that
we attain to heaven by using this world well,
though it pass away; we perfect our nature, not
by undoing it, but by adding to it what is more
than nature, and by directing it towards aims
higher than its own.10
Harrold further maintains that the liberal education of
Newman's university aims not at moral improvement but at
general cultivation of the mind.

Notwithstanding this aim,

Harrold singles out Newman's point that a liberal education
left alone may promote pride and self-centeredness.
Charles Dessain calls the reader's attention to the natural
earthly purpose of Newman's university and emphasizes that
the qualities to be gained there "are not virtu.e, though
they sometimes look like it." 11 Dessain cites Newman's

8 Ibid.
p. 108.

9c . .F. Harrold, John Henry Newman (New York, 1945),

10 Quoted in Harrold, p. 108, from the Idea, 1852
edition.
11
p. 104.

c. s.

Dessain, John Henry Newman (London, 1966),

2)

words to the effect that a university education should
prepare one for this world. It is not the education of a
"convent" or a "seminary. •• 12 For F. McGrath, the Idea
advances two separate theses which Newman "skillfully
blends."l)

The first is "the necessity of including religious teaching in any scheme of studies." 1LJ. The second is
the point that "cultivation of mind, rather than immediate
preparation for professional occupations, is the primary
end of a university." 15
While Michael Tierney assumes

th~

position that the

main function of Newman's liberal knowledge is preparation
in the virtue of prudence, A. Dwight Culler takes up where
Harrold leaves off.

Culler points up the ambivalence in

Newman•s attitude toward-religious and humanistic ideals, 16
traces it to problems in Newman's adolescence and evangelical background, and resolves the conflict in a Christian
humanism he feels to be characteristic of Newman's educational ideal in its completed form. 17 Culler asserts that

12 Ibid., p. 105.
1

~cGrath, p. lJJ.

lLI-Ibid.
l5Ibid.
16Culler, p. 228.

17 Ibid,, P• 242.
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the humanistic and religious views taken together "enable
man to fulfill his own nature and then to place that nature, fully developed, at the service of God." 18 I find
Culler's assertion here inconsistent with his claim elsewhere that Newman's gentleman is not to be taken as a serious expression. 19 This is a matter that will be treated
below with the problem of the nature of Newman's gentleman.
P. A. Dale, on the other hand, assumes the more radical
position that the Idea is fundamentally a justification of
Church control of university education. 20 He dismisses
the humanistic possibilities of Newman's educaiional goals.
The criticism cited points to problems in the relationship between Newman's university in the-abstract and

his Catholic university in the concrete.

Some of it recog-

nizes his multiple treatment of the university as a place,
on the one hand, that advances humanistic goals, and on the
other, as a place that fosters Christian educational ideals.

None of it, however, appears to unite Newman's two-

fold treatment of the fundamental nature of a university in
quite satisfactory a manner.

Corcoran appears at one end

of the critical spectrum; Dale, at the other.

In between,

18 Ibid.

19Ibid., p. 2)8.
20 victorian Prose, p. 139. Dale's argument is drawn
from "Newman's The Idea of a University, The Dangers of a
University Education" (Y§, 1972).
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there are Harrold and others who draw parallel lines of
humanistic and religious development in such a way that
there is no possibility of convergence.

Culler speaks of

a Christian humanistic ideal; yet he elsewhere undermines
this position by stating that Newman's statement on the
gentleman is an ironic one. 21 There appears to be more ambivalence in the attitudes of the critics than there is in
Newman's presentation of what his educational ideal is all
about.

Noticeably lacking is a key to its unified presen-

tation.
Another problem of this study deals with the nature
and interrelation of Newman's grounds in the Idea.

This

issue, as the critical discussion of it makes evident,
bears on the fundamental nature of Newman's university.
Does Newman pursue the nature and scope of university education in the abstract on humanistic and philosophical
grounds?

Or, on the contrary, does he follow more reli-

gious and theological lines of inquiry in pursuing the
scope of Catholic university education in the concrete?
The tendency of critics has been to reject one set
of grounds.

Harrold sees Newman "surveying the subject

from various lights, advancing and retiring from it, illustrating, confirming, comparing ...... 22 He observes Newman

21 Culler, p. 2)8.
22 Harrold, p. 96.
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auuroaching
his subject from many angles, but the two main
...
~

ones he feels are the vantage points of the humanist and of
the Roman Catholic. 2 .3 ''We are reminded," Harrold notes,
"that Newman's mind and thought were shaped not only by the
humanism of Oxford but also ••• by the Christian humanism of
24
the early Fathers."
He concludes that Newman's educational ideal is valid both in the world and in the Church,
and so, Harrold seems to suggest, are his grounds.
first states that in· Discourses I - V

I~ewrnan

McGrath

pretty much

adheres to his avowed purpose of treating university education from a philosophical standpoint and that the university envisioned is "a university in its essence, and [independen-t] of its relation to the Church. , 2 5 ~vlcGrath continues:

"the whole drift of his earlier discourses makes

it abundantly clear that his 'university in its bare and
necessary idea' excludes, to use his own phrase to Ornsby,
'the assumption of Catholicism. '" 26 However, in speaking
of the apparent difference between Newman's and the Pope's
view of the nature of a university, McGrath says that it is
a matter of approach.

The Pope's concern was a Catholic

2 .3Ibid., p. 115.
24Ibid.
2
5Quoted in McGrath, p. 168, from the 1852 edition,
Preface, p. v, of the Idea.
26

McGrath, p. 172.
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university in the abstract. 27

In sum, McGrath states that

although Newman initiates the discussion on purely philosophical grounds and maintains this approach through the
fifth discourse, the remaining ones reflect a combined
philosophical and theological treatmento 28 Zlsewhere,
!iicGrath will assert that Newman's sense of balance is demonstrated not merely in his attitude toward human knowledge
but in the method of his approach to it. 2 9 Dessain too
claims that Newman "made the basis of his Discourses as
broad as possible."30
Culler acknowledges Newman's multiple treatment of
grounds and ascribes its use to Newman's need to satisfy
different segments of his audience.3 1 Even though, as
Culler points out, the discourses present a ''philosophical
definition of the idea, the inner form or principle, university education,"3 2 and although Newman employs a "rationalistic approach" to them, the grounds overall emerge

27 Ibid,, P• 279.
28 rbid., pp. 281-282.
2 9Ibid., pp. 312-313.
3°Dessain, p. 103.
31 Culler, p. 14 5.
32Ibid., P• 173·
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as "humanistic" and "religious ... J.J

This to Culler is not

surprising in view of Newman's concern that his approach
not be .. too philosophical ... 34 Culler further observes that
the total treatment is marked by a "precarious balance,"
notwithstanding the fact that the humanistic ideal is presented with some ambivalence.35
A third important issue to which this study addresses itself is the nature and interrelation of the Idea's
temporal interdisciplinary grasp of knowledge for its own
sake to a supernatural interconnected view of knowledge for
the sake of something more.

The question involves Newman's

whole educational scheme and the role of the university
within that scheme.

It again raises the question

whethe~

Newman's university is primarily of a-religious or a secular character.
grounds.

It also relates to the matter of Newman's

The issue appears fundamentally to focus on

whether the "connected view" should encompass man and this
world or whether it ought to extend beyond, as well, to God
a~d

the next.

Does the intellectual cultivation to which

this view is central center on man's temporal intellectual
aspirations, or does it look more to man's ultimate spir-

33Ibid.

I

P• 227.

34 Ibid.

I

P• 148.

35Ibid., P• 228.
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itual needs, even while it does not neglect the temporal
ones?
It is difficult to think of an element more basic
to Newman's whole educational ideal than that of "view."
If there is a phrase that sums up his idea of a university,
it is that of a "connected view."

It carries the burden of

Newman's educational thrust and the brunt of his educational labors in the Idea.

It is to this perspective that any

interpreter of the Idea sooner or later must turn.

For

Newman touches bottom when he declares that all knowledge
forms a whole and when he affirms the need of the mind to
reflect that wholeness in its grasp.
Newman's treatment of the interdisciplinary grasp
serves a dual purpose.

It defines to some extent the ex-

perience of this special type of "viewing" and establishes
it as the goal of the university-educated man.

Unfor-

tunately, what Newman's presentation fails to do is fix
the parameters of the "view."

It tells us that the idea of

a university entails an awareness of the bearing of one
science on another by which the whole of truth can be perceived.36

It tells us that the "view" envelops a knowledge

of first principles and relations rather than mere facts.37
It elaborates an enlargement of mind that surveys "many

6
3 The Idea of a University, ed. I. T. Kerr (London,
1976), p. 97
hereafter cited as Idea of a University.
37Ibid., p. 121.
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things at once and as one whole"3 8 and that grasps the
"relative disposition of things ... 39

Newman's presentation

of the "connected view" speaks to the fact that reality is
one, that knowledge abstracts segments of reality, that
this knowledge is one and should be grasped integrally according to one's capacity.

Newman's treatment does not,

however, appear to indicate sufficiently the means whereby
one can combine lesser views into a single unified vision
of reality that accounts for God and man, this world and
the next, and man's temporal and eternal concerns.

Still

this is something, as he himself points out in the Preface,
the university must do if it would educate the whole man. 40
Does the "view" look to the development of the universityeducated man as a gentleman or to his growth as an intellectually cultivated saint?

The "connected view" has an

important role to play in perfecting the human intellect
and in improving the quality of human life in this world.
Does Newman also mean it to play a significant part in
man's preparation for the next?
The nature of the "view" advocated in the Idea has
generated its fair share of controversy ranging from
Corcoran's position which renders that interdisciplinary

38
b"d
p. 122 •
. 1..1:_.,
39Ibid., p. 105.
40 Ibid.,

PP•

6-7.
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view ill-suited for God's purpose to Dale's which leaves
the interdisciplinary grasp practically unfit for man's.
v/ise, Tardi vel, Harrold, McGrath, Culler, Dessain, Svaglic,
and Clancy assume positions between these extremes.

Their

stands on the issue reflect in the main their claims for
the fundamental nature of Newman's university and his
choice of grounds.

Harrold, for example, asserts that dis-

cipline of the mind is of central importance in Newman's
liberal program. 41 He adds, however, that Newman is opposed to purely secular education because .. theology gives
a unity and coherence to all other knowledge in the light
of ultimate ends." 42 Equally important, he points out that
the intellectual culture of Newman's university develops
the gentleman, while the Church, so influential on Newman's
total educational program, is trying to create saints. 4 J
Harrold also maintains that the general cultivation of mind
and its hallmark, the "connected view", do not in themselves reflect Newman's whole ideal.

1Iartin svaglic takes

an equally moderate stand when he affirms that Newman's
purpose is "a union of intellectual curiosity and achievement with the humility and charity of the truly religious

41 Earrold, p. 92.
42
Quoted in Harrold, p. 101, from the Idea, 1852
edition.
4

Jibid.' p. 111.
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man -- a humanism, that is, in the Judaeo-Christian tradition."44

In the main, McGrath too points out that Newman

holds to the "essential unity of religious and secular
teaching." 4 5 For without religion there can be no order
among the various branches of knowledge.
the whole man cannot be educated.

Without religion

McGrath's position sug-

gests that the "view" advocated in the Idea involves no
real distinction between intellectual and moral training in
the whole education of man.

Culler sees Newman as changing

course in the middle of the Idea.

In the eighth discourse

Newman seems to refute and to downgrade the philosophical
view which previously he felt to distinguish so commendably
his cultural idea1. 46
Yet another secondary issue pertinent to this study
deals with the nature and relation of the spurious religion
of the man of philosophical habit to the true religion of
the saint.

Cast in other terms, the question involves the

relationship of Newman's Faith in an Omniscient Creator
Whose Presence bears so integrally on the relationship of
the sciences as their source and End and Whose Providence
so intimately affects the lives of the men possessing this

44The Idea of a University, ed. M. J. svaglic (New
York, 1960), p. xxii.

45McGrath, p. 277.
46 Culler, p. 227.
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knowledge to the worldly gentleman's belief in a god of
reason a..Yld senti:nent whose presence appears somehow to regulate one's ma..Q'Ylers and tastes.

On the one hand, the ques-

tion concerns an approach to religion that dictates there
is no positive or absolute truth in religion, that declares
religion to be a matter of taste and feeling, and that advacates religion as a matter of personal preference without
any kind of objective reality.

On the other side of the

issue is the claim of the creature standing humbly before
the limitless demands of his creator as he attempts to work
out his salvation in a framework that involves all of his
human activities and embraces all of his human faculties.
i/hich religious perspective does Newman foster in a university program designed for the education of the whole man?
Is it a purely philosophic habit of mind that may very well
drive a man only into himself or a combined philosophic and
religious habit of soul that can lead him to God?

This

question too is not unrelated to those previously considered, for the religious spirit Newman purposes to inculcate
affects the type of university he
the grounds he will employ,
that he advocates.
twofold.

~nd

funda~entally

proposes,

the interdisciplinary grasp

Once again, Newman's treatment appears

In the first instance, his presentation develops

the religious ideal in the sphere of nature and reason.
the second, it portrays the ideal in the domain of Faith
and Grace.

Should Newman's religious ideal as part of a

In
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total educational purpose be allied with the forces of man
and reason, or should it be associated with the forces of
God and Faith in conjunction with reason?
3efore any further discussion of the question, we
would do well at this point to clarify
and use of the term "religion."

c.

Ne~~an's

meaning

F. Harrold's words come

closest to capturing Newman's position.

Harrold states

that Newman sympathized not at all with a religion of feeling.

Newman himself points out that "religion as a mere
sentiment is to me a dream and a mockery." 4 7 True religion
for Newman reflects a total human experience.

It is, in

Harrold's words "a synthesis, or harmony, of the activities
of man." 48 It includes a "metaphysical element" in its
dogma as well as an "ethical element in its sanctions and
commands. , 4 9 Then too, there is the ''aesthetic element" of
its "graceful and emotion-stirring rites, symbols and ceremonies ... 50

It contains, moreover, a "political element in

the organization of the Church as a militant power forever
at war with the world, ,,5l

Furthermore, Harrold sees in

4 7Quoted in Harrold, p. 55, from the Apologia.
48 Harrold, p.
4 9Ibid.
50ibid.
5libid.

4?.
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Newman's concept of religion an attempt to bring into account "every human faculty to transform the religious ideal
into the real -- cultivation of the intellect, the imagination, the will, the moral sense, and the social sense ... 5 2
According to Harrold, religion was, for Newman, irresistibly "all-embracing."

His intellect admired "logically

articulated dogmas" and welcomed authority with its "rigorous bounds," not to mention Nev;man' s respect for the
"elaborate discipline," .. ascetic devotions," and "spiritual
hygiene" that reflected its two thousand years of experience.5J

Newman just as much admired, Harrold notes, "the

great Catholic mystical tradition, with its symbolism, its
sacraments, its ritual, its miracles [and] its realistic
recognition of the reality of the supersensible world ... 5 4
The problem of the two religious views found in the
Idea has been investigated by various commentators.

They

recognize the distinction between the religion of Faith
and the religion of reason as fundamental, and they make
the distinction in general terms.

But their overall crit-

ical reaction to the problem leaves some serious difficulties unresolved.

The most obvious one is that they have

5 2Ibid.
5Jibid., p. 48.
5 4 Ibid.
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not yet found a means of reconciling two dramatically opposed religious views in one educational scheme.

There is

need of some means, perhaps a suitable philosophical apparatus, to effect the reconciliation.

In a question that

mirrors the conflict between humanistic and religious elements treated earlier, critics respond much the same as
they did on the nature of Newman's university, the problem
of his grounds, and the question of his view.
Corcoran's position leaves little room for dealing
with' the problem at all.

Although Wise sees in Newman's

treatment a recognition of the need of the Church to maintain the integrity of the university, he does not elaborate
precisely wherein that unity lies.

Harrold draws a sharp

line between the faith and the religion of the man of philosophic habit and the Faith and genuine religion of the
saint.

Harrold sees in the former the intellectual count-

erfeit of the latter.55

But he observes primarily in Hew-

man's presentation two parallel lines of development, one
of which is characterized by a false religion of sentiment;
the other, by a true

reli~ion

of a sound Christian spirit.

One marks the worldly gentleman; the other characterizes
the saint.5 6
Culler's position on the matter is not much differ-

55Harrold, p. 112.
~
~

6

.

Ib~d.,

p. 11 1.
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ent.

He affirms the ambivalence in Newman's thought re-

garding the two religious views.

The religion of philo-

sophy, Culler feels, places man in relation to man.

The

religion of the saint places man in relation to God.57
But Culler sets strict limits for Newman's university.
The university, he observes, can teach faith and morals as
subjects, but it cannot teach one "to believe the dogmas
of faith or to practice the precepts of morals ...... 5 8 Although Culler concedes that the university can be used by
the Church for its higher purposes, he thinks Newman does
not so use it.

Culler does not assert that the faith and

morals of a student are to be neglected in Newman's university, for the Church, Culler points out, "would be present
there to care for these things just as a doctor might be
present to care for a student's health."59

But this stance

runs counter to the nature of a close alliance between intellectual culture and spiritual perfection as part of the
total education of the university student.

In the matter

of a truly unified intellectual and spiritual educational
program, the faith and morals of a student would not be
merely not neglected; they would be positively fostered
and advanced.

57 Culler, p. 232.
5Bibid., p. 261.
59Ibid.
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According to IvlcGrath, on the other hand,

l~ewm~'1.

's

treatment appears
to state firstly that any university must
inculcate religious expression and leaven
all instruction with religion, and then to
state that in a Catholic university such
religion would be de facto the Catholic
religion.60
McGrath goes on to say that in a sermon given shortly after
the opening of the university church Newman took as his major theme the refutation of the assumption "that, to be religious, you must be ignorant, and to be intellectual, you
must be unbelieving." 61 Elsewhere in the same sermon, Newman described the interrelation of religious and secular
knowledge.

11:cGrath employs Newman • s words from another

source to show that, in Newman's judgment, the

~niversity

church symbolized "the great principle of the university,
the indissoluble union of philosophy with religion ... 62
A fifth issue, one of the most important for this
study, is the nature of Newman's gentleman.
bodiment of Newman's educational ideal?
of more

th~'1.

one type of gentleman?

Is he the em-

Does Newman speak

Should he primarily be

interpreted as a worldly or a Christian model?

How ser-

60McGrath, p. 170.
61 Quoted in NicGrath, p. 41 J, from Sermons on Various
Occasions.
62

Quoted in McGrath, p. 40J, from the Campaign.

39

iously ought Newman's treatment of him to be taken?

That

the gentleman is the end product of Newman's university education most critics appear to agree.

That the gentleman

represents some kind of educational ideal critics also generally grant.

There is little critical agreement, however,

on whether the gentleman's fundamental nature is Christian
or worldly, much less on how seriously Newman's view of him
ought to be considered.
Dessain sees Newman's gentleman as "the ideal product of a university, prescinding altogether from religion."63

Harrold also views him as an ideal and as the

product of university training:
the final product of intellectual cultivation
at a university considered apart from religious
principle, at once assisting and di$torting the
development of religious character.64
Culler too perceives the gentleman as an idealized type.
That the gentleman is some type of educational ideal appears not to be at issue.

The seriousness of Newman's

statement on him, however, is another matter.

Although

Harrold, Vargish, Griffin, and others assume the position
that Newman is quite serious, Culler, Buckler, McGrath, and
others advance an ironic or derogatory interpretation which
appears to be the more current and popular one.

6 Jnessain, p. 104.

64Harrold, p. 11J.

John R.
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Griffin attacks the latter stand.

He appears most obvious-

ly to be addressing himself to Buckler's kind of remark
that "the 'gentleman', which is education's best end product, is a figure with which no man of truly imaginative
vision would allow himself willingly to be identified." 65
Griffin cites Newman's remark at the end of Discourse V
that "Liberal Education makes not the Christian, not the
Catholic, but the gentleman."
Culler's interpretation of the gentleman also invites special consideration, especially in view of the
position on Newman's gentleman this study will adv-ance.
According to Culler, Newman did not know what to call his
gentleman, and, for want of a better term, he chose to name
the one who possesses intellectual cultivation the "man of
philosophic habit. " 66 For Culler, in addition to being a."l
"idealized type," he is one who reflects an "unattainable
ideal" and one whose value is largely "inspirational." 6 7
He is, moreover, "the living embodiment of Newman's conception of knowledge." 68

His responsibility is to seek the

perfection of the intellect:

"a clear calm accurate vision

6 5victorian Prose, p. 139.

66 Culler, p. 190.
67 rbid., p. 189.

68 l£11., p. 190.
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and comprehension of all things, as far as the finite mind
can embrace them." 6 9 Equally important is his intellectual
duty to be neither too narrow in his range of studies nor
superficial in his mastery of them.

Culler adds that if

there is one thing that characterizes the "man of philosophie habit" more than anything else, it is his ability to
view many things "at once as one whole."

However, Culler

voices his impatience with this ideal because Newman couches its qualifications in "contrasting pairs" and in "negative form."70

Even more reason for impatience, Culler

feels, is the fact that the "man of philosophic habit'' emerges from Newman's portrait "not so much a creature of
impossible virtues as a creature from whom an impossible
number of vices have been subtracted ... 7 1

He asserts that

Newman in his efforts to preserve the wholeness of man
makes the product of university education the most inefficient of all human types, the "jack-of-all-trades ... 7 2
nally, in speaking directly of

Newma~'s

Fi-

celebrated defini-

tion, Culler states that "it is ironic that this portrait
should be taken as a serious expression of Newman's posi-

6 9Quoted in Culler, p. 191, from the ~, p. 1)9.
7°culler, p. 191.
71Ibid.

72~ •• p. 19).
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i tive ideal. ,.73
In the light of his position that the humanistic
view and the religious view in combination enable man to
fulfill his nature and to present that nature fully developed in the service of God, I find Culler's ironical treatment of the gentleman inconsistent.

Culler identifies the

gentleman with the .. man of philosophic habit."

He consti-

tutes one-half of what Culler calls Newman's positive ideal.

If the gentleman represents half of Newman•s Christian

humanistic ideal, why should he not be taken seriously? .
If, moreover, the portrait of the gentleman contains Newman's finest comment on the religion of philosophy, areligious view most characteristic of the gentleman and most
typical of a more humanistic approach, why would Newman
wish this commentary to be viewed ironically?

Harrold and

other critics stress Newman•s point that intellectual cultivation and a religion of philosophy are not enough because they do not add up to Newman's concept of a whole education.

To treat Newman's worldly gentleman ironically is

to undermine a constitutive element of the total ideal.
Such an approach leaves only the Christian part, important
as that may be.
There remain two other questions of significance for
this study.

The first deals with a wholeness of theme in

73Ibid., p. 2)8.

4J

relation to a wholeness of structure.

':'he second concerns

the cause an.d Entity of .'Ie\'Jrllan' s idea of a university.
I·:arrold, Culler,
sed.

~! ewm~"l'

~.:cGrath,

3vaglic, and others have discus-

s theme of the wholeness of Jr.nowledge and the

inte5rated view by which this knowledge must be held.
Culler and Svaglic have provided excellent analyses of the
structure of the Idea.

No one, however, has explained the

relation of theme to structure in such a way as to show how
adequately the structure of the discourses conveys the interrelationship of the various branches of knowledge.

If

the governing principle of the Idea is one that declares
all knowledge to be whole and that proclaims the need of
tr.e mind to reflect that wholeness and if the structure of
the discourses helps to bear the burden of this theme, then
it appears appropriate for the unity of structure to be investi5ated in relation to the wholeness of theme.
structure of

the~

The

has its most notable characteristic,

wholeness, only according to its reference to

the~e.

The

theme of the Idea is a whole of the sort that has two components:

a wholeness of subject and a wholeness of view.

Correspondingly, the structure of the Idea is another whole
that has two parts:

one dealing with the relationship of

subject to subject; the other, with the mind's interrelating of these subjects by appropriate discourses.
gain, it should be noted that the structure of

Once a-

the~

appears whole only in relation to the wholeness of theme
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fiewman adva..11.ces.
The final question pertinent to the scope of this
study is the cause and Entity of Newman's idea of a university.

The problem relates to those previously discussed,

especially the one dealing with the fundamental nature of
Newman's university because it asks what makes the idea of
a university to be what it is, and why it is what it is.

I

introduce the question not merely to clarify Newman's educational theme but also to provide a philosophical explanation of that which gives the idea its Being, the "connected view."

At its core, the question is a philosophical

one and must be given a philosophical answer.

We have al-

ready seen that Newman advocates a liberal education that
pursues knowledge for its own sake and that ultimately produces a "habit of mind," the chief attribute of which is a
"connected view" of o.ld and new, past and present, far and
near.

This view perceives many things "at once and as one

whole." ·It grasps not only reality and the branches of
knowledge that mirror reality but their relations.

It en-

tails a comprehensive perspective or philosophical knowledge that grasps the relationship of all sciences on a
natural philosophical level by a man of cultivated intellect who has a predisposition to virtue, though he may more
likely be spiritually deficient.

It is on the foundation

of this rationally connected hold of reality and of all
intellectual disciplines, albeit one subject to spiritual
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degeneration and moral stagnation, that Newman lays a hopeinducing superstructure of Christ's message and promise
which assures that man's real destiny is-a God-given immortality.

The view of the superstructure embraces a compre-

hensive perspective of the sciences and of reality by a man
of intellectual cultivation whose ultimate purpose is to
become a saint with the moral and intellectual attributes
of a Philip Neri.

In contrast to the secular and mundane

goals of the man of philosophical habit, it looks to transcendent and supernatural ones which serve to satisfy both
the basic religious and intellectual aspirations of the university educated student.

This study's treatment of the

cause and Entity of Newman's Idea will limit itself to the
philosophical aspect of Newman's whole educational structure.
Not a few literary critics and scholars treat some
aspect of Newman's philosophical approach, and some of the
major influences thereupon, in the Idea and in his various
other works.

Speaking of Newman's Grammar of Assent, J. F.

Cronin states that in all major issues Newman's position
can be reconciled with the philosophy of Aristotle.7 4
Harrold deals provocatively with Newman's debt to Aristo-

74J. F. Cronin, Cardinal Newmanr His Theory of
Knowledge (Washington, D. C., 1935), p. xiv.

tle. 7 5

Culler _points to :,;evr.nan 's use of Aristotle's

science of Sciences, and to f\:ewman' s concern with 't!le problem of the One and the

:~la..."1.y.

¥.. ,,/eatherby addresses his

.
. :l 1.~sm. 76
ef f or•. . s, ~n
par t , t o Newman • s ~rea

~.

probes l'iev;man 's epistemolosic~l framework. 77
l;.cC.:ra~h

varc;ish
.Ferc;al

accounts for ;Xevro1an' s use of some I'homistic prin-

ciples.

?:dwar'i Sill em provides a clear introduction to

~'{evrmar:.'

s philosophy in the first part of his two-volume
p

'. t.~on. 7._;
ecu.

Charles .Jessain offers a comprehensive view

of introductory studies to

I~ewma.."1.' s

philosophy i.n his

guide to r;ewma.Ylian philosophical research. 79
:·rotwi thstanding. the variety and quality "of scholarship and criticism relating to

the~.

I do not believe

that ahyon·e has attempted to, explain newman's idea of a
university in reference to the cause and principle of its
3eing.

I~o

one, so far as I can determine, has tried to

analyze what makes the Idea to be what it.is and why it is.

~

75 H~ro1d,

I

7 6...~. 'r:, ea th.. er by, Car d ~na
· 1 ,,.
· ·- ·
·
~\ ewman ~n .tJ.~ s A~e:

·~.

.

pp. 14, 104,

1))~1)4.

'· ~· s
...
?lace in English Theoloiiy al"ld l.i terature C'iashv~lle, 197 3),

77 T. Vargish, Newman: The ontemulation of iv:ind
(New York, 1970). Varg~sh a so traces the argument on
"Severance" from corcoran.

78 sae The Philosonhical Notebook of John
Nev.rrnan, ed. E.

S~

em, 2 vo

7 0;Seen. ' 7, above.

Louva~n,

19 9;,
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In view of the largely philosophical nature of Newman's total educational ideal and treatment, e.g., philosophical
grounds, philosophical habit of mind, philosophical wisdom,
relieion of philosophy, and man of philosophical habit,
such an omission appears a serious one.
In a discussion of the view advocated by the Idea,
the question arises whether it should be labeled "a connected view" or "the connected view.''

The former would be

one which se§s truth and the relation of the sciences only
gradually and in partial steps.

The latter would pertain

more to the one and only absolutely true view of knowledge
and the sciences.

Ideally, there is probably "the connec-

ted view" or the whole integrated grasp of knowledge and

~·
1

truth toward which the mind should move.

~.··

would be truth in all its fullness -- perhaps the Beatific

'f

Here the object

;
~

!.

vision of God -- according to one's human capabilities.

E

3ut even this grasp would be limited and finite because it

~

is grasped humanly, in contrast to the one and only true

~·.

and complete "connected view" of reality found in the mind

~

~·

I

of God.

I'

Practically, however, the view advocated by Newman

as the goal of a university education is a more or less
perfect grasp of the relation of one science to another, of
one segment of reality to another, as the sciences and the

)\,

!

reality they reflect mirror the Ultimate Truth t/ho is their
Source and End.

The perception of truth would be gradual

and limited according to the individual's capacity to
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understand.

It would be, however, no mere matter of intel-

lectual cultivation that centers on man but a blend of intellectual and moral cultivation that leads ultimately to
God.
This brings us to the point of the importance of
Aristotle, especially his doctrine of equivocity by reference and some of his notions on cause and Entity, for this
study.

Why use Aristotle in an interpretive study of New-

man's Idea?

Can some of Aristotle's doctrines be employed

to explain the integrity of Newman's educational ideal and
the unity of his treatment?

Is some Aristotelian approach

fitting in the light of Newman's educational background and
interests, and is it suitable in view of Newman's material
and formal presentation in the Idea?
Newman himself observes in Discourse V that "while
we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians, for the great Master does but analyze the
thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of.humankind." 80
Elsewhere he states that Aristotle was "the most comprehensive intellect of Antiquity" and that it was he who
"conceived the sublime idea of mapping the whole field of
knowledge and subjecting all things to one profound analy~

80 rdea of a University, ·p. 102. A few lines later,
Newman adds: ''In many subject-matters, to think correctly,
is to think like Aristotle."
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sis." 81

Then, too, there is the fact that Newman's thought

was no doubt affected by the dominant influence Aristotle
wielded on the Oxford curriculum till the mid-nineteenth
century.

Furthermore, the liberal or philosophical know-

ledge, which Newman advances as the end of a university,
exists for its own sake, and it resembles to some extent
the wisdom treated by Aristotle in the first book of the
Metaphysics.

Newman even uses terms like "Philosophy" and

"First Philosophy" to describe it.

Analogues of Newman's

premise that philosophical knowledge consists in an awareness of the bearing of one science on another by which the
"whole" can be perceived can be found in Coleridge, Gibbon,
Bacon, and others, but, ultimately, Newman's approach is an
adaptation of Aristotelian doctrines set forth in the Metaphysics.82

It should be noted, however, that while the

associations drawn have merit, they must be viewed cautiously.

Although Newman's philosophical knowledge does

envelop a variety of features similar to those found in
Aristotelian wisdom, certain key characteristics can be
claimed for it as a whole which distinguish it from the
wisdom of Aristotle rather than identify it with that wisdom.

Newman's liberal knowledge, for example, at its most

81 Quoted in Culler, p. 187 from the Historical
Sketches, pp. 111, 195.

azsvag1.

~c,

p. xv.
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Aristotelian is distinct from the wisdom of Aristotle because Newman's consists in an interdisciplinary grasp of
the bearing of one branch of knowledge on the other.
is a matter proper to the Physics.

This

It is not a study of

3eing gua Being which belongs to the Metaphysics.

Even so,

one still may claim that Newman's philosophical knowledge
is wisdom in a secondary sense, if he uses "wisdom" as a
term that is equivocal by reference, a consideration that
leads us into the major justification of the interpretive
scheme to be employed.
For the main reason for using Aristotle in this
study centers on the manner in which Aristotle's doctrine
of equivocity by reference can be used to clarify the unity
of Newman's educational ideal and the way it can be employed to render more intelligible Newman's handling of
various issues.

Specifically, the doctrine serves to clar-

ify NeviiJlan's treatment of a Catholic university and a university in the abstract, theological and philosophical
grounds, temporal and eternal "connected views," theme in
relation to structure, and worldly man of philosophical
habit in reference to the Christian gentleman.

Aristotle's

doctrine also provides the means to help explain the cause
and Entity of Newman's idea of a university -- its ultimate
"why."

Furthermore, Newman's search for unity among a mul-

tiplicity of educational elements and his multiple treatment of the university issue, grounds, theme and gentleman,
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in the scope of their concern for unity in difference, lend
themselves to comparison with that fundamental Greek problem of the One and the :,:any.

.Because Aristotle's doctrine

of equivocity by reference proves helpful in solvin5 some
problems of sameness in difference in Nevnnan 's material and
formal presentation in the Idea, just as it proved helpful
in ,rovidinG a coherent solution to that central problem
facinG the early Greek philosophers, Aristotle's doctrine
appears warranted as a schematic device.

Any critical ap-

paratus that would help insure the unity of r-.rewman • s educational ideal and the integrity of the elements that elaborate this ideal merits our consideration.

Aristotle's

doctrine of equivocity by reference, as interpreted by
. a device that can be presented in such a
Joseph Owens, 83 1s
way that it shores up the unity of

Newm~'1.

's educational

doctrine and the integrity of his treatment found in the
Idea.
'Nhile it is true that the reader may not arrive at
the final truth of the Idea's unity by such a means, at
least he will be given the benefit of a plausible solution
to the problems of unity relating to Ne·wrnan 's educational
thought, and he will be provided a substantive interpretation of the formal elements whereby Newman presents his
university view.

text.

The use of an Aristotelian scheme is' also

e3see n. 6, above, for the comolete citation of
Eereafter, this text will be cited as Owens.
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supported by our recalling once a:;ain :,:evr;Tian 1 s tendency
tnroughout his life to seek a principle of unity
hos~

~~ong

a

of intellectual, educational, and spiritual concerns.

In the Idea's discussion of the oneness of reality, the
wholeness of knowledge, the
and reality,

~~d

compreh~nsive

view of knowledge

the composite intellectual and spiritual

make-up of the ideal product of the university, that lifetime concern is adequately reflected.

Given i'Jewman 's ad-

miration for Aristotle and Aristotle 1 s influence on
m~~·s

i~ew-

educational development, one sees in the Aristotelian

approach a sui table means of pursuing one avenue of :·Iewm~~·s

lifetime search.
Thiq interpretation of the Idea is determined by

three considerations, if some Aristotelian method is to
followed.

be

'J:lhe first is that we distinGuish clearly the

purpose of our interpretation from ?'Iewman 's formal intent
in the Idea.

To say that his university issue, grounds,

theme, structure, and gentleman

ca~

be interpreted after

the manner of Aristotelian equivocity by reference is not
to say that Newman meant to speak in Aristotelian equivocal
terms or that he intended these issues to be so treated.
Rather, I mean to say that here is a means whereby the
reader may better understand the unity of

~Jewma..'1. • s

educa-

tional ideal and the integrity of its treatment in 'the
~·

.zut a v1ord of caution is in order.

'l'here is an

ordinary, common-sense understanding of the vvord "equi vo-
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cal" that is antithetical to the Aristotelian use of the
term employed in this study,
ed.

The two uses must be separat-

Aristotelian equivocity by reference does not, accord-

ing to Owens' interpretation, suggest a use of terms that
_;_ ;'; .intentionally vague. misleading, or ambiguous,

It does

not suggest a use of terms to deceive, dodge, or hedge.
On the contrary, as a later section of this chapter will
point out in some detail, 84 Aristotelian equivocity by reference refers to things expressed in various ways but always in reference to one nature or form that is the primary
form or nature of the thing.

Equivocity by reference in-

volves primary and secondary instances of terms and the
things they signify.

But only the nature or form of one

of the things said to be equivocal is primary,

'Any second-

ary instance derives its ultimate meaning from that primary nature or form.

r1·:y Aristotelian use of the term

"equivocal" purposes to establish a priority of issues in
the Idea.

A more current use of the term would more likely

provide for a misleading or ambiguous statement regarding
their true nature and relationship.

So, too, when I claim

that some key Aristotelian notions on cause and Entity can
be used as part of an interpretive scheme to explain the
cause and Entity of .Nevvman' s idea of a university, I do

84
See pp. 57-65, below, for an extended discussion
of Aristotelian equivocity by reference.
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not assert that these Aristotelian ideas were operative in
Newman's conception of the university ideal reflected in
the lectures.

Whether Newman consciously adverted to Aris-

totle for any of the principles, in terms of which the Idea
will be dealt with in this study, is another matter.
A second consideration influencing this treatment of
the Idea is the need the Aristotelian scheme satisfies, a
matter touched on earlier in the chapter.

Although critics

recognize Newman's search for a unified educational ideal
and even while they acknowledge to some extent his manifold
treatment of university issue, grounds and the like in the
Idea, they do not provide a satisfactory means of unifying
the ideal and elements of Newman's presentation.

Culler

appears to come the closest, but even he does not go far
enough.

For Culler points out that the central intellectu-

al problem of Newman's formative years was the problem of
the one and the many.B5

He adds that all of the basic

problems found in the man of philosophical habit are forms
of this root issue and stem from Newman's conception of
knowledge. 86 In short, Culler sees Newman's problem as one
dealing with the way in which the mind can reconcile the
unity its nature so badly

B5culler, p. 204.

e6Ibid.

need~

with the multiplicity of
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the external world.

Culler reduces Newman's problem of

educational unity, with its implications for an educational
ideal, to a philosophical problem.

But philosophical prob-

lems require philosophical solutions.

If the basic prob-

lem of educational unity for Newman is seen by Culler in
the light of the one and the many issue, then Culler's solution to

Nev~an's

problem should take into account a

scheme that also addresses itself to that fundamental question raised by early Greek thinkers.
What is needed is an interpretation that goes a
step beyond Culler.

What is needed is one that shows the

central problem of unity in Newman's educational ideal,
i.e., how all knowledge interrelates and the need of the
mind to show that interrelation, to have its correlative
in Newman's manifold treatment of the elements that elaborate the oneness of knowledge and view in the Idea.

What

is needed is an interpretive mechanism, such as Aristotel-

ian equivocity by reference, that not only clarifies Newman's cardinal principle of the wnoleness of knowledge and
the need of the mind to reflect that wholeness in its view,
that not only serves to reconcile Newman's multiple approach to the issues of the nature of a university, the
grounds of the study, the nature of a "connected view," and
his idea of a gentleman, but one that also clarifies, unifies, and reconciles these issues in terms of a specific
doctrine geared to answer the problem of sameness in dif-
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ference.
A third consideration affecting this a.Ylalysis of the
Idea is that the interpretive scheme be harmonious with
those elements to which it is applied.

In order to give

the reader a general sense of the critical mechanism involved and some estimate of its applicability, I will offer an
explanation of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, as
interpreted by Owens, and I will cite three ways the doctrine will be applied in this study.

The overview of

Aristotle's doctrine will be drawn from joseph Owens' solid, scholarly interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics. 8 7
Apart from its other notable qualities, Owens' work provides an appropriate Artstotelian critical apparatus suited to the purpose of this study.

In its elaboration of

Aristotle's doctrine of equivocity by reference, it supplies a plausible means to explain Newman's manifold treatment of elements in the Idea.

It also furnishes background

on Aristotelian notions dealing with the principles involved in sensible change and the .Being of sensible realities.
~hat

Cwens' thesis does, in short, is afford the critical

reader that Aristotelian unifying device necessary to
"form" a helpful, more philosophically "connected view" ot
·what makes Newman's idea to be what it is, even while it

8 7rt is mandatory to indicate which of Aristotle's
interpreters will be used, inasmuch as their analyses of
Aristotelian theory oftentimes differ so markedly.
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provides him with the no less important means of unifying
~ewman's

multiple treatment of university issue, grounds,

theme, and gentleman in a manner and to an extent not previously attempted.

In this study, equivocity by reference

will be applied in three ways:
ment of the following issues:

first, to Newman's treata Catholic university and

a university in the abstract, theological and philosophical
grounds, temporal and eternal "connected views," theme in
relation to structure, and worldly man of philosophical
habit in reference to a Christian gentleman; second, to the
"connected view" as a cause or principle of change; and
third, to the "connected view" as that which gives Entity
to Newman's idea of a university.

But first an explanation

of Aristotelian equivocity is in order.
According to Owens, to understand Aristotle's philosophy, especially his Metaphysics, one must understand his
doctrine of equivocity.

If he does not, the reader may

very well find himself hopelessly lost in a maze of confusion and ambiguities as he attempts to understand the Aristotelian text.

But understanding Aristotle's use of equiv-

ocals also presents some problems.

Part of the difficulty
lies in the equivocal nature of equivocity. 88 Aristotle's
use of the term is manifold.

so many of the things he

studies and the terms he employs are equivocal o

88 Owens, p. 121.

"Being'',
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"cause," "wisdom," a::1d "form" provide a few exam-

"~ntity,"

ples.

I~

his profound concern with the study of sensible

thin;:;s, .1.ristotle loo1?;:s at

thin~s

with the S2Jne name to de-

ternine v1hether they are lexpressed uni vocally or equi vccal~9
ly, ·~,

.rre studies them to ascertain how they are the same
.
90 I:e finds that thine;s are in some
in form yet dJ.fferent.
ways the sar:1e and in other ways different.9 1

Always his

focus is on things known directly and in themselves,9 2
Aristotle looks for a universal form within sensible
things.

Ee wants to

J~now

how a "many" ca.YJ. be a "one."

.r. e

finds the answer in the form or definition of the thing on
a :')hysical level and in the Entity or 3ein6 of the thing on
a metaphysical plane.

.

Eis doctrine Qf equivocity is the

zeneral means of Aristotle's physical and metaphysical solution to the problem of how a "ma.YJ.y" ca.'1 be a

~·one,

.. and

its most important element is form.

The Aristotelian doctrine of equivocity concerns
"thi::1;s said -- or •neant in many ways. ,.93

The doctrine em-

braces terms, concepts, and definitions and the things

go

/Ibid,, p. 126.

90~,
.d
.,!.OJ.,,,

p. 127 •

91-.!.bJ.a.,
..

P• 130 •

"' Ib""

pp. 129, 132.

02

~··

O'i

•

"'""Ibl.d,, p. 118.
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defined.

It should be noted, however, that although words

and concepts can be said to be used equivocally, it is
.
th a t are pr1mar1
.
. 1 y equ1voca
.
1 • 94 Th a t 1s
tl e • s
. Ar1sto
.
th1ngs
primary concern -- the equivocal nature of things.

second-

arily, he is interested in the equivocity of words and concepts.

Once again, Aristotle's procedure, according to

Owens, involves looking at things denominated by the same
name to determine whether the things are expressed univocally or equivocally.95

If they are expressed equivocally,

Aristotle assigns reasons for the equivocity.

He studies

and cites various ways the things are equivocally stated.
He does not restrict terms to one exact meaning.

Rather,

he employs them univocally or equivocally as the terms and
the things being treated demand. 96 Aristotle's central interest in the matter may be summed up as a search for sameness in difference.
Understanding Aristotle's doctrine of equivocity imposes two obligations on the reader.

One is to determine

what is the primary and fundamental meaning of the term, or
more precisely, the primary and fundamental nature of the
thing signified by the term.

94 Ibid., p. lJO.
95Ibid., p. 126.
96 Ibid.

The second is to locate sec-
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o~dary

instances of the term or of the thing signified

~~d

to assign some proportional relation of the secondary instance to the primary one.

Eaving done this, the reader

will be well on his way to understanding the fundamental
meaning of the term and the primary nature of the thing
signified, as Aristotle explains it.
Owens further points out that, in the Categories,
Aristotle mentions univocals, equivocals and paronyms when
he speaks ~f the three classes of things.97

Univocals are

things that have a common name and definition.

"Animal,"
for ex~~ple, is defined the sa~e both in man and ox.9 8
Equivocals, on the other hand, are things that have a common name but different definitions.

In Cwens' words, "the

things are equivocal, the name is identical,

~~d

the defi-

nitions (as denoted by the na~e) are different."99

Paro-

nyms are the third class of things described by Aristotle.
Paronyms differ on the basis of what Owens calls grammatical distinctions.

For example, grammarians are named from

"grammar," the brave from "bravery," senator from "senate, ..
and so on. 100

Today, univocals, equivocals,and paronyms,

97 rbid., p. 111.
98 rbid.
99 rbid., p. 112.
100Tb"d
=--.!_·, p. 111.
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or their literal equivalents, designate terms for the most
?art.

For Aristotle, however, they were defined as
things. 101 All three classes of things merit consideration, but in view of the scope of this study, equivocals,

especially equivocals by reference, warrant our closest
attention.
In Owens' view, Aristotle speaks of three types of
equivocal:

equivocals by chance, equivocals by analogy,
and equivocals by reference. 102 Equivocals are "things expressed in various ways." 10 3 Things are equivocal whose
definitions differ but whose names are the same. 104

There

are, however, degrees of difference in the definitions.
The degree of difference involved in the definition determines what type of equivocity is involved.

The difference

is total in the case of equivocals b;y chance, the first
type of equivocal Aristotle treats. 10 5 Equivocals by
chance have a common name but totally different defini-

101 rbid., p. 112. The definition of univocals, equivocals, and paronyms as things would not prevent Aristotle from saying, for example, that a word is used "equivocally." It is just that Aristotle's approach appears
consistently to be on the side of things.
102 Ibid.,

P• 118o

lOJibid., p. 115.
104Ibid., p.
121.
l05Ibid.
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tions.

"Jate" meaning the fruit of a tree and "date" sig-

nifying a day of the month serve to illustrate this
type. 106 The only thing in common is the name, and that
is attributed by mere chance.

In equivocals by analogy,

another type Aristotle proposes, the difference in definition may not exclude a certain unity.
totle's definition:

Owens cites Aris-

"By the analogies I mean when the

second is related to the first as the fourth is related to
the third ... l07

Owens notes, moreover, that analogy is the

principle of metaphor:

"As the stone is to 3isyphus, so
is the shameless man to his victim. •• 108 He concludes that,
for Aristotle, "the analogous is also found naturally located in the things themselves." 10 9
Squivocals by reference are the third type Aristotle

discusses.

Here again the difference in definition does

not exclude a certain unity.

This time it is by reference.

Once again, in one sense, the definitions are the same:
in another sense, they are different.

In this type of e-

quivocity, things are expressed in various ways but always
in reference to something one or in reference to one nature

106 rbid., p. 110.
l07Ibid., p. 123.
108 rbid.
109 Ibid.

6J
or form that is the primary form or nature of the thing. 110
Differences are overshadowed by some degree of sameness -of unity, but the differences are still present, and the
true nature of the term or of the thing it signifies is to
be found only in the primary instance. 111 Equivocity by
reference, then, involves primary and secondary instances
of terms and the things they signify.

The primary or fun-

damental instance of the true nature of the things is signified by the primary instance of the term.

Corresponding-

ly, a secondary instance of the true form or nature is signaled by a secondary use of the term.

Furthermore, every

secondary instance of the term and that signified has a
special independent relation to the primary term and
..
112
th ~ng.
Three dominant conclusions emerge from Owens' treatment of Aristotle's equivocity by reference.

One is that,

for Aristotle, terms equivocal by reference reflect the
equivocity found in things.

A second is that equivocity by

reference involves two terms, in contrast to at least four
found in equivocity by analogy.

One term and thing are

primary in importance because it is only in reference to
that term and thing that proportional secondary instances
have their meaning.

But only the nature or form of one of

111 Ibid., P• 119.
112 Ibid., p. 125.
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the two things said to be equivocal is primary.

In refer-

ence to that, the secondary instance derives its form.

The

final deals with the need on the part of the reader to recognize the two terms involved and to locate primary and
secondary instances of the true meaning of the terms and
the funda'1lental nature or form of the things these equivocal terms signify.
Owens cites various examples of this type offered by
Aristotle in the

~~:etaptysics.

For exa'1lple, a medical trea-

tise and a medical knife are called "medical" through reference to something one, medical science. 11 3 The tr~atise
"proceeds from medical science;" the knife is "useful to
it. •· 114 The form or nature of "medical," here, iq located
in the primary instance, "medical science," not in the secondary instances of the treatise or the knife, even though
they do have their own forms.

Each of the secondary in-

stances has a special independent relationship to medical
science.

Owens points out in Aristotle's words that vari-

ous things are "medical by reference to medical science -for one thing is called medical because it possesses medical science, another through being naturally adapted to it,
and another through being a function of medical sci-

tt)Ibid., p. 119.
114Ibid.

ence."

11~

~

In a second example drawn from the Metaphysics,

owens speaks of things said to be healthy, e.g., healthy
color, healthy exercise and so forth.

Aristotle explains

these instances by stating that "everything healthy is expressed in reference to health, one thing through preserving health, another through producing health, another
through being a sign of health •••• " 116 Accordingly, the
nature expressed in the instance of healthy color, healthy
food, and healthy exercise would be found only in the "disposition of the bodily organism."ll7 ,The other instances
have their own proper forms or different natures, but they
also have a unity of reference to the nature of the primary
instance, that is, in Owens• words, they "are of such anature as to have some reference to health ...... 118
But what has Aristotle's doctine of equivocity by
reference to do with the scope of this study?

How specifi-

cally does it apply to Newman"s multiple treatment?

In an

earlier discussion of certain basic problems raised by the

ll5Quoted in Owens, p. 119, from Book IV of the
Metaphysics.
116
Quoted in Owens, p. 119, from Book IV of the
Metaphysics.
117 owens, p. 119.
118 Ibid.
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Idea 11 9 and in our review of some critical literature 120
pertinent to these problems, we saw that Newman treats various elements comprising his formal and material presentation with more than one voice.

We saw that Newman's dual

presentation pointed, for example, to a relationship between Catholic university and university in the abstract
that was not simple but reflected the complexity of sameness and difference found in Newman's exposition of philosophical and theological grounds, natural and supernatural
"connected views," religion of reason and religion of
Faith, theme and structure, worldly gentleman and Christian
gentleman.

We also saw a complexity of sameness and dif-

ference in Newman's treatment of these elements as issues.
Which are the most important, and which one is Newman's
primary question?

At the time, I asked how Newman's multi-

ple treatment of these issues could be unified in some
measure.

How can the questions of Newman's university is-

sue, grounds, theme, gentleman and the like be said to be
the same yet different as issues?

I

also inquired just how

Newman may be said to speak variously of grounds, theme,
religion and gentleman, and yet be said to speak of
grounds, theme, structure and gentleman with some degree of
sameness or measure of unity.

119 See p. 15
- , above.

120 See p. 10_. ' above.

The question was, and it re-
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mains, whether Newman's manifold treatment of elements can
be made one.

Aristotle's doctrine of equivocity by refer-

ence, as interpreted by Owens, appears ready to supply a
solution worthy of our consideration.
Judged in the light of Aristotelian equivocity, "issue" is the first term that should be treated as an equivocal by reference.

All of the issues treated earlier as

part of the scope of this study suggest a certain unity by
reference to each other:

Catholic University to secular u-

niversity, theological to philosophical grounds, Christian
.gentleman to the worldly man of philosophic habit, and so
forth.

But these issues also suggest a proportional refer-

ence of secondary issues to the primary one.

In the Aris-

totelian context proposed, Newman may be said to express
the issues of the Idea in various ways but always in reference to something one, that is, in reference to one issue
that is primary or fundamental.

Although the differences

in the definitions of the issues are restricted by some degree of sameness, i.e., that they are all issues relating
to the primary one in some way, still the differences are
evident, and the true nature of the term "issue" is to be
found only in the primary instance.

In this interpreta-

tion, the nature of a Catholic University is the primary
issue of the Idea.

The nature of a university in the ab-

stract, grounds, theme, religion and gentleman are issues
only in reference to that primary one.

Each one of these

secondary issues has a special independent relation to the
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~rimarY

one.

3ach

tirr:ate for!': and
l i:.::2..

de~ends

:neanir;,~

on the 9rimary issue for its ul-

as an issue in the context of the

.,2;.1t the nature expressed in the instances of secular

university, srounds, theme, relision, and 6entleman as is*

sues is to be found primarily in the question.of what is
the nature of a 8atholic university.

iach has its own

·;)roper form or different nature as an issue.

All have a

:J.ni ty of reference to the nature of the primary instance in
that they contribute in some way to the fashioning of
~an's

~'~ew

Catholic university ideal.
r:ewma.Yl 's treatment of issues is not the only one

that may profitably be viewed in terms of Aristotelian
equivocity by reference in order to render his educational
ideal and the formal elements of its presentation more unified and intelligible.

As we suggested earlier,

~\ewman

•s

exposition of the relationships of Catholic University to
s8cular 1.miversity, supernatural to natural grounds, eternal to temporal "connected view," wholeness of theme to
wholeness of structure, religion of Faith to religion of
reason, and Christian gentleman to worldly gentlema.Yl may
~lso

be so considered.

Here,

o~

course, the focus is on

the relationship of grounds to zrounds, view.to view, .::;entleman to gentleman, 'and the ·like, rath.er than on their importance as secondary issues in relation to the primary one
of the nature of a Catholic Vniversity.

In this context,

"-srounds," "view," "religion," "wholeness" of theme and
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structure, and "gentleman" emerge not as univocal terms of
equal importance and meaning but as equivocal ones whose
significance is to be determined by the importance of that
to which each term and what it signifies primarily refers.
Here again we have instances of terms and things whose definitions show a degree of sameness in difference.

Once

more, secondary instances have their own proper forms or
different natures, but they also show a unity of reference
to the nature of the primary instance.

In the process of

locating primary and secondary instances of these terms,
one observes that the Idea's philosophical grounds are
called "grounds" through reference to its theological
grounds, its temporal "connected view" is called "view"
through reference to its eternal "connected view," its
wholeness of structure would be ''whole" through reference
to a wholeness of theme, and its man of philosophic habit
is called "gentleman" through reference to its Christian
gentleman.

Philosophical grounds, temporal "connected

view," wholeness of structure, and worldly gentleman would
be secondary instances whose importance derives only from
their relation to the primary ones, at least in the context
of this Aristotelian approach to Newman•s Idea.
To understand better the second general application
of Aristotelian equivocity by reference to

the~.

that

is, to the "connected view" as a cause and term equivocal
by reference and as a principle of the change from unrelat-
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ed branches of knowledi;e to interconnected branches viewed
in one whole interdisciplinary

~rasp,

it may be useful at

this point to review some aspects of Aristotle's approach
to cause as interpreted by Owens.

Such an overview centers

on the motivation, starting point, procedure,and goal that
owens sees Aristotle employing. 121 To supply motivation
and an irrefutable basis for philosophical speculation, Aristotle states that ''all men by nature desire to know. " 122
This desire for knowledge exists apart from an utilitarian
concern. 121- r.:a...YJ. needs to know the causes of the material
universe, and he seeks this knowledge for its own sake.
Aristotle goes on to his starting point, sensible reality. 124 He begins with things of the sensible universe and
wonders what are the elements or principles by which·such
things can be made more intelligible.

The 3tagirite finds
these elements to be real physical principles. 12 5 ~very
object in the sensible universe, he observes, is a union of
two ultimate principles:

the material constituent or mat-

ter, and the formal principle or form, which makes the sen-

121 owens, p.
17.
12')
. . £.Ibid. , P• 158.
12 3Ibid.
124Ibid. , p.
172.
12 5Ibid. , p.
174.
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sible object to be what it is.

This union is an internal

one in which that which has the capacity to become a determinate sensible thing does become a determinate sensible
thing.

The union is one in which undetermined matter which

has the potentiality to become an actual, informed sensible
reality does become a definite, actual, informed sensible
reality.
This explanation of sensible things by means of internal, constitutive principles of matter and form also involves science or knowledge or the causes of things, a consideration which leads into Aristotle's procedural explanation of sensible things through their causes.

Strictly

speaking, matter and form are the ultimate constitutive
principles that make up a sensible object.
ter is that out of which something is made.
that which gives matter its determination.

Again, the matThe form is
For example,

the form or shape of a man informs the matter of marble to
make up the statue of a man.

However, in speaking of know-

ledge of this or any other sensible object, Aristotle describes these two internal principles, and two external elements as well, in terms of causality.

He sees them as

physical principles, components, producers, and ends involved in the physical change of what is potentially a sensible reality to what becomes actually a sensible reality. 126

126 rbid.
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Aristotle calls these principles and. elements "causes'' and
speaks thus of them in the Physics:
The causes are expressed in four ways. Of
these we say that one cause is the Entity,
and the what-is-Being ••• , another the matter
and substrate, a third that from which motion
takes its source, and a fourth the cause
correspoy~~ng to this, the purpose and the
good ••••
Aristotle's goal is the ultimate cause that fully and finally answers the questions about which man naturally wonders.128
How does this treatment by Owens relate to our consideration of the "connected v.iew" as the cause of Newman's
idea of a university?

In the process of determining how

the "connected view" makes Newman's idea of a university to
be what it is, this study will address itself to the internal and external elements involved in the change of mere
undetermined learning to determined interrelated learning.
The causes studied in this inquiry will be four:

the mate-

rial cause or that out of which the idea of a university is
made; the formal cause or that which makes the idea to be
what it is; the efficient cause or that from which the
movement from unrelated disciplines to related disciplines
takes its source; and the final cause, the end or good for
which the id.ea exists.

127 Ibid., p. 173·
128ill.£.' p. 172.
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means the primary instance of 3eing. 1 3 1
Being has some dependence.
things.

Upon it all other

It is the cause of Being in

It often signifies something concrete, and it of-

ten refers to something individual.
use ousia.

Owens does not wish to

Neither does he wish to employ "substance" or

"essence" in order to express Aristotle's concept of Being.1 32 In their place, he substitutes the term "Entity''
as that word best able to describe the equivocal notion,
or more precisely, the equivocal nature of the sensible
things Aristotle treats. 1 33

.

An important key, then, to understanding Owens' interpretation of Aristotle's treatment of Being is that allimportant equivocal term"Entity" by which Being is expressed in various ways but always in reference to something one or in reference to one form.
mary instance of Being.

Entity is the pri-

It alone contains in itself the

true nature of Being, and only in reference to Entity are
all other things said to have Being.

In using Entity as an

equivocal by reference, Owens handles Aristotle's treatment
of different sensible things with reference to the nature
of their primary instance, or secondary instances in rela-

l3libid., p. 13B.
l3 2 Ibid., p. 140.
l33Ibid., p. 153. Owens capitalizes "Entity" to
show the reader that it is being used to render the Aristotelian ousia.
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tion to primary instances.

~ntity

expresses the primary

and secondary instances of the 3eir.g of sensible things in
Dro-oer relation.

~

~

It is the guide to the things denoted,

a:td it assumes the
?rorr.

-~hese

meanin~

of all instances encountered.

considerations, "=::nti ty" er.1erges as a comprehen-

sive equivocal

te~1

that expresses the ultimate principles

of unity and permanence in concrete things.

It is the per-

manent foundational principle of their 3eing.
principle of
~nti ty

cha~zes

s&~eness

com~on

It is the

to everything that is Being.

is ·that which remains permanent notvv'i thstanding the
something undergoes.

7-he primary instance of 2nti-

ty in a sensible thing is its form or what-IS-3eins•

s:'his

form expresses timeless 3eing or what essentially and neeessarily is :aeing.

The what-IS-3ein5 expresses the formal,

intelligible perfection of a thing.

It is that by which

the thing is known.
According to Owens' interpretation, the problem of
3eing becomes the problem of Entity.

Among other thines,

"Entity" means the formal cause of the Physics.

Entity

also means that permanent substrate that does not change in
sensible things, while its "affections" do.

entity mea1·1s

the ultimate subject of predication and of accidental
change.

Entity means the substrate of the accidents, the
matter, the form and the composite in that substrate. 134

lJ 4Ibid., p. 456.
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Primary Entity means a form without matter or a form that
does not inform matter. 1 35
The primary instance of Being in the Metaphysics is
Entity.

The primary instance of Entity in sensible things

is the form.

Moreover, efficient, final, and material

causes have their ultimate basis in the formal cause.
Owens sees the Aristotelian formal cause as the "act" or
''energy" observed in sensible things.

Owens further points

out that while the Aristotelian form contains elements of
the Platonic form, in that it is "knowable," "determined,''
"necessary,'' and "unchangeable," the Aristotelian form is
essentially actual, in contrast to the potentiality and
the passivity of the Platonic form. 1 36 The Aristotelian
form is essentially act, and something that does act, does
know, and does provide ''knowabili ty" to composite sensible
things.

Again, the Aristotelian forms are "knowings," by

way of contrast to the Platonic "knowables."l37
Furthermore, Owens notes that things differ specifically because of their different formal causes.

Each one

of the specific forms or separate Entities is a "what-IS-

135ill£.
l3 6 rbid., p. 457.
l37Ibid., P• 458.

-
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Being." 1 38

The presence of matter, that which is unknow-

able, differentiates them, not by adding to the form, but
by introducing plurality and indefiniteness.

For Owens,

Aristotle explains plurality within sensible species thus:
he begins with that which is knowable in the sensible universe; he perceives a variety of forms, separate Entities
or "what-IS-Being" in different things; he reduces these
forms to some kind of unity.

Aristotle does not, in Owens'

thesis, choose a "one" and ask how it can be a "many."
Rather, he takes a "many" and questions how it can be
one. 1 39 His response is the unity of a form that gives
Entity and Being to the matter and the composite.
Entity as formal cause is form as act.

Again,

Ultimately, sensi-

ble things have "Entity" because their form is, or can
share, in the permanence of the "eternal" and "divine." 140
In explaining the science of Being gua Being, Owens
explicates the science of Entity and so adds to our understanding of Aristotle"s use of the term.

According to

1 38 Ibid., p. 459. Although somewhat of an oversimplification;-It is not too far wide of the mark to say that
for Owens the "what-is" pertains to the matter of a thing;
the "what-IS-Being," to its form. Owens capitalizes the
"is" to signify that the word expresses "timeless Being"
as the basis of formal necessity.
l39Ibid., p. 460.
140 Ibid., pp. ~61-46).
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Aristotle, as interpreted by Owens, there is a science of
3eing gua Being. It is the science that concerns Bein5
universally. 141 Man naturally seeks to know the "first
causes" of Being according as it is 3eing.

These four

"first causes" must be considered in a unity that binds
them under one science.

In such a context, all causes
pertain to one nature, namely, Being "qua" Being. 142 owens
recapitulates Aristotle's manifold use of Being in reference to some things as Entity, to others as "affections" of
:Sntity, to still others as they are "corruptions," "privations" etc. -- all instances of Being referring back to tf1e
primary instance of Being, Entity. 14 3 It is the primary
instance that contains the true nature of Being.

Accord-

ingly, 3eing, or 3eing according as it is Being, or the
true nature of Being, can be found in Entity alone. 1·44
3eing thus considered is not, in Owens' interpretation,
used as a genus, but as an equivocal by reference. 145 Cnly

141 Ibid,, p. 259.
142_b.d
.:!::.._L.

,

p. 262 •

14 3rbid., p. 265. .3eing, dealt with in the L'<ietaphysics is expressed in many ways. As an equivocal by reference, Being denotes one nature, as well as many natures.
Its true nature is that of its primary instance, Entity.
But Entity has primary and secondary instances also. Form
is the primary instance of Entity in sensible things.
144Ib"d
----1.:.... , p. 267.
145Ib"-l

~·· p. 268.
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thus can there be one science that deals with all :aeing.
Things will be denominated :aeing, mediately or immediately,
by reference to Entity.

~ntity

comes across as the common

,. ,
.
146
nature rererred
to by everyt h'lng consl. d ere d as :Oelng.
All "first causes" pertain to Being ''qua" .Seing.

All re-

late to Entity and are applicable to whatever Entity includes.147
In relation to matter as Entity, Owens points out
that for Aristotle the most distinctive characteristic of
matter is its potentiality.
tion of 3eing.

Katter alone has no determina-

Only form gives it that determination.

Something can be or not be. This capability is, for Aristotle, the matter. 148 It is the matter of a thing that enables it to become something else.
of the ,.what-is" of a thing.

~~atter

is an expression

The "what-is" can be consid-

ered the thing's matter; it can also be viewed as form in
the sense that the matter gets its actuality from the form.
So too, may the "what-is" refer to the composite in the
context that there is under consideration the matter al-

146 rbid., u. 270. Under consideration here are different expressions of Being, not divisions of Being. .c:elng
extends to its various instances as an equivocal by reference. Again, the primary instance of Being is Entity.
147 rbid., pp. 272-273·
148
rbid., p. 339. One may express Entity as matter,
but only in-a-secondary and potential wayo
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ready determined by some form. 14 9

The "what-Is-Being,"

however, refers only to the form. 15°
considered the thing itself.
ed as potency.

The matter may be

The matter is the thing view-

It is in reference to form, and so, in ref-

erence to Entity, that matter is said to be or to have some
In short, matter is a secondary and potential ex-

Being.

pression of Entity because whatever Entity it has derives
from a form. 1 5 1 There appears to be consistently present
for Owens a significant identification of Entity, form and
act with determination.
For Aristotle, in Owensv view, form is act; matter,
potency.

Aristotle treats of a potency "to be acted upon,"
as well as a potency "of acting upon something else." 15 2

Accordingly, he distingutshes act and movement.
not seek an end outside of itself.

Act does

The end of the act is

the act itself.

In movement, however, act is the thing
being acted upon. 153 The more perfect kind of act is that

in which the act is agent.

Act has priority over all kinds

14 9But to know a thing is to know its "what-Is-Being," not its "what-is."
l50The "what-Is-Being" is that which belongs by its
own proper nature. "VIhat-Is-Being, '' is per se.
l5libid., p. 345.
152 Ibid., p. 40J.
l53Ibid., pp. 404-405.
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of potency. 154
to act.

Potency can be understood only in relation

These considerations relate especially to the fi-

nal cause.

So considered, the final cause is ultimately

the formal because that is the purpose intended -- the end
of the act is the act itself.l55
Again, it is significant to note for this study that
all Aristotelian causes, as interpreted by Owens, have
their ultimate basis in the formal cause.

Efficient cau-

sality is described in reference to form.

The form is the

agent that can cause that form elsewhere.

The efficient

cause of one thing can be considered formally identical to
the formal cause of that same thing.

Efficient causality

is "imperfect" and "incomplete" because it finds its complete actuality only in something else. 15 6 When agent and
patient are in proper relation, a certain effect is inevitable.

The actuality of the efficient cause is in the pa-

tient, not in the agent, which, considered as a perfect
form, cannot have any actuality outside of itself.
Owens also makes the final cause dependent on the
formal in his explication of Aristotle's position.

The

final cause is ultimately the form because that is the purpose intended in the instance of act when the end of the

l5 4 Ibid., p. 406.
l55Ibid. , p. 40?.
l5 6Ibid. , p. 406.

8)

act is the act itself.l57

Ultimately, there is involved a

search for the unchangeable and permanent -- what Owens
calls "the restless seeking of the divine, the imitation of
the divine." 15 8 Finally, material causality is identifiable with formal causality.

The matter is the form poten-

tially, and it can be known and explained only in terms of
form.

In short, all causality, in Owens' scheme, must be

considered in relation to formal causality, for only to the
formal cause can each of the other three ultimately be reduced.
In relation to our study of what gives Newman's idea
of a university its Entity, Entity will be treated as an
Its primary instance will be lo-

equivocal by reference.

cated in·the form of the idea, the "connected view," for
that makes the idea to be what it is and explains why it
essentially and necessarily is.

Again, it is important to

note here that if Newman's idea of a university is to be
known at all, it will have to be known after the manner of
Entity.

For, as Aristotle points out, to know anything is

to know it as Entity.

Accordingly, to know the idea of a

university is to grasp its form, what-Is-Being or 2ntity.
Knowledge of the idea requires a reduction of knowledge to
Entity because in seeking the Being of the idea we are

l57Ibid., p. 407.
l5Bibid., p. 469.
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seeking its Entity.

The

~ntity

of the idea is identifiable

with its formal cause, the "connected view."
Furthermore, in seeking to explain the Entity of the
idea of a university, we should bear in mind that the fundamental question concerns why the matter of mere learning
or unrelated sciences is something.

The answer, of course,

is the form or what-Is-Being of the idea.

The interdisci-

plinary grasp is the cause of the idea's Being.

According-

ly, we must look to this form for the Entity of the idea.
The idea has Entity or Beingness only because of its form.
In the foregoing context, the four causes are conceived in
much the same way as before.

Only now, they will be treat-

ed not so much as principles of change, but rather, as
principl~s

of the idea's Being.

One~

again, material, ef-

ficient and final causes will be absorbed in a study of the
formal cause since it alone constitutes the primary instance of Entity.

It alone is the primary cause of the

idea's Beingness.
After these lengthy but necessary considerations of
the relevance of the Idea and its quest for unity, some
problems and critical literature pertinent to the scope of
this analysis of the Idea, the Aristotelian schema to be
employed and the reasons for its use, one more task remains
in the chapter, namely, a summary statement of this study's
purpose.

Basically, its aim is to present an exposition of

the argument of the Discourses and to interpret the argu-
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ment in terms of an Aristotelian framework.

Specifically,

the study calls for an adaptation of Aristotelian equivocity by reference to these areas of the Idea:

first, to

its issues, grounds, theme, structure, and gentleman; second, to the "connected view" as the cause or principle of

.

the change from unrelated disciplines to sciences grasped

in a unified, interdisciplinary fashion; and third, to the
"connected view" as that which gives Entity to the idea of
a university.

The object of this adaptation is to render

the content of Newman's artistic statement on the nature
of university education more meaningful, his structure more
intelligible, and his total presentation more unified.
means to this end is Joseph Owens' interpretation of
totle's Metaphysics.

For

i~

The

Aris~

enables one to show the extent

to which Aristotle's treatment of the unchangeable in
changing sensible things, his efforts to reduce a plurality
of forms to some type of unity, and the manner in which
Aristotle's notions on equivocity, cause

~~d

Entity can be

employed to reduce Newman•s multiple treatment of scope,
grounds, theme, and gentleman to some kind of unity, even
while these notions enable one to see better what makes
Newman's idea of a university to be what it is.
Aristotle's treatment of equivocity by reference,
cause, and Entity, as interpreted by Owens, also lends itself to a more effective analysis of the unifying view that
forms the idea of a university, a totality that determines
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the structure of its presentation)and an integrity that
characterizes the living embodiment of Newman's ideal -the natural man of philosophic habit whose potential

r~ewman

expands by means of a supernatural view.

Again, J:Iewman' s

approach to view is twofold in the Idea.

In tern:s of Aris-

totelian equivocity by reference, the primary instance of
the view advanced is that "connected view" or interdisciplinary grasp of all sciences by a man of intellectual culture in whom Faith and reason are allied,
a view actively cultivates his mind,
tively pursues Christian perfection.

~~d

A

man with such

he even more ac-

His is a joint ven-

ture having natural and supernatural overtones.

In the

case of this primary instance of view, the nature of a
Catholic university emerges as the primary university issue, theological

~~d

supernatural as the primary instance

of grounds, and the Christia.Yl gentleman as the primary instance of the university's human product.

In the light of

Aristotelian equivocity by reference, the secondary instance of view advocated is that interdisciplinary

~rasp

of

the sciences held by a man of purely intellectual culture.
In the context of this view, the nature of a university
considered ·apart from the Church surfaces as Newman's secondary university issue, philosophical or natural lines of
inquiry as the secondary instance of grounds, and the man
of purely intellectual refinement as the secondary instance
of Newman's gentleman.
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Newman's educational ideal encompasses spiritual as
much as it does intellectual growth.

It looks to the dev-

elopment of the whole man whose integrated view, according
to its capacity, embraces all branches of knowledge with
the philosophical habit serving as its system and Revelation as its guide.

Newman's ideal seeks out the mysteries

of reality and the wisdom of the universe.

It aims at the

satisfaction of man's loftiest aspirations for truth and
human perfection.

But more than this, it purposes to lead

him to the End of Truth or source of Perfection that gives
all things their ultimate meaning and value.

CHAPTER II
THE TYPE OF BUILDING:
BASIC ISSUES IN NEWMAN'S PREFACE
As I indicated in Chapter I, this study of the Idea
addresses itself to a number of basic issues notable for
the critical controversy they have aroused.

Three of these

questions Newman raises and tentatively answers in the Preface.
ersity.

The first considers the nature of a catholic UnivA second deals with the nature of a university

considered apart from any relation to the Church.
third concerns the nature of Newman's gentleman.

The
As I also

pointed out in the previous chapter, each issue has been
subjected to critical investigation under such varied headings as Newman•s alleged severance of intellect from virtue, his conflicting presentation of religious and humanistic elements, and his serious or ironic treatment of the
gentleman.

Earlier, I proposed that the major obstacle to

ascertaining Newman's ultimate responses to various issues
is his multiple treatment of the issues.

Further, I sug-

gested that Newman speaks with two voices; and that, if
Newman's manifold treatment of issues is to be reconciled,
there will have to be found some unifying principle to effect a reconciliation.
88
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In my review of critical literature on the Idea, I
loo:{ed to a number of highly qualified commentators on

j·~e·~v

man's Catholic university and secular university issues and
found an abundance of incisive commentary but no unifying
key.

As a result, I proposed one in the form of Aristot-

le's doctrine of equivocity by reference as interpreted by
Joseph Owens.

The purpose of this chapter will be to im-

plement that proposal in regard to the issues advanced in
the Preface.
argument

I will do so, first, by an elaboration of the

~ewman

supplies in response to the nature of a

Catholic university and in response to the nature of a university abstractly considered; and second, by an interpretation of these issues and responses in terms of Aristotelian equivocity by reference.
Using "issue" as a term equivocal by reference, I
propose to unify in some measure

~iewman

's treatment of is-

sues in the Preface and to determine which issue is his
fundamental one.

All of the issues discussed earlier as

part of the scope of this study suggest a certain unity by
reference to each other.

These issues include:

the nature

of a Catholic university, the nature of a secular university, the grounds of the inquiry, the nature of the "connected
view," and the type of gentleman.

All issues, except, of

course, the primary one, also suggest a proportional reference of secondary issues to the primary one.

In the con-

text of Aristotelian equi voci ty by reference,

I~ewm.an

ex-
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presses the issues of the Idea in various ways but always
in reference to one issue that is primary.

Although the

differences in the issues are restricted by some degree of
sameness, i.e., that they are issues, yet the differences
remain, and the true nature of the term "issue" is to be
found only in the primary instance of issue.

In this stud-

y, the nature of a Catholic university will be treated as

the primary issue.

The others will be viewed as issues on-

ly in reference to that question.

Each secondary issue,

including the two -- the nature of a secular university and
the type of gentleman -- raised in the Preface, will be
treated as having a special independent relation to the
primary one.

Each will be seen as dependent on the primary

issue for its ultimate form and meaning as an issue in the
Idea.

Furthermore, each secondary issue will be viewed for

its contribution to the fashioning of Newman's Catholic university ideal.
In dealing with "issue" as a term equivocal by reference, one must bear in mind that the relative importru1ce
of issues does make a difference in understandin5 the Idea
and Newman's formal educational ideal.

He must be equally

conscious of the order in which various issues are addressed.

For the very meaning of one question may hinge on the

resolution of another.

For example, in order to understand

secondary questions, like those of Newman's secular university, grounds, "connected view," and gentleman, one must
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first address the question of the nature of a Catholic university.

Only in reference to that issue must all others

be cor.sidered because only in reference to that question
are all other issues of the Idea ultimately meaningful -at least, in the context of the

Aristoteli~~

scheme propos-

ed for this study.
In general, John Henry Newman uses the Preface of
the Idea to indicate the scope of the nine subsequent discourses.

Central to his definition of purpose is a state-

ment of the question and delineation of subordinate issues.
The question of what is a gentleman, which will generate a
later issue of whether Newman's idea, as it is formulated
in Discourse VIII, is a serious expression or not, is part
of another issue of just what is the nature of a university.1

That question, in turn, is part of a still larger is-

sue of what constitutes a Catholic university.

This latter

appears to be the foundational issue Hewman elaborates by
means of the two foregoing subordinate ones.
"The view taken of a university in these Discourses," he begins his Preface, "is the following:

That it is

1As I indicated earlier, although Harrold, Dessain,
Vargish et al. take Newman's definition of a gentleman in
DiscourseVIII as a serious expression, Culler, lv'IcGrath,
and others advance an ironic or derogatory interpretation,
which appears the more current and popular one. However,
John R. Griffin's "In Defense of Newman's ':;entleman'",
(Dub?., 1965) is corrective of Culler a..'1.d i:1'lcGrath.
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a place of teaching universal knowledge."
paragraph,

~~ewman

2

In the second

adds,

such is a university in its essence, and independently of its relation to the Church. 3ut X
practically speakins, it ca.n...v;.ot fulfill its
object duly, such as I have described it, without the Church's assistance; or to use the theological term, the Church is necessary for its
integrity.J
havinG touched upon those two root concerns, he proceeds, two paragraphs later:
••• some persons may be tempted to complain, that
I have servilely followed the English idea of a
university ••• and they may anticipate that an academical system, formed upon my model, will result
in nothing better or hiGher than in the production of that antiquated variety of huma11. nature
and remnant of feudal~sm, as they consider it,
called 'a gentleman.'
A few paragraphs later, Newman goeq on,

Heturning, then to the consideration of the
question ••• thus much I think I have made ,500d, /-:--'"
-- that, whether o: no a ?atholic University
(:£
should put before 1t, as lts gre~t object, to
make its students 'gentlemen, ' still to make them
something or other is its great object, and not
simply to protect the interests and advance the
dominion of science.5
It is in these four statements, drawn from the Preface to the nine discourses, that ;:,iewman Lnrr.ediately i.:1troduces what I consider to be three of the major issues with

2 rctea of a University, p.

3-·
lOl. d •
4,
I Ol"d • J PP•

5--b"
d
d:...2:__.

J

5-6.

p. 8.

5·
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which he will concern himself in The Idea of a University.
The first asks what is the nature of a university considered apart from the Church.

The second questions what is the

nature of a university of which the Church is an essential
part.

'rhe third inquires what is the nature of the human

product of a university.

Then, the question arises con-

cerning what order of priority one ought to assign these
issues, a question I will approach in terms of Aristotelian
equivocity by reference.
Although Newman deals initially with the nature of a
secular university or the natural form of a university, I
submit that his ultimate concern is the nature of a Roman
Catholic University.

That was his original charge -- the

founding of a Catholic University.

Was that not the pur-

pose "contemplated by the Holy See in recommending just now
to the Irish Hierarchy the establishment of a Catholic university," he reminds us, early in the Preface. 6 When the
Supreme Pontiff advocates the establishment of a university, it is in the "interests of Revealed Truth'' and "for the
sake of Religion."?

I don't think it too wide of the mark

to say that Newman can be considered, regarding his ultimate purpose, one with the Pope in rejoicing "in the widest
and most philosophical systems of intellectual education,

6Ibid., p. 6.
?Ibid.
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from an in.timate conviction that Truth is his rea.l ally .....
and

.ln.

af£'.irminz t:!J.at "?.nowledge and

isters to Faith. ,.S

.~eason

are sure :TJin-

:.:oreover, if it becor:~es the 3uccessor

of the Apostles to ali.;n himself with st. Pa'.ll in

sa~rinc;,

":ron judicavi me scire aliquid inter vos, nisi Jesum
Christum, et hunc crucifixum,"9 so docs it become John
;:enry

~~ev>I!-:J.an,

as a worthy an<i devoted son of the Church, to

make the Figure and purpose of the Cross his ultimate concern in founding a Church university.

~oreover,

if the

Church founds a university
for the sake of her children, with a view to
their spiritual welfare and their religious
influence and usefulness, with the object of
training them to fill their respective posts in
life better, and of makin6 them morrointelli6ent,
capable, active members of society,
does it not befit Newman, as the instrument of the Vicar of
Christ

a~d

the Irish

~piscopate,

to establish a university

in Ireland with a similar purpose?
Just as he gives abundant evidence, in the discourses, of his preoccupation with the

ch<?.r;~e

3ee and the Irish Hierarchy, so too does

of the Eoly

:,~evlffian

provide

early indication of the start of his concern with the nature of a Catholic university when

8 r· · d
D~ •

10_, . d
~·

h~

speaks, in the Pre-
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face, of the university's need for the Church's "assistance," when he questions whether the object of such an institution ought merely to be an "English Gentleman," when
he wonders "whether or no a Catholic University should put
before it, as its great object" to develop something more,
but especially, when he speaks of the university's need of
the Church to maintain its integrity. 11 After all, should
the student of a Catholic university be exposed to a "cultivation of mind" unequal to that of his Protestant counterpart?12
Apart from the witness of the Preface itself, Cardinal Newman's lifetime devotion to the cause of Revealed .rteligion, the vital and life-unifying force of his personal
beliefs, an awful awareness of God's Presence within himself, his profound sense of the immediacy of the Church,
and his sensitivity to the urgent wishes of the

Soveris~

Pontiff leave little room to doubt the nature of Hewma.'Yl' s

11 Ibid., p. 5.
12 rt is worth noting that Newman's quarrel is not
with Protestant education so much as it is with secular
non-Christian education. The alternative to Catholic education is not Protestant education but purely secular education which has at its core a philosophical knowledge that
sees the relationship of science and all earthly things as
subject to man. The point of view here would be natural
and philosophical. Newman contrasts this worldly type with
Christian education that provides for transcendent supernatural goals and Christian perfection. This latter type
makes rna.~, science, and all of reality subject to God.
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ultimate educational interest. 1 3

When the foregoing con-

siderations underscore so heavily the primacy of his concern with spiritual matters, why should it be otherwise in
his case for the nature of a Catholic university?

I say

this notwithstanding the fact that the view he assumes most

.

immediately is that of the university as a place for "universal knowledge."
In incidental reference to the role of the Church in
Newman's idea of a university -- the fact that fundamentally and ultimately Newman's idea is spiritually oriented
there comes to mind a statement ascribed to Dr. Whately in
the biography published by his daughter in 1866.

Although,

contextually, Whately is addressing himself to the problem
·of "mixed education," his charge might be regarded as not
untypical of a perennial criticism levelled at Roman Catholic education.

Dr. Whately states, "The principle on

which that Church is constructed, the duty of uninquiring
unreasoning submission to its authority, renders any doubt
fatal." 14 How can any man, he goes on to ask, survive in a
Church "which claims the right to think for him?"l5

How

1 3see Dessain, pp. Xll, 20, 2~ and 50 for a rather
extensive treatment of the impact of Revealed Religion and
God's Presence upon Newman's life.
14
Jane iJhately, Life and correspondence of Richard
Whately, D.D. 2 vols., (London, 1866), 11, p. 244.
l5Ibid.
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can a person, he further demands to know, "who is commanded
not to think for himself" not ultimately disassociate himself from such a communion?

Cardinal Newman"s whole educa-

tional philosophy, especially his ideas on the nature of a
catholic university, provides some ready answers to the objections made by this prominent former friend and associate
of Newman at Oxford, for the letter and spirit of his educational ideal run distinctively counter to the core of
Whately's contentions.
The Preface to Newman's Idea tentatively recognizes,
and the subsequent discourses readily approve, the traditional Catholic philosophy of education, in which intellectual and religious instruction are allied, science and religion interrelated.

Newman never doubts the necessity for

moral development in the whole education of man.

Again and

again he shows the need for an omnipresent spirit of religion in university matters.

Newman doubts not at all that

a university's purpose is to infuse a religious spirit.
This was always his position, both as an Anglican and Roman
Catholic.

In a report giving early expression to his idea

of a university, Newman statesa
All academic instruction must be in harmony
with the Principles of the Catholic Religion,
the Professors will be bound, not only not to
teach anything contrary to religion, but to
take advantage of the occasion the subjects they
treat may offer, to point out that religion
is the basis of Science, and to inculcate the
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love of Religion and its duties.16
Newman's view of a Catholic University, or of a
catholic education if you will, is fundamentally a spiritual one, but in no way is it "uninquiring" or "unreasoning."

Neither would Newman have the educational view of

his Catholic University students be unthinking.

On the

contrary, it should be pointed out, in the words of C. F.
Harrold, that Newman's "whole career, both as an Anglican
and Roman Catholic, was devoted ••• to rendering institutional Christianity acceptable to the critical and historical
sense of nineteenth -century man ... l7

Furthermore, Harrold

is no doubt accurate in saying that Newman's efforts centered on a "rational and imaginative justification of existing orthodox Christianity for educated men and for their
responsible leaders." 18
If, on the one hand, a desire for order and system,
a deference toward authority, and a reverence for tradition
so markedly distinguish his career, so, on the other, does
a profound respect for intellectual boldness, dialectical
skill, and solid reasoning characterize an organic part of

16 Quoted in McGrath, p. 118, from the Irish Report
which, among other things, gave to the professors involved
a definite status, along with certain legislative and administrative powers.
17Harrold, p. 2.
18 Ibid., p. 54.
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his practical efforts.

While Calvary is the source and ul-

timate end of Newman•s religious and intellectual views, he
sees man•s testimony to those central facts not restricted
to eternal efforts, but also extended to temporal ones.
consequently, Newman voices his concern over the inferior
standards of Catholic education.

As Dessain aptly points

out, Newman
wanted Catholics to come out of the ghetto
and take their place in the world, to adapt
themselves, to enlarge their minds in the confidence that truth could never contradict
truth, and to be guided like responsible men
by their duly enlightened consciences •••• 19
The Preface reinforces the notion that Newman seeks the
widest possible intellectual culture, not an intellectual
isolation that is culturally stagnant.

In that context,

"cultivation of mind," "culture of the intellect," and a
"connected view or grasp of things" are important watchwords.
Furthermore, in reference to Newman•s idea of a
Catholic university, still another possible criticism comes
to mind, ru1 objection which, like the previous one of
Whately, I raise in view of my claim for the importance of
the Catholic university issue.

In Newman's preoccupation

with the nature of a Catholic university, with its stress
on the role of the Church, as initially proposed in the
Preface to the Idea and later developed in its discourses,

19nessain, p. 168.

100
some critics may see contradictory or irreconcilable elements.

For, in the very first paragraph of the Preface,

cardinal Newman states that a university is a place for
teaching "universal knowledge."

In the discourses follow-

ing, Newman provides extensively for theology and argues
against its exclusion.

But should he not argue as well,

critics may claim, for the inclusion of other theologies,
and not just that of the Roman Catholic Church?

They may

also demand to know how Newman's stress on the natural
scope of a university is to be reconciled with his supernatural or spiritual concern for its foundation.

Is there

not more than ambivalence at stake in the statement and delineation of issues?

Might there not even be a certain

measure of incompatibility in his claims for dogmatic, theological teaching and liberal education? 20
It would be easy enough to respond simply that Newman believes the Roman Catholic Church to be the repository
of Revealed Truth, with the charge of conserving and interpreting that truth.

According to that charge, the Gospel

would be, in the words of Newman, "no mere philosophy
thrown upon the world at large, no mere quality of mind and
thought, no mere beautiful and deep sentiment or subjective

20
T. Corcoran maintains, in effect, that the Idea's
religious and secular university goals are irreconcilable.
Culler sees an ambivalence in Newman's presentation of humanistic and religious ideals. Dale eliminates the humanistic possibilities altogether. See above pp. 21-24.
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Jp~nion,

but a

substa~tive massa~e

preserved in a visible polity." 21

from above,

~uarded

and

Accordingly, "to the

::;hurch has been entrusted this revealed message and ti:e awful

respo~sibility

,":'!a tter

of Faith.

of

carryi~g

it to the whole world as a

3u t this Faith,

:~ evvrnan

would add, re-

quires system, doctrine, propositions -- a corpus of thealo~ical

truth.

It is this theological system that would

;ive unity and coherence to all knowledge in lie;ht of an
11ltimate purpose.

In view of this response, it would no"t

at all be surprising that ;·;evrman assign the Church a certain
p:::-eeminence and its theology a proportionately more significant status in the composition of his university.

3ut

tf.is response would probably strike these same critics as
too facile.
If so, then one could reply to their contention in
ter:ns of one or two practical considerations.

In the Idea,

Cardinal Sewman is addressin.s himself primarily to Cathalies, though his call certainly does not preclude appeal to
those of other communions.

he wants an intelligent, well-

educated laity, and clergy for that matter, who can exert a
proper influence on their Church and society.

He desires

them to maintain their spiritual integrity in an age marked
by secularistic, specialized, and naturalistic interests.
2or this reason, i:fe·,vman says, "I want the intellectual lay-

21 Quoted in Dessain, p. 142, from Certain Jifficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching.
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~an

to be

reli~ious

and the devout ecclesiastic to be in-

?2

tellectual."-

In addition to the matter of audience, there comes
to mind a second practical response.

i\ewman has been

charzed with the founding of a Catholic university by the
?ope and the Irish Eierarchy.

In the spirit and letter of

that delegation the Holy Father does, in a ?apal Brief, ex!10rt the Irish Bishops, and Newman indirectly, to take any
measures necessary to insure the founding of a university
deserving of its Roman Catholic designation. 2 3 In much tr.e
same vein, the early Irish

~piscopal

advocates of the Cath-

olic university, in their .Address to the People of Ireland,
also propose "to provide for the Catholic youth of Ireland
education of a high order, every way commensurate with the
. t e_11 ec t..Ua l wan t..S o f t'ne t.1me •••• u 24
1n·
.1.

.l.

These practical mat-

ters would appear to supply some justification for l\e'<lrl1an 's
emphasis on the Catholic Church and its theology in his university scheme, if one chose to use them.
~'iotwi thstanding

these considerations, it is possible

that our concern here ought not to be dispute over whether
~,;ev..man

is ri:ght or

wron~

in assigning some priority to Ro-

·~ ''
p. 277, n. 1, from Sermons
?reached on Various Occasions.
22 r

~uo

t ed b y

2 3r
.d
.:...2.k..

24

J

+.
~cura~n,

p. 27 J .

Quoted by

~cGrath,

p. 100.

lOJ
::1an

,_;atholic theolo;;;y, but rather, to determine whether he,

in fact, does so; and if he does, 1vhat is the nature an.d
extent of the l)riori ty.

Father Jessain asserts that :;evrman

"claL-:1ed a l)lace for theolo.::;y in education on general
c;rounds, without introducin£; pleadinJ;S that ap:plied to any
+.

nar~1cu

1 ar

, ..

re~1~1on.

"25

:-rewma.."'l. appears to bear out Jessain

".3ut I have been in. 1 yon ~aura~
., t
, "'
~y ••• , " 26
also v1hen he
Slmp
~neo 1 o 6

·Nl-:.en he states, in a later discourse:

in a letter to R. Ornsby, the.t "I am .;oing to

~')ro.fesses,

treat t:1e whole subject not on the assu.:nption of :;atholicism, but in e. way of reasoning, and as men of all reli__

"')

\

\

·..·

.

rr;

II

.r::::

I

In spite of 0essain's assertion and Newman's disclaimer en the preeminent role of the Church and its theology, it would appear that the Preface
)oint up their importance in

:~ewman's

a."ld.

.:.Jiscourses d.o

thou.:,):-';.

~;ow,

al-

tl;.ou.;;h the matter of their relative im.portance can be clarlfied by mea:1s of a real and

lo~gical

distinction, there is

a.nother interpretation that may prove rnore useful.

T!:.is

explanation concerns itself v1i th a proper understa:ndins of

t!Je particular point of view regardin.;; issues .·:ewrnan assumes at spscified times in the Idea.

25-.:..iessa~n,
.
26
2

p. lOJ.

rctea of a Gniversity, P•

71.

7~uoted by ~cGrath, p. 142.

:t is to a closer
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examination of these views in the Preface that I would now
return for a substantiation of my contention that

i:~ewman'

s

ultimate issue is, in fact, his idea of a Catholic university and not merely his idea of a university.

For, if the

former question is foundational, one must show how it can
be reconciled with the view or notion of a "university in
its bare and necessary idea" 28 which would exclude "the assumption of Catholicism" 2 9 and insist on a "Natural Theola.
. t"~on JO
gy, " an d wh"~c h wou ld re fl ect an a b s t rae t ~nvest~ga
with its focus on "universal knowledge," an emphasis evident from the initial paragraph of the Preface.
I believe that the objection of possibly contradictory or irreconcilable elements in Newman's concept of a
Catholic university, the claim of a possible conflict between his natural and supernatural objectives in the establishment of a university, and the fundamental relationship
of two cardinal issues can be handled effectively by an examination of what constitutes Newman's primary and secondary issues, with "issue" being used as a term equivocal by
reference.

This examination will lead, I might add, into

my treatment of the second major issue Newman proposes in

28
2

1852.

Quoted by McGrath, p. 172.

9From Newman's letter to Ornsby dated April 14,

JOidea of a University, p. 6.
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the Preface -- the nature of a university considered in its
"essence" or natural fonn.
In his profound concern with scope, Newman points
out, midway through the Preface, that
when the Church founds a University, she is
not cherishing talent, genius, or knowledge,
for their own sake, but for the sake of her
children, with a view to their spiritual welfare and their religious influence and usefulness •••• )
That statement is of no little importance because it helps
one ascertain the priority of Newman's issues.

It clari-

fies the relationship between a Catholic university and a
university in the abstract.

It points to a complexity of

·sameness in difference in Newman's treatment of the nature
of a Catholic university and the nature of a secular university as issues.

It also provides a fairly clear response

to the question whether Newman*s fundamental concern is a
secular university that with its liberal education makes
all things subject to man or a Catholic university which
with its supernatural orientation makes man and all things
subject to God.

The priority of issues is important be-

cause the issue that prevails here may very well determine
the primary grounds Newman will employ, the dominant "connected view" he will advocate, and the preeminent human university product he will advance.

If Newman's fundamental

issue is the nature of a Catholic university, then his

)libid., p. 7•
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grounds will more than likely be theological, his view, a
supernaturally connected grasp, and his gentleman, a Christian one.

If, on the other hand, Newman's primary issue is

the nature of a secular university, then his grounds of inquiry will more likely be philosophical, his "connected
view," temporal, and his gentleman, worldly.

The quotation

cited helps support the position that Newman's fundamental
concern is the nature of a Catholic university, a university concerned with its students' intellectual and spiritual
welfare.

In accord with the Church, Newman considers the

university as a place for the advancement of one's Faith
and the fostering of one's virtue, no less than the cultivation of one's mind.

It is in line with this concern that

I propose the question of the nature of a Catholic university as Newman's primary instance of issue and the question
of the nature of a university abstractly considered as a
secondary instance of issue.

I do so using "issue" as a

term equivocal by reference.
In the case of Aristotelian doctrine, as formulated
by Owens, the secondary instances of things said to be equivocal have their true nature or form only in reference
.
. t ance. 32 Accor d.1ng1 y, 1n
. t h.1s lnterpre.
t o th_e pr1mary
1ns
tation of Newman's issues, a secondary instance of issue,
the nature of a university, is denominated "issue., only to

2
3 That is, they are in a certain way expressed
according to one form. Owens, p. 121.
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the extent that it relates to the primary instance.

The

form or nature of the primary instance makes Newman's university issue to be what it really is.
you will.

It gives

~ntity,

if

The nature of a Catholic university is the pri-

mary instance of what the nature of Newman's inquiry is all

.

about.

It reflects a primary instance of issue, from which

other issues derive their form.

The nature of a Catholic

university is that which distinguishes Newman's fundamental
question from ru1y other issues raised.

This question con-

cerns the nature of a university in which both temporal and
eternal matters count rather than one in which merely ternporal affairs are of paramount

importa~ce.

Then, depending on the viewpoint of issues he assumes, Newman can speak variously on the nature of a university, without doing a disservice to the issues or subject
matter.

Thus, in one breath, he is able to speak of the

university as a place for "universal knowledge," of a "university in its bare and necessary idea," or of a university in the abstract that disclaims "the assumption of
Catholicism."

For the same reason, Newman can, in the next

breath, address himself in the Preface, to the university's
"practical need for the Church's assistance, .. 33 and elsewhere, maintain that "Christianity and nothing short of it

33Idea of a University, p. 5.
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must be made the element and principle of education ... J 4
Thus is he also able to say at the end of the Preface:
At least it is a matter of deep solicitude to
Catholic Prelates that their people should be
taugh~ a wisdom, safe from the excesses and
vagar1es of individuals, embodied in institu~
tions which have stood the trial and received
the sanction of ages, and administered by men
who have no need to be anonymous, as being
supported by their consistency with their predecessors and with each other.J5
~eedless

to say, it is a matter of deep solicitude for

Cardinal Newman as well.
The foregoing treatment of the first issue, with its
emphasis on the fundamental role of the Catholic Church and
its relation to the secondary issue viewed

equivocall~

is

not intended in any way to downgrade the importance of the
secondary issue -- the nature of a university considered
apart from its relation to the Church.

Nor is it meant to

deemphasize the concern for liberal education that Newman
displays.

It purposes only to place a secondary issue and

Newman's view of it in due relationship with what I regard
as the ultimate issue and primary instance of Newman's
treatment of issues.
The secondary issue, the nature of a university abstractly considered, cannot be lightly dismissed because

34 Quoted by McGrath p. 279, from The Tamworth Read-

ing Room.

J5Idea of a University, p. 15.
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its importance is readily apparent in the implementation of
Newman's educational plan and ultimate resolve.

In Dis-

courses I-V, Newman maintains, in large measure, his avowed
purpose of treating his subject from a philosophical standpoint and of concerning himself with a "university in its
essence, and independently of its relation to the Church."
Moreover, it is to the nature of a university abstractly
considered that Newman devotes a significant measure of his
efforts even in the Preface.

In the Preface and subsequent

discourses, this secondary instance of issue has its own
proper form, nature and importance, even though as an issue
its ultimate significance derives from the primary instance
of issue.

The nature of a university considered apart from

the Church looks to a "discipline and refinement of intellect,"36 a "cultivation of mind,"37 or a ''culture of the
intellect"3 8 that alone characterizes the goals of a university whose scope is purely natural.

It is to this same

end that Newman speaks when he says that the qualities
sought are "the force, the steadiness, the comprehensiveness and the versatility of intellect, the command over our
own powers, the instinctive just estimate of things as they

36 Ibid., p. 9.
37Ibid., p. 10.
3Bibid.
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S

"e+-ore
~
~·

11,
~

••••

"3 9

For :\ ew:nan, cul ti vati on of that ob-

jective would start early with the ''first step in intellectual trainir:g [oeins] to imlJress upon a boy's mind the idea
of science, method, order, principle, and system; of rule
. ..
h
.
an d excep t 10n,
o f r1c
ncss an d 'narmony. .,40

Then

~iewman

adds:
Let him once gain this habit of method, of
starting from fixed points, of making his
::;round good as he goes, of distin5-uishing what
he knows from what he does not know, and I
conceive he will be gradually initiated into
,
the largest and truest philosophical views .... 4 1
Cardinal Newman's treatment of the primary issue, as
I

tentatively interpret its presentation in the Preface, is

certainly consonant with orthodox and traditional Church
concerns that emphasize an allia..'1ce of literary and reli~ious
~ion

instruction and a unification of

knowled~e

and reli-

with appropriate stress on moral improvement.

It

should be noted, however, that the view advocated in his
treatment of the primary issue is far more intellectually
comprehensive than the rather narrow, ecclesiastical, or
lay perspective of some contemporaries who, in their overzealous regard for authoritarian demands, would tolerate no
criticism from within or without the Church.

39Ibid.
"0 Ibid., p.
12.

"1"

41~, . d
.d:..Q.L_ • ,

p • 1J .

}:is view on
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the nature of a Catholic university is in no way that of
so~e

contemporaries who could not suppress their apprehen-

sian regarding any intellectual research or scientific inquiry, however loyal, docile, and reverent the spirit in
which it is conducted.

~e\~an's

notions on the nature of

a university that combines intellectual and spiritual cultivation admit to no confusion of misguided personal feeling with traditional Church Doctrine.

his is not an over-

riJins concern that the authority of the Church will be
disputed, much less lost in a world of rapidly changing
values, by the bonafide intellectual endeavors of its devoted sons.
3ewman fears, rather, the intellectual apathy of
the Catholic with no views at all, "the mere hereditary
Christian, who has never realized the truths which he
"no ld s •••• ,42

For if, according to

:~ewman,

even fallacious

views consistently held are much more influential and inspirational than no views at all, 4 3 how much more respectable ought that view which reflects a solid, intellectual
6rasp of the proper relation of things from a natural
standpoint to be considered.

Further, if even a purely

philosophical point of view is so commendable, even
benefits will derive

42.,.b.d

~··

fro~

p. 12.

~reater

a rational view that has Revela-
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tion as its guide, for then, that view will truly reflect
"a wisdom safe from the excesses and vagaries of individuals, embodied in institutions which have stood the trial
. d th e sane t"~on o f ages •••• u44 In the former and
and rece~ve
latter statements I see a rationale for the two views advacated in relation to the nature of a Catholic university
and in relation to the nature of a university considered
apart from the Church.

The view expounded in the framework

of a Catholic university reflects a primary, formal instance of "connected view" that looks to the "relative disposition" of things in this life and the next.

As the

view advanced in the context of the nature of a Catholic
university, it will take precedence over the secondary instance of "connected view" advocated in reference to the
nature of a university considered independent of the
Church.

This view, of course, would look more to the "rel-

ative disposition of things" in this world.

Both views
will be dealt with extensively in subsequent chapters. 4 5
The third issue Newman raises and tentatively answers
in the Pre:face concerns the relation of the university
and the Church to the nature of a gentleman.

Although the

question will be treated in a later chapter of this study,
with special attention being devoted to whether Newman's

44

Ibid., p. 15.

45 See Chs. IV, VI, and VII of this study.
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definition of a gentleman in Discourse VIII is a serious or
46 . t .
. expressJ.on,
.
. t out, h.ere,
ironJ.c
J. J.s necessary t o poJ.n
that Newman's idea of a gentleman is an issue closely allied with the two issues treated thus far, and the primary
and secondary instances of the "connected view" touched on.
Tentatively and from a natural, philosophical view of the
nature of a university, Newman calls for a man whose cultivated intellect and considered view set him apart from his
fellows, for he speaks as one who knows what he is talking
about. 4 7 From the more supernatural view of the nature of
a Catholic university, Newman wants to produce a university
man with a more comprehensive view that includes eternal
matters.

It is in light of this latter view that Newman so
.
admires St. Philip Neri and will offer him as a model for

Catholic university students whom he desires to make not
merely gentlemen, but Christian gentlemen with .an integrated intellectual and spiritual grasp of this life and the
next.
If, thus far, my presentation of the issues Newman
has raised in the Preface and of the tentative answers he
has proposed therein appears disproportionately to concern
itself with the primary issue, it does so only because the
secondary issues raised in the Preface appear ultimately

46

See Ch. VII of this study.

47Idea of a University, p. 11.
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so~e
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9osltion on the relationship and priority of these

has to be established before these same issues or

some additional questions, like those of
and structure, ca.l"l be addressed.
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CHAPTER III
THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL
GROUNDBREAKING IN DISCOURSE I
As an educator, philosopher, and theologian, John
Henry Newman evolved, and the task of charting his development in philosophy and theology, much less his progress as
a critic and commentator on education, is not an easy one. 1
The philosophical and theological principles that surface
in The Idea of a University lend themselves to no simple
explanation.

Neither do these principles, as they underlie

his statement of issues in the Preface or Discourse I,
adapt themselves to any simple clarification.

No individu-

al works embody Newman's philosophical and theological manifestoes.

Neither does any single work capture his doc-

trine on university education, although the Idea does come

1In Victorian Prose, p. 166, Charles Stephen Dessain
points out that "the best way to understand Newman's philosophy and theology is to read and reread his own writings."
A. Dwight Culler reminds us, in The Imperial Intellect, p.
xii, that the general biographies of Newman too often focus
on the development of Newman's religious opinions from too
restricted a viewpoint, namely, the content of the Tractarian movement and the proximity of his thought to Rome.
Culler adds that a number of significant influences, like
the five illnesses of his youth and early maturity, have
not been adequately explained.
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close. 2

Newman has, however, produced an awesome array of

books, sermons, letters, notebooks, journals, and manuscripts.J

To some of these and to some solid, critical expositions and studies of them, 4 the student of Newman can

advert for help in tracing the genesis of the philosophical
and theological ideas that serve as a foundation for the
superstructure of his educational theory and practice.

To

the foregoing he can also turn for background material
helpful for an understanding of the basic issues as they
are formulated and developed in the Idea.

2Although, again, the best way to determine Newman's
thinking on education is to consider his own words on the
subject, and though there is no better statement of his position than in the Idea, F. McGrath, in Newman's Universitys Idea and Reality, p. 281, issues the warning that
"Newman's complete teaching is not to be found in one work
alone." He observes, a page afterward, that for a comprehensive view of Newman's definition of a university, one
must study the appendix to the first edition of the Idea,
along with materials Newman describes as "illustrations of
the Idea of a University," which he contributed to the
University Gazette in 1854.
)Typical sources would include: "Intellect the Instrument of Religious Training," Sermons Preached on Various Occasions (London, 1870); Letters and Corres ondence of
John Henry Newman, ed. Anne Mozley, 2 vols. London, 1891 ;
Historical Sketches (London, 1872-73), III; Loss and Gain
6th ed. (London, 1874); "Faith and Reason Contrasted As
Habits of Mind," Sermons Preached Before The Universit of
Oxford (London, 1843 ; Lectures on the Present Position of
Catholics in England 2d ed. (London, 1851); MY Campaign in
Ireland, ed. w. Neville (London, 1896).
4

The texts of Culler, Dessain, Harrold, and McGrath,
already cited in this study, provide good examples. To all
four this writer is much indebted for information and inspiration.
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Some investigation of these materials suggests the
tentative view of a man who unites the offices of student,
teacher, and educational theorist to an unusual degree and
a man who sees both teacher and student as seekers of a
truth whose ultimate value lies in its power to improve the

.

temporal, intellectual lot and the eternal, spiritual prospect of educated men.
joint venture.

Faith and reason are allied in this

Both work to make men better understand the

relative disposition of different areas of knowledge and
serve to bind men in the strength of an intellectual fraternity and in the humility of a spiritual kinship as sons of
God.

Newman sees the need on the part of university educa-

tion to realistically portray and appraise the value of this
intelleetual brotherhood and spiritual bond, as they relate
to mankind's basic desire for intellectual and moral betterment in this world and in the next.

In Newman's judgment,

educated men should purpose to treasure Faith, their spiritual legacy, primarily, and to value reason as a precious
natural tool, but not to the extent that it jeopardizes the
supernaturally preeminent position of Faith.

For Newman,

the educated Catholic's primary criterion should be fidelity to the Church and its theology because they reflect the
wisdom and historical continuity of eighteen hundred years
of Providentially guided experience.

His secondary test

ought to be the utility of any philosophical system that
aids him in the pursuit of truth and holiness.
of the

~.

Discourse I

in some measure, bears out these assertions.
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This chapter will not attempt any complete summation
or appraisal of Newman's philosophical and theological
ideas, however important they may be in their impact on his
educational theory and practice.

Rather, its purpose is to

state the argument of the discourse and to relate its material on the nature of the university Newman proposes and
the grounds he will employ to the framework of an Aristotelian analysis.

The scope of Newman"s university and the

grounds of the inquiry will be interpreted in terms of
Aristotelian equivocity by reference with a view to reconciling Newman's multiple treatment of them.

The argument

of the discourse provides for the history of the question
proposed in the Preface.

It traces two germinal questions

that emerge from that question's immediate historical elaboration.

It offers a rationale for an ultimate answer, and

it touches on the historical validity Newman cites for his
appraisal.

Finally, the argument points to the ultimate

authority upon which Newman draws.

To the extent that they

affect Newman's position in his development of the foregoing matters or that they play a role in the educational
thought reflected in the discourse, some early and forma-

tive educational influences will be brought out. · In relation to this study, the central question of the discourse
is whether Newman•s primary concern is the nature of a
Catholic university pursued on theological and supernatural
grounds or the nature of a university in the abstract
sought along purely philosophical lines.
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Although this introductory discourse might profitablY be studied as one whose rhetorical function serves to
win the sympathy of Newman's audience,5 it may also be
viewed as one rich in the thematic and structural implications it generates for the other discourses.

Most impor-

tantly, it is one profound for the light it sheds on what
is Newman's fundamental issue in the Idea and what are the
primary grounds of his inquiry.
Newman beginsa
In addressing myself, Gentlemen, to the consideration of a question which has excited so much
interest, and elicited so much discussion at the
present day, as that of University Education, I
feel some explanation is due from me for supposing,
after such high ability and wide experience have
been brought to bear upon it, that any field remains for the additional labours either of a disputant or of an inquirer.6

5see M. J. Svaglic's introduction to his edition of
Newman's Idea of a University, p. xvi.
6Idea of a University, p. 19. It is worth noting
that in this statement of the question Newman alters his
focus somewhat from the nature of a university to the nature
of a university education. The questions appear closely
enough related in Newman•s mind that he can move comfortably from one in the Preface to the other in Discourse I
without doing a disservice to either question. Because Newman•s concern is the foundation of a Catholic university in
Dublin and the publication of a fairly complete educational
manifesto to guide in its foundation, it appears reasonable
that he make the nature of the university proposed a key issue. So long as one understands the end or idea of a university to be that liberal or philosophical knowledge which
consists in an awareness of the bearing of one science on
the other by which the "whole" can be perceived, he should
be allowed some flexibility in treating this interdisciplinary grasp and the place in which it is advocated.
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Not uncharacteristically, Newman draws his attention, and
ours, to the issue raised in the Preface.

He is attracted

not merely by a question that affects the implementation of
his plan to found a university, but also, by an issue that
has concerned him from his Oxford days, namely, the nature
of a university education.

Apart from the fact that his

question skirts a controversy surrounding Oxford, it also
leads directly to the nature of a university he will found
and to a c0nsideration of the ideational structure he will
shortly be developing.

But now, the position to be advanced

will no longer be that of another, a Copleston or a Davison,
so much as, in 121£, that of John Henry Newman. 7
Having reiterated the question, Newman voices his
concern over the principles of the inquirya
If, nevertheless, I still venture to ask permission
to continue the discussion, already so protracted,
it is because the subject of Liberal Education, and
of the principles on which it must be conducted,
has ever had a hold upon my own mind.8
In these words, the question of the nature of a university
remains the same, but the more specific issue of the nature
of a university education is laid bare.

Newman considers,

?Harrold, John Henry Newman, p. 105 and n. 11, p.
398. Harrold singles out the influence of Edward Copleston
and John Davison upon Newman's treatment of secular and religious education as distinct disciplines. For Copleston•s
and Davison's impact on Newman's position regarding utility
and specialization in a university, see Culler, pp. 220-222.
8 Idea of a University, p. 19.
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as well, the lines upon which the inquiry is to be drawn.
There is also evident, here, the disciplined mind of Newman, logic-bound, viewing possible facets of the question
and their implications for himself.

His mind appears ever

at work grappling and grasping for mastery of the logical
framework within which he will carry out the discussion.
should the inquiry be conducted on philosophical or theological grounds?9

The answer will be forthcoming, a few

paragraphs later.
In explanation of the source of his concern and in
development of the history of the question, Newman proceeds
by calling our attention to that place in which
I have lived the greater part of my life ••• a place
which has all that time been occupied in a series
of controversies both domestic and with strangers
••• the English University, of which I was so long
a member, which after a century of inactivity,
at length was roused, at a time when (as I may say)
it was giving no education at all to the youth
committed to its keeping, to a sense of the responsibilities whbch its profession and its station
involved •••• l
Newman adverts to "the singular example of a heterogeneous
and an independent body of men, setting about a work of
self-reformation •••• "
countereda

He speci!'ies the difficulties en-

"Its initial efforts, begun and carried on amid

9critics tend to reject one set of grounds; yet they
offer no satisfactory key to unify Newman·s dual presentation. See pp. 25-28, above, for an overview of various
critical interpretations of Newman's grounds.
10 Idea of a University, p. 19.
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manY obstacles, were met from without, as often happens in
such cases, by ungenerous and jealous criticisms ...... 11
Having cited the first stage of the controversy and having
outlined the second, Newman declares "inutility'' and "religious exclusiveness" as the two basic issues emerging from
the controversies. 12
Apart from any consideration of the foregoing material as allusion to the history of the question or as a
statement on the root of Newman's preoccupation with the issue of university education, there is evidence here of the
measurable effect that an eminent English university had on
Newman when it came time for him to struggle with the problem of establishing a catholic university.

Equally apparent

is the influence that the two immediate historical controversies surrounding that university's curricula wielded on
Newman when his turn came to formulate an educational manifesto for a Catholic university in Ireland. 13 Evident,
also, in this introductory discourse is not only a place
but people whose ideas and principles might be said to have

11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., P• 20.
l)For the role played by Oxford in shaping Newman•s
Idea and the impact of the Edinburgh Review attacks upon
Oxford with resultant controversy, see McGrath, pp. 115,
1))-1)7, )06, )12, and 370. See also Culler, pp. 37, 115,
1)8, 140-141, 1~)-144, 146, 220-221. See also Harrold,
John Henry Newman, pp. 8 and 105.
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provided the intellectual springboard for Newman's Idea.
For the formation of his educational ideal no doubt began
long before that May day in Dublin when Newman began his
series of lectures on university education before a distinguished audience.

So too was the foundation of his educa-

tional construct laid some time before the Catholic University of Ireland, with barely twenty students, opened its
doors on November 3, 1854.

Perhaps Newman's educational

ideal and construct began the day he set foot on the grounds
of Trinity College, Oxford, or the day he awoke to the
beauty of his classical studies, or the day he began cultivation of a group of associates, sometimes lifelong friends,
as an undergraduate, fellow, tutor, Vicar, and leader at
Oxford. 14 At any rate, Newman's allusion to his days at
Oxford appears significant in the development of the Idea
and the search for a more meaningful intellectual and spiritual university life that it reflects.
If Newman's reference to his Oxford days is significant because Oxford helped mold his educational philosophy,
his allusion to the Edinburgh Review attacks is also note-

14Harrold, pp. 13-19. Harrold surveys what Tardivel
sees as the two important formative influences on Newman's
religious make-up: "the influence of Oxford itself-- its
classical studies, its eighteenth-century interests, its
brilliant Noetic school of liberalism, its commanding per~onalities (especially Keble, Froude, and Pusey); and the
~nfluence of the early Church Fathers.''
Moreover, in much
t~e same way as Guitton, Harrold roots Newman in the English
e~ghteenth century.
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worthy in the context of Oxford related experience. 15

For

two issues, stemming from the resultant controversies, have
germinal significance for Newman's Ideao

Specifically, his

declaration in Discourse I of the two questions emerging
from the Edinburgh criticisms provides important structural
and thematic groundbreaking for subsequent discourses.

The

issues to which Newman refers in this discourse are "inutili ty" and ••religious exclusiveness."

Both issues will sur-

face as two key questions of Discourse II:

whether theolo-

gy ought to be taught in a university and whether a university should make utility its major concern.

In the dis-

course following, Newman's response to these questions will
serve to elaborate and provide responses for the larger issue of the nature of a university and Newman's ultimate
question, the nature of a Catholic University. 16
Furthermore, by resurrecting in Discourse I the is-

l5Harrold, p. 16. In Harrold's words, Newman's "intellectual powers were molded and tempered by Oxford's
great classical tradition." Harrold adds that Newman voiced
his debt in the Apologia for a number of religious doctrines gained from Oxford thinkers. Harrold also observes
that it was from the Noetics that Newman really learned to
think clearly and accurately.
16Again, regarding the matter of structure, Discourse
I, in providing the germ of the two crucial questions of
Discourse II, the first of which Discourses II, III and IV
will answer, the second, Discourses V, VI, VII and VIII,
does, indeed, appear to assume an integral part in the organic structure of the Idea.
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sues of "inutility" and "religious exclusiveness," Newman
raises two questions with significant transitional overtones.

For these matters appear under the dimension of an

unresolved controversy of the past and the hope of a future
synthesis.

Through these issues, Newman looks back to an

ideological source, one he fondly views as the educational
font from which he has derived so much intellectual and
spiritual nourishment; but he also looks forward to something more for which he feels his university in Ireland to
be destined. 17 Moreover, these questions also serve to
connect the educational heritage and experience of a young
man at Oxford with the present, emerging values of a middle-aged religious and educational leader seeking an appropriate educational ideal for a new Irish university with
its own special problems. 18

Scanned in the context of the

l7Newman's words from the Historical Sketches, quoted on p. 169 of Culler, testify to th~s point: " ••• and in
it [DublitiJ I see a flourishing University, which for a
while had to struggle with fortune, but which, when its
first founders and servant were dead and gone, had successes
far exceeding their anxieties. Thither, as to a sacred
soil, the home of their fathers, and the fountain-head of
their Christianity, students are flocking from East, West
and South, from America and Australia and India, from Egypt
and Asia Minor, with the ease and rapidity of a locomotion
not yet discovered."
18

culler, p. 1)8. Culler observes that the picture
drawn by some of Irish society, along with the attitude toward higher education reflected by that society, was not a
happy one. Three of Newman's advisers -- Frederick Lucas,
Robert Ornsby and Henry Wilberforce (all Englishmen, converts to Roman Catholicism and Dublin residents) -- depicted
the Irish, including the educated ones, as having not the
least notion of a university like Oxfordo
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oxford controversies, these issues come across as transitory and unfixed.

Viewed in the Newman manner, that is, from

a naturally and supernaturally connected perspective, they

will appear to share in a world of educational doctrine
that is immortal and permanent.
In addition to its structural and transitional significance, the question of "inutility" suggests more, in its
thematic implications for the whole of the Idea, than a conflict between knowledge and the fruit of that knowledge.

It

suggests a conflict between means and ends; between ideality
and practicality; between classical values and pragmatic,
utilitarian concerns; between cultivation of one's mind and
cultivation of one's purse; between humanistic-type activity
and utilitarian accomplishment; between self-discipline or
restraint and intellectual disorder or chaos; between natural and supernatural values; and certainly, between a meaningful and meaningless educational life or perspective.
Correspondingly, the issue of "religious exclusiveness," as
Newman treats it, extends well beyond the limits of a dispute over the inclusion or exclusion of theology in a university.

For it might also be viewed as a conflict between

Reason and Revelation, between Nature and Grace, between
gentleman and Catholic gentleman, between Humanism and
Christian Humanism, a.'"1d even a conflict between God and man.
But these ramifications of both germinal issues are matters
for some development and notation elsewhere.

I suggest them
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here only as material correlative and especially significant in relation to the import of the two issues stemming
from the Edinburgh controversies and any possible interpretation of them.
Furthennore, in regard to the issues of "inutility"
and "religious exclusiveness," it should be noted that, although there may be some tension and a degree of ambivalence
in Newman•s attitude towards them or the contexts in which
they might be treated over the whole work, Newman's total
position must be evaluated in the light of two factors.
One is his ultimate, dominant concern over matters of Faith,
Revelation and Dogma; 19 the other, his desire for a principle of unity.

Newman sees the Church as a unifying histor-

ical principle, Catholic theology as a unifying theological
principle, and a "connected view or grasp of things" as a
unifying educational principle.

Always, in his efforts to

resolve differences, to reconcile diverse elements, and to
synthesize opposing viewpoints, there is present a concern
for the relationship

of~

whole to its many parts.

In

regard to the structure of the discourses the foregoing relationship will become most immediately apparent and especially relevant.

Moreover, just as the relation of part and

whole must be taken into account in ascertaining the impor-

l9Dessain, p. x~~. Dessain presents a strong case for
and devotion to the cause of Revealed Religion as the
root interest and unifying concerns of Newman's life.
.

fa~th
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tance of "inutility" and "religious exclusiveness," so too
must the latter issues, that constitute kernel questions
for the rest of the work, not be underestimated in the light
of Newman's search for unity and his efforts to found a
university whose philosophical perspective does focus on a
spiritual end, a union with God, the ultimate One whose
stability, order, permanence and fixedness it is the final
purpose of the many to seek.
Thus, in dealing with the matter of utility and specialization, Newman is really coming to grips with the allimportant question of man's ultimate end or destiny. 20 He
sees an answer in continued striving for the development of
one•s natural talents.

He advocates the pursuit of know-

ledge for its own sake.

He advances a "connected view"

that he would have a university-educated man develop.
These are natural goals, but they have their supernatural
counterparts.

If all knowledge is one, if the subject mat-

ter of all knowledge is unified, if, indeed, science and
religion are really but a part of the whole, then Newman
does have a key for a university ideal that helps place
man's temporal interests and ultimate, supernatural concerns

20 Newman's argument is not with specialization as
such. But of the overspecialized and utilitarian approach
that emphasizes the product of knowledge rather than the
knowledge itself he does take a dim view. Moreover, in the
matter of the useful and the specialized, Newman's ultimate
criterion is mankind's end in the light of Calvary's meaning.
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in proper perspective.

The whole of man's life purpose is

not sacrificed or neglected for any partial needs, for in
Newman's university scheme, man has a "connected view" of
all branches of knowledge with philosophical habit his system and Revelation his guide.

These are substantial means

in a program of temporal and eternal self-growth and development, and that, basically, is what Newman's educational
ideal is all about.
Thus far in Discourse I, Newman has restated the
question raised in the Preface and has restricted it to the
nature of university education.

Newman has, in addition,

questioned the lines of the inquiry and traced the history
of the question in relation to his Oxford experience, citing for special consideration, two issues that emerged from
controversial attacks upon that university's curriculum.
Now, he will go on to provide a rationale for the approach
to the nature of university education he will follow and
the grounds he will employ.

By his reference to Protestant

experience, Newman intimates the mode of his treatment of
the nature of a university and what will be the lines of
the inquiry.

Newman will also attempt to justify his ref-

erence to Protestant educational principles and to validate
his use of these on the basis of historical Roman Catholic
Practice.
Newman first points out that his opinions on the
nature of university education are lifelong, not occasional

1.30
ones:
It would concern me, Gentlemen, were I supposed
to have got up my opinions for the occasion ••••
Many changes has my mind gone through: here it
has known no variation or vacillation of opinion ••••
Those principles ••• were my profession at that early
period of life, when religion was to me more ~ matter of feeling and experience than of faith.2l
Natural self-evident truths constitute the grounds
of the inquiry and furnish a second reason for Newman's
"referring, on this occasion, to the conclusions at which
Protestants have arrived on the subject of Liberal Education."

He observes:
The principles on which I would conduct the inquiry
are attainable, as I have already implied, by the
mere experience of life. They do not come simply
of theology; they imply no supernatural discernment; they have no special connexion with Revelation; they almost arise out of the nature of the
case; they are dictated even by human prudence and
wisdom, though a divine illumination be absent, and
they are recognized by common sense,,.,22

We note here that Newman's reason for consulting Protestant
thought is that its conclusions on the subject of educational grounds reinforce the principles on which Newman
hopes to conduct his inquiry.
The foregoing excerpts with their attendant material
relate significantly to the matter of Newman's ultimate is-

21 Idea of a University, pp. 20-21. Newman appears,
most of his life, however, to have had little time for religion of feeling. His sense of dogmatism seems pervasive and
constant from quite early an age. The Apologia testifies to
this.
22 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
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sue and grounds in the Idea.

At the beginning of this dis-

course, Newman questioned the lines upon which the inquiry
would be conducted.

Here he affirms that the grounds are

philosophical and non-sectarian and that the principles
"may be held by Protestants as well as Catholics." 2 J If it
is possible to determine the issue by the principles and

lines of the inquiry relating to it, the foregoing matter
does appear to bear out the contention that the primary issue of Newman's Idea is the nature of a university, not the
nature of a Catholic university.
Subsequent reasons seem to generate additional
support for the position:
But I shall consider the question simply on the
2 3Ibid., p. 22. Although Newman's reference to
Protestant thought and experience is meant to clarify his
approach to the university issue and his use of grounds, it
raises a number of questions. For example, when Newman opposes Catholic education to its alternative, that alternative appears to be Protestant education. But is not Protestant education also Christian education? Newman appears
to equate Protestant education with secular or worldly education and grounds. Should they be equated? If by Protestant education Newman means that education which makes all
things subject to man, that education in which theology and
other sciences are not allied, that education in which Faith
and reason are irreconcilably separated, and if by Protestant education Newman means that education which looks to
religion as a matter of taste and sentiment, and to God as
fate, chance, or some impersonal force, then he appears
justified in equating Protestant education with that of a
secular or worldly type. For that education should not be
called Christian, much less Catholic education, in Newman's
judgment. If, however, by Protestant education Newman means
that education which provides for belief in a personal,
omniscient God, one that views intellectual and spiritual
Perfection as the joint goal of education, and one that
sees man and all things as subject to God, then Newman would
surely be misled in making such an equation.
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grounds of human reason and human wisdom. I am
investigating in the abstract, and am determining
what is in itself right and true •••• I am concerned with questions not simply of immutable
truth, but of practice and expedience,2~
When Newman states that this is not a disputation "directly
bearing on the subject matter of Divine Revelation,"~5 when
he affirms his lifelong profession of the opinions to which
26 wh en h e d.~sc 1 a~ms
.
.
.
. 1
vo~ce,
a pure 1 y th eo 1 og~ca
he g~ves
source, supernatural orientation or "divine illumination," 27
when he asserts that the principles on which the inquiry
will be conducted can be held by Protestants and Catholics
alike, when he points out that "the philosophy of education
is founded on truths of the natural order," 28 and when he
declares "human wisdom" and "human reason" to be the grounds
of the question, 2 9 Newman is providing ample evidence to
support the assertion that the primary issue of the

~

is,

indeed, the nature of a university, considered on purely
natural, abstract, and philosophical grounds.
But a second look at Newman's presentation leads to

24 Ibid., p. 24.
25Ibid. p. 20.
26I.Qis!., p. 21.

27 Ibid., P• 22.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 24.
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quite another conclusion on the nature of his ultimate issue and grounds.

It is evident, here, that Newman is using

protestant educational experience to suggest the natural
lines of inquiry he will follow and that he is supplying
historical evidence for his doing so.

It is most important

to note, however, that each time he poses the philosophical
or non-sectarian grounds of his inquiry, he juxtaposes a
catholic groundwork.JO

Moreover, ever present in Newman's

words is a theological and supernatural emphasis that his
disavowals and disclaimers do not dismiss but only point up
the more forcibly.

Examples are many.

Although Newman

deals with principles, grounds, or lines within a natural
scope, he does so under the sanction of the Church.

In

spite of the natural bent of his mind toward thoughts and
disputations distinct from the "subject matter of Divine
Revelation," these considerations are important "for Catholic objects" and do admit "of a Catholic treatment. ,,Jl

3°Newman's grounds might be interpreted according to
this dialectic. With philosophical grounds constituting his
thesis and theological, his antithesis, Newman might be said
to synthesize the philosophical and theological lines in an
overall groundwork of inquiry that reflects his concern for
the development of the whole man, his desire for a Catholic
university which provides adequately for intellectual culture, and his search for the man of "philosophical habit"
who looks at things from a combined intellectual and spiritual point of view.
Jlidea of a University, p. 20. For Newman, that
"treatment" is a theological one that gives unity in the
light of ultimate ends.
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Newman adds that the opinions he advances
might be said to evidence the faith I reposed in
the practical judgment of the Church, and the intimate concurrence of my own reason with the course
she had authoritatively sanctioned, and the devotion
with which I could promptly put myself at her disposal •••• J2
so too, though the opinions he expresses are a matter of
lifelong profession, they are sanctioned by the Church and
reinforced by Newman•s study of the "records of Christian
Antiquity ... JJ
Amid these contrapuntal, natural and supernatural
grounds of inquiry, the thought suggests itself that, if
Protestants are able to arrive at such worthy conclusions
on education, as Newman claims they can, if "Protestants,
depending on human means mainly,· are led to make the most
of thema

.

their sole resource

being

to use what they

have," with "knowledge" their "power" and little more,3 4

32Ibid., p. 21. The opinions he advocates might
also and again be said to reflect Newmangs preoccupation
with a principle of unity. If there be any apparent conflict in his position regarding philosophy and theology,
between denominational and non-denominational education,
between Christianity and humanism, or between philosophical
and theological grounds, the conflict is not insolvable
viewed in relation to Newman•s whole and partial view. It
should be noted that philosophy without theology, science
without religion, or humanism without Christianity do not
constitute the whole of Newman's educational viewo Neither,
in this investigation, do philosophical grounds. They are
a part. They do not constitute the whole line of the inquiry. They are not sufficient in themselves.
JJibid.
34 Ibid., p. 22 •
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hOW much more ought Catholics, though they be inclined to
rest in the knowledge of their "goodly inheritance," be able
to arrive at even more solid conclusions and use them more
efficaciously, with not the solitary tool of reason, but
the added resource of Revelation to guide them?35

Then,

catholics would be using what they have "by nature to the
utmost" and, at the same time, be looking out "for what is
beyond nature in the confidence of faith and hope ... 36
But, at this juncture, Newman's more obvious concern is to provide historical Church precedent for his use
of Protestant experience.

He first states the principle

involved,
The Church has ever appealed and deferred to witnesses and authorities external to herself, in
those matters in which she thought they had means
of forming a judgment: and that on the principle
"Cuigue in arte sua credendum." She has even
used unbelievers and pagans in evidence of her
truth, as far as their testimony went.37
Newman then supplies example1
She has worded her theological teaching in the

35while Newman does not identify "Revelation" with
Catholicism, he does see the Catholic Church as the chief
repository of Revealed Truth. Her responsibility is to
conserve and interpret that truth. Her divine commission
is to be the "visible polity" that guards and preserves
that truth.
36Ibid. Although Newman acknowledges, later in the
discourses;-that we attain heaven by using this world well,
the focus here appears to be on attaining heaven.
37Ibid., p. 2).
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phraseology of Aristotle; Aquila, Symmachus,
Theodotion, Origen, Eusebius, and Apollinaris,
all more or less heterodox, have supplied materials
for primitive exegetics. st. Cyprian called Tertullian his master; St. Augustin refers to Ticonius;
Bossuet, in modern times, complimented the labours
of the Anglican Bull; the Benedictine editors of
the Fathers are familiar with the labours of Fell,
Ussher, Pearson, and Beveridge. Pope Benedict XIV,
cites according to the occasion the works of Protestants without reserve, and the late French collection of Christian Apologists contains the writings
of Locke, Burnet, Tillotson, and Paley.38
Newman cites further examples of the juxtaposed lines
of the inquiry when he states that, even though the principles ''almost arise out of the nature of the case," although
they "are dictated even by human prudence and wisdom,'' and
"though a divine illumination be absent, i:t is "in the
plenitude of her divine illumination" that the Church has
ever used authorities outside the pale.39

In much the same

spirit Newman here makes use of Protestant experience regarding educational principles.

Furthermore, although the

questions of concern to Newman are matters "of practice and
expedience," they are matters of "immutable truth" as

well.~ 0

Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that he express-

ly purposes to investigate the question on the basis of
"human reason and human wisdom" and that he wishes not to

38 Ibid.
39Ibid.

~O Ibid • , p • 2~.

137
interject the authority of the Church, Newman does bring
that authority into account.
pears never to forget it.

As a matter of fact, heap-

The weight of Church authority

appears important to Newman because the weight of its appearance is constant and suggestive in the context of the
grounds he employs.
If some doubt remains concerning the role Newman will
assign Church authority in the Idea, he dispels it toward
the end of Discourse I where he takes the opportunity
of recognizing once for all that higher view of
approaching the subject of these Discourses, which,
after this formal recognition, I mean to dispense
with. Ecclesiastical authority, not argument, is
the supreme rule and the appropriate guide for
Catholics in matters of religion,41
The founding· of the Catho.lic University in Ireland, along
with the educational doctrine propounded on the occasion of
its establishment, is such a matter.
man•s ultimate view.
one.

Here, then, is New-

It is a theological and supernatural

Having formally recognized its preeminent place, New-

man places it back of him, but not too far back because, a
few paragraphs later, he speaks of the aim of a "University, of which Catholicity is the fundamental principle,"LI-2
and then in the following section acknowledges that he
"shall insist on the high theological view of a Universi-

41 Ibid., p. 26.
42 Ibid., p. 27.

1)8

ty" 4 J with confidence in the knowledge, any criticism or
argument notwithstanding, that it is a Catholic University
sanctioned by an ultimate authority:

"It is the decision

of the Holy See; St. Peter has spoken." 4 L}
The reasons cited midway and the support developed
in the latter part of this discourse bear significantly on
the question of what is Newman's fundamental issue in the
Idea.

His treatment yields two possible answers.

One sug-

gests that Newman is addressing himself, on purely natural
and philosophical grounds, to the root issue of the nature
of a university in the abstract.

The second proposes that

Newman's ultimate issue is the nature of a Catholic university, developed on theological and supernatural grounds.
Because the evidence for either answer reflects a measure
of ambivalence on Newman's part, it is difficult for the
reader to assess the natural and supernatural or the philosophical and theological grounds of the inquiry for their
true worth, much less ascertain which issue holds dominance
in Newman's educational scheme.

Although some clarifica-

tion of his position rests in the realization that Newman
here, as well as elsewhere in the discourse, is attempting
to elicit the support of as many segments of his audience
as possible, I submit that, while appearing to address him-

44

Ibid., p. 28.
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self to the purely natural issue, Newman by his constant
reference to the theological and supernatural groundwork,
really underscores that question preeminent in his concern
and central to his scope, the nature of a Catholic university.
The answer, then, to the fundamental issue of the
Idea
...........

hinges on a reconciliation of Newman's multiple treat-

ment of the nature of a university.

So too, the solution

to the problem of Newman's multiple presentation of grounds
lies in a unification of his twofold presentation of
grounds.

Once again, Aristotelian equivocity by reference

provides the means to effect the reconciliation and unification.45

From an Aristotelian standpoint, the fact that

Newman speaks variously on the scope of his university and
grounds can be explained by the primary and secondary instances that together, in proper relation, reflect Newman•s
primary and secondary views on the nature of the university
proposed.

Accordingly, in the secondary instance, the is-

sue is the nature of a university abstractly considered;
the grounds are natural and philosophical.

But in the pri-

mary instance, the issue is the nature of a Catholic university, with supernatural grounds constituting the lines
of the inquiry.

Considered as the secondary instance of

45For a detailed explanation of Aristotle's doctrine
of equivocity see Ch. I, pp. 57-65.
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his view of the scope of a university, Newman's claim for
the nature of a university considered apart from the Church
and his call for natural philosophical grounds are most
reasonable.

Correspondingly, considered as the primary in-

stance of his view of the scope of a university, Newman•s
call for the sanction of the Church, a Catholic treatment,
a high theological view, "Catholicity" as the basic principle, and ecclesiastical authority is also justifiable.
Once again, it should be

obs~rved

that, according to Aris-

totelian equivocity by reference, the secondary instances
have Entity and are ultimately meaningful only as they relate to the primary instance.

This holds true for the sec-

ondary instances of Newman's university scope and grounds.
However important the philosophical grounds and the nature
of a university viewed separately from the Church may be in
Newman's total educational ideal, this issue and these
grounds derive their ultimate importance only in reference
to the primary form or nature of Newman's university scope
and grounds, namely, the nature of a Catholic university
and supernatural or theological grounds.

Although the

differences in definition between the corresponding parts
of each set are overshadowed by some degree of sameness -the unity by reference to the university issue and grounds
the differences are still present, and the true natures
of the terms are to be found only in the primary instances.
In the last part of Discourse I, Newman supplies
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ample reason for a favorable reception on the part of his
audience to the voice of the Holy See.

He points out that

the Chair of the Apostles has excellent claim on their attention because a wealth of documented experience and historical successes confirm its veracity and Divine Origin.
That supernatural origin concerns Newman because he wishes
not merely to trust the temporal powers or tools of man,
like reason.

Rather, he would shore up his position with

more of an eternal guarantee from a Providential Source.
This Newman feels he has in the Catholic Church and the
Vicar of Christ.

For this reason can he sound a note in

the concluding sections that is triumphant, victorious,
and supportive.

Newman appears exhilarated by the thought

of his Church's Providentially directed resurgence and
renewal, oftentimes in the face of humanly insurmountable
odds.

He feels that, because the Church has ever been

successful, so can they be who follow its Apostolic directives on this educational mission.
Newman concludes his introductory discourse with a
glowing tribute to the perennial wisdom of Rome and the
richness of Ireland's educational history.

CHAPTER IV

·:rrlE

s·rRUCTURAL FOUNDATION AND ·rHEMATIC

SUPERSTRUCTURE IN DISCOURSES II AND III
This chapter has two objectives:
the other interpretive.

one expository

a~d

The expository segment aims at

providing a summary of the major content of Discourses II
and III.

It looks to Newman's.principle of the wholeness

of knowledge and the need of the mind to reflect that
wholeness in a "connected view."

It also recognizes New-

man's belief in the existence of a personal, omniscient God
\·/hose influence as their Source and .End bears so intimately
on all sciences that to apprehend them is in some measure
to apprehend Him.

This expository part also acknowledges

the existence of theology as a science and grants it a
rightful place among the sciences.

It stresses the point

that theology cannot be excluded from the university because its omission would fragment the wholeness of knowledge, cause "neglect" to the other sciences, and compromise
the ultimate attairunent of truth.
poi~ts

No less importantly, it

up Newman's epistemological framework.

indicates two questions with notable thematic

Finally, it
~~d

structur-

al significance for the rest of the discourses.
The second or analytical part of the chapter pur142
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poses to render a :nost important element of

~'ie'r'il1lan

's con-

tent in these two discourses -- his theme of the wholeness
of knowledge -- in the closest possible allia.."lce with the
form of its presentation.

Specifically, it will attempt to

relate theme to structure in terms of Aristotelian equivocity by reference.

In that context, "wholeness" of theme

and "wholeness" of structure will be considered as equivocal
terms.

We saw in the two preceding chapters that equivocity

by reference pertains to the relative importance of issues
and the order in which their treatment ought to proceed.
All of the issues discussed -- the nature of a Catholic
university, the nature of a university in the abstract, the
grounds of the inquiry, and the nature of Newman's gentleman-- suggested a certain unity by reference to each other.
All suggested, as well, a proportional reference of secondary issues to the primary one.

From the discussion, the

nature of a Catholic university emerged as the primary issue.

The other questions were treated as issues ultimately

meaningful only in reference to the fundamental one.

But

we also observed in the last chapter that equivocity by
reference can be applied to an order of priority in dealing
with Newman's theological and philosophical grounds.

That

treatment centered on the relationship of grounds to grounds
as much as it concentrated on the relationship of grounds as
a secondary issue to primary question of the nature of a
Catholic university.

Employing "grounds" as a term equivo-
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cal by reference, we determined that the theological
grounds should be viewed as the primary instance of grounds
and that the philosophical grounds should be approached as
a secondary instance.

The treatment in this chapter will

focus on the nature of the relationship between wholeness
of theme and wholeness of structure in Discourses II and
III, and it purposes to show that the relationship carries
over into subsequent discourses.

The governing principle

of the Idea states that all knowledge is whole and that
man's mind must reflect that wholeness in its view.

The

structure of the discourses is shaped in such a way that
it helps bear the burden of this theme.

Because the rela-

tionship between theme and structure is not simple, and
inasmuch as it reflects the complexity of sameness in difference found in Newman's overall treatment of issues and
in his presentation of theological and philosophical
grounds, it will be approached with the same critical apparatus.

By means of Aristotelian equivocity by reference,

this section of the chapter will attempt to render Newman's
theme and the elements of its formal presentation more unified and intelligible.
John Henry Newman's preoccupation with oneness seems
not inappropriately reflected in the thematic and structural unity that might be said to characterize Discourses II
and III in themselves and in their relation to the other
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discourses of the Idea. 1

As the structure of all the dis-

courses assumes a specific direction in Discourse II, so
does the principle of the wholeness of knowledge present
itself as a significant thematic and structural device.
still present is the priority of issues and grounds proposed in the Preface and Discourse I; but now, in bolder
relief, the principle, along with the assumption of belief
in the existence of a personal, omniscient God, surfaces in
such a manner as to place the Catholic and secular university issues, along with the natural and supernatural
grounds, in firmer perspective. 2 Both principle and assumption serve to show the ultimate, interrelated nature of
all

~hings,

to point up the consequent interdependence of

one science on

another~

and to clarify the interdisciplina-

ry view with which one should hold the facts of reality,
the knowledge that reflects these facts, and the Omnipotent
God Who is their Source.

Just as the assumption of the ex-

1 See Ch. III, p. 127, n. 19, and p. 134, n. J2,

above, for other instances of Newman's preoccupation with
unity.
2In the process of analyzing Discourses II and III,
this reader finds it difficult to lay aside, even temporarily, the notion that this series of lectures, with its pervasive Catholic tone, is a preeminently Catholic work about
a Catholic university and is being delivered primarily for
Catholics. If that is so, its apparent disproportionate
emphasis on Catholic theology and concern with the Catholic
university issue become more understandable. The Preface
and Discourse I suggest that interpretation. Discourses II
and III tend to confirm it.
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istence of God makes more meaningful the principle of the
wholeness of knowledge, which, in turn, makes necessary a
"connected view or grasp" of theology in relation to other
sciences, so does a correlative instance of wholeness render intelligible the structure of Discourses II and III.
They form a part, in relation to previous and subsequent
discourses, which constitute the whole of the Idea.
In Discourses II and III, Newman is concerned with
the establishment of theology as a science and its "bearing" on other branches of knowledge.

By implication, he

shows equal interest in the relation of university education to the correlative concern of an afterlife.

Themati-

cally, he addresses himself to both matters by employing
the principle that all knowledge forms a whole, by exercising a "connected view or grasp" of the relation of all
forms of knowledge, and by advocating the existence of a
personal God Who gives meaning to the whole of knowledge,
a personal God Who reflects the ultimate truth which.the
whole of knowledge comprises, and toward which the interdisciplinary grasp moves in partial steps.

Accordingly, he

formulates questions in Discourse II whose answers reaffirm
the wholeness of knowledge, whose responses point up the
need for an interconnected grasp, and whose implications
lead toward an Ultimate Truth as the end of the discourses
and the whole of the idea.
In Discourse II, Newman raises two questions that
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draw our attention to an assumption and a principle which
with its specific view will help form this thematic response.3

First, he asks whether theology ought to be

taught in a university.

Second, he questions whether the

university should make utility its major concern.

After a

brief clarification of the first question, Newman answers
it in the form of a syllogism.

Its major premise states

that a university must teach all sciences; its minor, that
theology is a science.

The conclusion follows that a university must teach theology. 4 In the main, the discourse,
develops this response to the first question.
In support of the major premise, Newman states that
by definition a university should teach all sciences:
As to the range of University teaching, certainly
the very name of University is inconsistent with
restrictions of any kind •••• I am only putting
on its popular, its recognized sense, when I say
that a University should teach universal knowledge.5
Newman supports this contention by the authority of Dr.

3Idea of a Universit¥, p. 33. The principle of the
wholeness of knowledge appl~es to studies and students. In
reference to studies, it pertains to the subject matter
viewed. In relation to students, it concerns the mode of
viewing.
4
rbid. The conclusion is understood. Regardinc; t.:1e
syllogis-cical support, Culler stresses that the most cogent
reason the university should teach theology is that in no
other way can it reach truth. See Culler, pp. 180-181.
5Idea of a University, pp. 33-34.
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Johnson an d .•,osnelm.

,/hat matters is not so much their

support as the fact that Newman introduces, in this section, the notion that all knowledge forms a whole.

It is

by this principle that he will establish theology as a
branch of knowledge and ascertain its relation to other
sciences.

nere, he will employ the principle in relation

to studies -- in relation to the subject of the view or the
interrelated nature of all knowledge.

At the same time,

Newman will exercise it in reference to students, the ma..'1ner of viewing or the interdisciplinary grasp.
that he can make the whole

reaL~

he believes

of knowledge intelligible

by tracing correspondences that exist between the different
segments that make up the whole of knowledge.
According to Newma..'1, one can discuss the exclusion
of theology only in the context of two positions.

£ither

theology does not deal with real knowledge, or else, one
important branch of knowledge is being omitted.?

here,

6
Ibid., p. J4. In his dictionary, Johnson defines
the university as "a school where all arts and faculties
are taught; "r•Iosheim, in the role of the historian, points
out that, before the rise of the University of Paris, "the
whole circle of sciences then known was not taught" and
that the University of Paris "which exceeded all others in
various respects, as well as in the number of teachers and
students, was the first to embrace all the arts and sciences, and therefore first became a University."

7Ibid., n. 16.

By theology Newman means a science
that contains a-corpus of truth about God and man's relationship to Him. Theology embraces system, doctrine, and
propositions. It provides unity to the whole of knowledge
ln the light of an ultimate end.
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Newman is contesting the former view.

That view suggests

that theological beliefs do not constitute knowledge.

It

holds that theology does not contain objective and absolute
truths, a position Newman cannot abide.

For him, such a

position is intolerable because it maintains that nothing
can be kno\vn for certain about the Supreme Being.

Such a

position is untenable because it excludes from the subjects
of one's knowledge " a fact encompassing, closing in upon,
absorbing, every other fact conceivable." 8 It is as if one
would "investigate any part of any order of Knowledge, and
stop short of that w'hich enters into every order. " 9 Newman's position is understandable if one admits a God of the
type in Whom Newman believes.
He goes on to support his major premise by a general principle:
••• when men combine together for any common object,
they are obliged, as a matter of course, in order
to secure the advantages accruing from united action, to sacrifice many of their private opinions
and wishes and to drop the minor differences •••
which exist between man and man •••• Compromise •••
is the first principle of combination.lO
Newman then supplies specific examples.

Both principle and

illustration stress that, in the advancement of universal
knowledge, much can be sacrificed that is personal and in-

8 Ibid., P• J8.
9Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. J5.
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dividual, but the one thing that may not be sacrificed is
"Knowledge itselr.•• 11 For if knowledge is sacrificed, so
is science.

If science is surrendered, so is truth.

truth is sacrificed, so is God.

If

Such concessions would

render a university, as a place for the fostering of knowledge, science, and truth, unworthy of its name.

How can

such an institution profess every science, yet leave out
the foremost among them? 12 If, moreover, science, truth,
and God are disregarded, then the assumption of God's existence and the principle of a whole knowledge and a whole
view might just as well be discarded.

Such exclusions

would be, for Newman, morally and intellectually reprehensible.
To provide additional support for his major and
minor premises, Newman counters the objection that knowledge pertinent to university study should be limited along
certain lines.

Once again, principle and assumption play

a role in his response.

If one admits a God, Newman points

out, he admits an all-encompassing fact that cannot be denied without fragmenting the whole of knowledge. 1 3 This

11 Ibid., p. 36.
12 The validity of the argument hinges on belief in
the existence of a personal omniscient God and the recognition of theology as the science which studies Him.
lJidea of a University, pp. 37-)8.
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fact holds for natural theology, even more so for Revelation.

For Newman, the concept of God refers not at all to

chance, an impersonal force or fate.

The God Who forms the

subject of Newman•s theology is "an Individual, Self-dependent, All-Perfect, Unchangeable Being ...... 14 Furthermore,
belief in such a Supreme Being requires an act of Faith.
It also demands an intellectual act whose object is truth
and whose result is knowledge.

This knowledge forms a sci-

ence that cannot be cast aside as a matter of mere feeling
or sentiment.

God does exist, and man has an immortal

soul capable of attaining Him in the next life and a mind
capable of comprehending Him to some degree in this one.
For Newman, there is no natural evidence to controvert
these beliefs.

At the same time, Newman concedes that if

one believes theological facts not to be absolutely true,
if he thinks them to be no more than a matter of sentiment
or feeling, and if he believes God to be only some impersonal force at work in the world, such a person would have
good reason to exclude theology from a university and to
think its exclusion impairs the wholeness of knowledge not
at all.

If, on the other hand, one believes according to

Newman•s terms, then he cannot exclude theology without
dislocating the parts and whole of knowledge and without
undermining the assumption of God's existence.

14Ibid., p. 46.
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In Discourse II, Newman pursues the true nature of
a university with special emphasis on the first of the two
questions the discourse proposes, namely, the place of theology in a university.

This is a concern Newman views as

fundamental to the establishment of the university's formal
nature.

In treating the question, he reveals the fine line

separating educational reality from pedagogical illusion
and theological truth from religious nonsense.

He shows

how some men operate between each pair as if they were in
an educational or theological labyrinth.

This is unfortu-

nate because there are natural and supernatural guidelines
to insure their not getting lost if only they will use
them.

Newman proposes these guidelines in the form of a

principle and an assumption.

Should anyone choose not to

incorporate them into his view of university education,
Newman adds, that view will be a partial, limited one.
Further, should he wish not to employ them, that person
will find no reconciliation possible between what a university professes to be and what it actually is.

Finally,

should he opt to disregard them, he will discover no realistic compromise possible between man's religious and intellectual aspirations.

His efforts to find fulfillment in

a university framework will go begging.

Left unreconciled,

these aspirations will force him into an intellectual isolation and an educational dream world that refuses to face
theological or secular scientific realities.

In short,
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Discourse II affirms that to deny theology its rightful
place as a science in a university and to separate it from
other sciences is tantamount to polarizing equal branches
of knowledge, proportionate segments of reality, and corresponding natural and supernatural aspirations.

In New-

man's judgment, such an effort places man's spiritual and
educational welfare in jeopardy.
The assumption of belief in a personal God Whom
theology treats in such a manner that the resultant knowledge qualifies as a science, the principle of the wholeness
of knowledge with its interdisciplinary grasp of theology
and other sciences, all matters apparent in Discourse II,
all elements shaping its thematic unity, are further developed in Discourse III.

While merely sketching them in the

former discourse, Newman details their thematic implications in the latter, providing all the while a second answer to the first question of Discourse II.l5

The previous

lecture argued that theology ought not to be excluded because to do so would be a grave omission.

This lecture

points out that the omission of theology would also be
prejudicial to other sciences.

Its argument merits sum-

mary, for it serves to amplify the thematic response of the
previous discourse.
Early in Discourse III, the objection is raised that

l5That is, whether theology ought to be taught in a
university.
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secular and religious subjects should be taught separately
because they deal with different worlds • 16 i'iewman responds
that the omission of religious subjects would be prejudicial to other sciences.
lines. 17

His reasons follow along these

The object of knowledge is truth.

facts and their relations.

Truth deals in

All that exists, as contemplat-

ed by the mind, constitutes a complex fact, a whole which
can be broken down into many particular facts with manifold
interrelations.

Knowledge is the "apprehension" of these

facts in themselves and in relation to one another.

The

hu.rnan mind knows the whole fact only in "partial views or
abstractions.

These segments are called sciences.

Science

emerges as a logical abstraction of the "whole vast fact"
of reality as contemplated by the mind.

It is a "partial-

view" by which the mind embraces "larger or smaller portions of the field of knowledge." 18 For, in spite of its
capabilities, the mind cannot enfold the fact in a. glance
or all at once.

Rather, the mind must view it "under dif-

ferent aspects by way of making progress towards mastering
the whole."l9

Furthermore, each science differs in its

16 rdea of a University, p. 51.
17Ib"
.
__!£•' pp. 52-54.

18

Ibid., p. 53·

l9Ibid.
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importance and impact on the rest.

All sciences "viewed

together," represent the whole amount of objective truth
the mind is capable of grasping.

Consequently, the mind

moves closer to objective truth according to the number of
2
sciences it has mastered in right relation.
Correspond-

°

ingly, the fewer parts, sciences, or branches of knowledge
the mind knows, the less is its grasp of the whole objective truth.

One branch of knowledge depends on the others.

:C:ach helps maintain the whole circle of knowledge.

Again,

the more parts the mind knows, the closer it is to grasping
the whole.

The better it knows the truth in part, the bet-

ter it will grasp the whole of truth.

Finally, if the mind

knows only one relation between two sciences, it may know
quite a bit, but

it~

knowledge will break down and not be·

quite so extensive as it would be with the knowledge of
additional relations.

Newman sums up the principle thus:

I lay it down that all knowledge forms one whole,
because its subject-matter is one; for the universe
in its length and breadth is so intimately knit together that we cannot separate off portion from
portion, and operation from operation, except by a
mental abstraction •••• 21
Discourse III goes on to point out the theological
implications of the wholeness of knowledge,

Newman observes:

He of course in His own Being is infinitely separate ••• , and Theology has its departments toward

20 Ibid., p. 54.
21

Ibid,, p. 57·
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which human knowledge has no relations, yet He
has so implicated Himself with it, and taken it
into His very bosom, by His presence in it, His
providence over it, His impression upon it, and
His influence through it, that we cannot truly or
fully contemplate i~ without in some main aspects
contemplating Him.22
Here is the core of Newman's argument in Discourse III and
a link in principle and assumption with Discourse II.

If

we concede that all knowledge forms a whole with one subject matter, that knowledge is the apprehension of facts in
themselves and in relation to others, that one's grasp of
truth is in direct proportion to the number of relations
.perceived between various sciences, and that God's "presence," "providence," "impressions," and "influence" bear
so strongly on other sciences that to apprehend them is, in
some measure, to apprehend Him, then we must also concede
that theology, the "science of God'' or the "truths we know
about God put into a system," is an especially significant
branch of knowledge and that its omission would seriously
impair our understanding of all sciences and their relations.23

For not to know an important part that bears sig-

nificantly on other parts is to jeopardize our knowledge of
the other parts and the whole.

We cannot exclude theology

or religious truth without compartmentalizing the sciences.
That the principle of the wholeness of knowledge

22 Ibid.
2 3Ibid., p. 65.
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also plays a substantive role in Discourse III is readily
apparent. 24 It underlies the right relation of sciences
and underscores their relative importance.

To say that

knowledge is whole is to affirm that knowledge is one and
integral.

Omission of a part and neglect of due relations

destroys that integrity.

Much as it did in Discourse II,

the principle gives Discourse III its thematic direction,
one pointing toward the ultimate apprehension of the whole
truth and one requiring a science whose principles illuminate that truth by shedding their light and influence upon its parts.

Thus, the principle might also be said to

direct the mind toward an understanding of the nature of a
university that purposes to seek the whole truth by teaching all the sciences that reflect it. 25
No less apparent in Discourse III is Newman's assumption that God exists. 26 His whole argument on the ex-

24 Ibid., p. 57·
25The relationship can be expressed in other ways.
For example, we can say that the sciences of a university
interlock. This interlock binds all of them. Some links
are stronger and, consequently, more important. Theology
is such a link. Its strength, especially, binds partial
truths with the whole. Without the interlock and without
the stronger ~inks, there is no chain, but only separate
links. Separate links of knowledge make a whole chain of
knowledge impossible.
26
Idea of a University, p. 62. In Discourses II and
III, Newman does not attempt to prove the existence of God.
He merely assumes it.

158

istence of theology as a science, its merits, relative importance, and consequent inclusion in a university hinges
on that assumption.

If God exists, then the science that

treats of the truths we know about Him should be duly recognized.

If God exists, theology or the "science of God"

has merit equal to that of any science dealing with a fact
of reality.

If God exists, the science that specially

pertains to Him is important for our understanding of all
sciences because His influence extends to all sciences.

If

God exists, theology is a valid science with an undeniable
impact on other sciences.

Finally, if God exists, the ex-

clusion of theology from a university would work a disservice on the other sciences, the other parts, because it
wouid impair the whole, mutilate· the circle, and throw
knowledge out of joint. 27 Correspondingly, if God does not
exist, as Newman understands Him, then theology would not
constitute a science, would not have any merit in itself or
importance to other sciences, and its exclusion would be no
great loss.

But admit a personal God like Newman's and the

wholeness of knowledge takes on a significantly different
light.
Of equal importance in Discourse III is the interdisciplinary grasp, which is the principle of the wholeness
of knowledge applied to students.

Z7Ibid., p. 69.

Here, again, Newman em-
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ploys it as a process of viewing sciences, the parts of
knowledge, in their proper disposition to each other and
the whole of knowledge.
ence of sciences."

He calls this exercise the "sci-

It synthesizes the partial with the

whole view, the partial with the whole truth, many segments
of knowledge with the whole, and particular facts with the
"one large system or complex fact" 28 of all that exists, as
contemplated by the mind.

'vvhen Newman affirms that theol-

ogy cannot be omitted without detriment to the whole and
other parts of knowledge, he is no more than exercising
the "science of sciences" to develop his theme. 2 9
After the content of Discourses II and III has been
examined for an assumption, a principle of wholeness-, and a
correlative view that shape its thematic unity,3° it might

28 Ibid., p. 52.
2 9For a rather extensive treatment of the "science
of sciences," see Culler, pp. 1~2-1S6, 251, 257, 265, and
2?0.

30The influence that the assumption of the existence
of God, the principle of the wholeness of knowledge, or the
interdisciplinary grasp all wield in shaping the thematic
unity of Discourses II ana III cannot be overstressed.
Principle deals with the partial branches that make up the
whole of knowledge. It justifies Newman's contention for
the place of theology and its inclusion in a university
that purposes to teach not partial knowledge or truth but
the whole range of knowledge and gamut of truth. Assumption treats of the whole and parts of knowledge in relation
to the existence of a God 't'lho makes them ultimately meaningful. The interdisciplinary grasp incorporates partial
views into as whole a view as the mind can comprehend.
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also be examined for evidence of yet another cohesive device, that of structural unity.3l

Within the structure of

the two questions that open Discourse II and the summarized
arguments that conclude Discourse III, two answers to the
first question are enclosed.

Again, that question asks

whether theology ought to be treated in a university.
whole of Discourse II provides one complete answer.

The
It

responds syllogistically that a university must teach all
sciences, that theology is a science, and therefore, that
a university must teach theology.

The parts of Discourse

II support the major and minor of that argument.

Corre-

spondingly, the whole of Discourse III provides a second
answer to the first question of Discourse II.

It states

that to omit theology from a university is not only to impair the whole of knowledge by a major omission but also
to impair the parts, as well, by the importance of the
omission.3 2
Discourses II and III move from question to answer

31Before going on to structural unity, one should
note that principle, assumption, and view also come to
grips in some way with the problem of the one and the many.
The principle of the wholeness of knowledge treats of the
relation of many parts to the ~ whole of knowledge; assumption, the relation of many aspects of truth to the ~
whole truth which is God; "connected view", the relation of
man~ partial views to the one whole view that encompasses
the right disposition of arr-things.
32 Idea of a Universitv, pp. 57-58.
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with an organizing principle of wholeness which can be
viewed as equivocal by reference to that found in the
wholeness of theme.

A part-whole relationship can be seen

in the structural composition of each discourse.

The parts

of each contribute to the structural wholeness of both.
used as an Aristotelian equivocal by reference, "wholeness"
of structure constitutes a secondary instance of "wholeness" of theme.

Then too, for the perception of this

structural wholeness, there is required an interrelated
view not unlike that exercised in establishing the oneness
of theme.
Discourses II and III are structurally unified.
Their structural wholeness complements their thematic integrity.

When Newman relates one section of Discourse II

to another and to the whole to show that theology is a science, which cannot be excluded from a university;JJ when
he, section by section, shows the relation of one science
to another, especially theology to other sciences; when he

JJThe sections of Discourse II relate to each other
and the whole along these lines: statement of the question; answer in the form of a syllogism; support for the
major premise by definition and from two authorities; a
general principle and specific illustration in support of
the major premise; support for the minor in the form of a
response to an objection; a major assumption of the thesis.
The various parts of the discourse constitute Newman's whole first response to the question of whether theology should be excluded from a university. The answer, of
course, is that its exclusion would constitute a grave
omission, one that would hinder the attainment of truth.
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employs the makeup of the discourses to point out that the
partial view, representative of one science, must be related to the whole view of all sciences taken together; when
he, part by part, shows that the partial truth of one science must be seen in its proper disposition to the whole
truth of all sciences; when he by various sections of Discourse III captures the bearing of theology upon other
sciences so that its exclusion is not tolerable without
neglect to part and to the whole;34 when he, in short, uses
the structural parts of each discourse to reflect the
wholeness of knowledge, and to reflect the need to view
knowledge as one, he does then appear to reflect his theme
by the appropriate structure.

By unifying structurally the

segments of each discourse, he shores up his thematic purpose.

His structure suggests his meaning because all

parts of the two discourses blend to shape the formal
structural picture of the two discourses, much the same as
all branches of knowledge unite to form his thematic view
of the wholeness of knowledge.
Concentration on the part-whole relationship or the
complementary nature of theme and structure, however,
should not exclude the more distinctively Aristotelian

4
3 In a similar manner, Newman uses the parts of Discourse III to issue a second response to the first question
of Discourse II. This response states, in short, that to
~xclude theology is to impair the other sciences by the
~mportance of that omitted.
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interpretation that one may assign to the relation of theme
and structure in Discourses II and III.

That interpreta-

tion, following Owens• thesis, addresses itself to the
"wholeness" of theme and the "wholeness" of structure as
Aristotelian equivocals by reference.35

Again, it should

be noted that such equivocals have a common name but different forms and definitions.

Although the forms differ,

there is some unity by reference.

Furthermore, the true

nature of the term or, more precisely, the object it signifies, is found only in the primary instance.

Every other

instance has a special independent relation to the primary
one.

In Discourses II and III, wholeness is expressed in

various ways but always in reference to something one, one
form that is whole primarily.

The primary instance of

wholeness in the foregoing discourses is the wholeness of
knowledge in relation to studies and also in relation to
students.3 6 Accordingly, all knowledge is one, and it must
be viewed in an integrated fashion.

The unity of the view

and the subject viewed is the theme for both discourses.
Considered as the primary instance, the wholeness of knowledge makes Newman's theme for Discourses II and III what it

35see Ch. I, pp. 39-45, for a detailed explanation
of Aristotelian equivocity. See Owens, pp. 259-267.
6
3 In general, the principle of the wholeness of
knowledge is applied primarily to studies in Discourses II,
III, and IV; to students, in V, VI, VII, and VIII.

16~

really is.

It gives Entity.37

This principle renders New-

man's theme formally intelligible and makes his contention
for the inclusion of theology in a university eminently
reasonable,38
The wholeness of knowledge is the primary, formal
instance of wholeness in both discourses.

It constitutes

a primary, formal, thematic instance of wholeness that
takes precedence over any other instance.

It is that pri-

mary instance of wholeness that distinguishes the partwhole relationship of sciences from the part-whole relationship of structure in the two discourses.

The primary

instance is a thematic one by which Newman links Discourses
II and III in principle and form.

The secondary instance

in the aforesaid discourses is the structural whole their
respective parts do comprise.

In this context, structure

is whole and has Entity or form only to the extent that it
refers to the primary instance, the theme or wholeness of
knowledge; for theme alone contains in itself the formal
nature of wholeness for Discourses II and III.

The Entity

of wholeness here is that formed by all branches of knowledge and the integrated view by which they are held.

37The Entity of the wholeness of knowledge is the
primary instance of the Being of the wholeness of knowledge.
8
3 As the form, Entity or what-IS-Being, the principle of wholeness provides ~knowability". See Ch. I, pp.
77-78, above.
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Again, structure derives its Entity only in reference to
that thematic oneness.
As equivocals by reference, thematic and structural
wholeness appear in some ways the same and in other ways
different.

They seem the same in that all sciences are

necessary for a structurally whole picture of Discourses II
and III.

Thematic and structural wholeness also appear

similar in the sense that both deal with part to whole relationships -- partial knowledge to the whole of knowledge,
partial truths to the whole truth, partial views to the
whole view, and partial structural segments to the whole
developed picture.

They differ fundamentally because theme

deals with the relation of part to part and part to the
whole of knowledge, while structure concerns the relation
of partial answers to the complete one.

The burden of

their equivocity by reference, however, is to be found in
the relationship between the primary instance that points
to the interdisciplinary relation or view of the sciences
and the secondary instance that stresses the structural integrity of Discourses II and III.
the equivocity hinges.

On this relationship

Only in relation to it are theme

and structure denominated "whole."
Furthermore, if the importance of any part can be
determined by its impact upon other parts, then Discourses
II and III are very significant indeed to the overall theme
and structure of the Idea.

Thematically, Discourse II is
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crucial because the principle of wholeness stated therein
governs the whole Idea.

Structurally, Discourse II is

pivotal inasmuch as the direction of subsequent discourses
turns on answers to the two questions it proposes.3 9 Discourse III is no less important for the elaboration of
theme and structure it provides.

As its theme, it reaf-

firms the place of theology in a university, employing the
sa~e

principle supplied in Discourse II.

In its structure

it contributes a second answer to the first question of the
previous discourse.
In the context of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, Discourses II and III appear equally important for
the whole of the Idea because their thematic and structural
wholeness mirror the thematic·and structural wholeness of
succeeding discourses.

The primary instance of wholeness

for all of the Idea is the integrity of all knowledge and
the interdisciplinary view of all sciences.

The secondary

instance is the structural oneness of the discourses that
suitably reflects the basic integrity of various branches
of knowledge.

From the standpoint of an Aristotelian in-

quiry that makes the theme and structure of the whole Idea
more intelligible, the Aristotelian approach appears well
suited.

The interrelation of knowledge is applicable to

all the discourses, not merely the second and third.

39Idea of a University, p. 33·

It

re0isters the highest, the primary instance of wholeness in
:-Jewman' s work and relates unmistakably to theme.

A corre-

spending oneness of structure not only refers back to theme
but also might be said to complement it.

If this wholeness

of theme and structure can be adequately established and
some proportional relation between primary and secondary
instances assigned, then the reader will have a useful
Aristotelian key to a better understanding of the unity of
the Idea.
now, then, do the remaining discourses form a thematic and structural whole?

3tructurally, Discourses II-IX

treat two subordinate issues raised at the beginning of
Discourse II.
olo~y

Again, the first of these asks whether the-

ought to be taught in a university; the second,

whether a university should make utility its major concern.
3oth issues are considered subordinate because they elaborate a larger issue.

They constitute part of a larger

question of just what is a university.

This, in turn,

forms part of a still larger issue, treated earlier as l'iewman's preeminent concern, the nature of a Catholic univerSl. t y. 40

.
In genera 1 , Newman uses Dlscourses
II, III, IV,

VIII, and IX to answer the first question.

Ee employs Dis-

courses V, VI, and VII to respond to the second.

In elabo-

rating and responding to the two questions of Jiscourse II,

40

see Ch. II of this study for a treatment of that
major issue.
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the foregoing discourses constitute important structural
parts of the whole answer to the question of what makes up
the nature of a Catholic university. 41
The modes of wholeness considered previously reflect
some of the ways that wholeness can be treated in the Idea.
Wholeness can be expressed in many ways; but in keeping
with the Aristotelian schema, it must always be expressed
in reference to one definite nature. 42

Again, the one def-

inite nature, the form or the primary instance of wholeness
in the Idea, is the interrelated nature of knowledge and
the interdisciplinary manner in which sciences are held. 4 J
Everything else considered whole refers back to this primary wholeness, whether it be that which produces the
wholeness, that of which the wholeness is the sign or the
one for whom the wholeness is formulated.

This dependence

holds especially true for the organization of the discourses.

Structurally, the Idea is almost an artistically

41 All of the foregoing discourses, by their elaboration and response to these two subordinate questions, do, in
fact, "form" the answer to Newman's question of what constitutes the essential nature and scope of a university.
42

See Owens, p. 265.

4 JApart from the Idea, the primary instance of
wholeness would probably-oe-that wholeness of knowledge or
interdisciplinary grasp of knowledge found in the mind of
God. In reference to His interrelated knowledge or "connected view," the one in the Idea would be a secondary instance.
----
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perfect whole to which not much more need be added and from
which little can be removed without damage to the whole.
In general, the structural unity of the discourses
is assured by the uninterrupted interdependence of the
parts -- the issues and the responses.

More specifically,

structural oneness is achieved by the response of all nine
discourses to the primary and secondary issues raised in
the Preface and Discourse I, by the elaboration of these
issues that the two questions of Discourse II provide, and
by the charge they impose for a response in subsequent discourses.

The structural unification of the whole Idea is

further enhanced by the three questions raised in Discourse
VI. 44 While Discourses II and III contribute two answers
to the first question of Discourse II, the fourth discourse
supplies a third answer to the same question.

Discourses

V-VII focus on responses to the second question raised in
Discourse II.

The sixth, seventh, and eighth discourses

respond to the issues raised in Discourse VI, serving at
the same time to elaborate the second issue raised in Discourse II, which, in turn, elaborates the primary and secondary issues raised in the Preface and Discourse I.
Central to any consideration of the leading questions raised in Discourse II and the proper thematic or

4

~Idea of a University, p. 115. These deal with the
relation of intellectual culture to "mere knowledge," "professional knowledge," and "religious knowledge."
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structural unification of subsequent discourses is the
principle of the wholeness of knowledge.
ideal unifying principle.

It serves as an

It supplies an orderly world or

context for the generation of Newman's thematic response to
the basic issues he proposes.

.

It might be said to activate

or complete, in a formal Aristotelian sense, the matter of
Newman's idea of a university.
forms the "body" of his work.

It is the "soul" that inConsidered in the context

of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, the principle constitutes the primary instance of wholeness in all the discourses.

For in addition tO unifying thematically the dis-

courses, it structurally relates them to one another and to
the whole, specifically,.by showing structurally the relationship of theology to other branches of knowledge.

To

reflect the integral relationship of the sciences, the
structural unity of the work also requires an interdisciplinary point of view.

The principle of wholeness inte-

grates and harmonizes the nine discourses, moving them well
along toward what the Idea structurally ought to be.

It

provides the form that makes the nine discourses whole.
It helps make the work a totality that, one suspects, reflects the totality of view and the integrity of the man
who presented the discourses.

The totality of the work

also appeals to the person who would read the Idea with a
total, integrated view.
Much the same as other parts of the Idea, Discourses
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II and III strike the reader with a sense of actuality and
formality that can be viewed profitably in terms of equivocity by reference.

The reader perceives this sense in

the subject matter and form of the university program Newman proposes.

He also notes it in the formal issue or

primary instance of issue that constitutes what is the real
question of Newman•s idea of a university.

This sense of

actua]j_ -~y and formality is no less perceptible in the

grounds or primary instance of grounds on which the idea
is treated. , It is also present in the formal nature of
wholeness, the primary instance of wholeness, that specifies theme and structure.

The reader can also observe a

sense of actuality and formality in the unifying principle
that might be said to govern and to activate the whole
work.

The key to formality and actuality, its primary in-

stance in this case, appears to be the wholeness of knowledge considered in the context of its interrelated subject
matter or interdisciplinary view.

Repeatedly, primary and

secondary instances of the principle of wholeness arise.
Then, too, there is the example of a specific work
being actualized before our very eyes.

Although this pro-

cess is evident in many works, it appears to hold especially true in this case where we see the idea of a university -- its issues, grounds, theme, and structure -- being
actualized, formed, and perfected in a singular manner.
The ultimate factor is the form or formal cause that makes
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this idea of a university newman's and not someone else's.
?orm gives the idea Entity and provides its what-IS-Being.
The formal cause of the idea is the "connected view" or
the interdisciplinary grasp of all sciences.

It is the

formal, shaping, inner, vital, necessary, and unchanging
principle that makes Newman's idea of a university distinctive.
It is not enough, Newman says, for a student to
know well just one area of knowledge.

Neither is it suffi-

cient that an instructor sit in his chair confident in a
firm grasp of his own discipline.
more than that.

.3oth must know and do

Their views must be more comprehensive.

Once we concede that in reading Newman's Idea we
should focus on "the wholeness of knowledge or the interdisciplinary view as an important key to the form or actuality of the work, our understanding gathers around our
formal response to its issues, grounds, theme, and structure because it arises from it.

The actuality of the fore-

going elements in the work points to the sense of actuality
by which they should be interpreted.

The correlative pat-

tern of the discourses reflects the interrelated nature of
the knowledge or sciences whose relations, especially in
reference to theology, the structure of the discourses is
supposed to show.

In other words, the actuality of issues,

grounds, theme, and structure should be mirrored in the
actuality of our integrated view of them.

If all knowledge
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is one, and if the relationship of the various branches is
adequately conveyed by the structure of the discourses,
then our view as readers or listeners should also be one
and integral.
sponse.

If it is, we bear the whole work in our re-

Then our response might be said to be formed and

shaped by the work's theme.

The principle of the wholeness

of knowledge mandates that one perceive the proper disposition of the discourses and the branches of knowledge

whi~h

they treat in right relation to each other and to the
whole.

Accordingly, our understanding of the meaning of

Newman's Idea is shaped by our correct, formal integrated
view.

This response also renders our vision of the Idea

whole, for different facets of the Idea are being read and
treated consistently as primary and secondary instances of
the wholeness of knowledge or the interdisciplinary view.
This approach, used consistently, reflects a valid, philosophically connected view, with Aristotelian equivocity by
reference being employed as its most distinctive schematic
device.

Furthermore, if a sense of actuality is present

to the degree pointed out in this chapter, and form is the
key to that sense of actuality, then the formal cause of
the Idea would appear to merit some extended consideration.
This will be given in a later chapter. 45

~5The interdisciplinary view as the formal cause of
Newman's idea of a university will be treated inCh. VI of
this study.

CHAPTER V
A DISCORDMiT NOTE SOUNDED IN DISCOURSE IV
In Discourse II, Newman raises the question whether
theology ought to be taught in a university.

In Discourses

II and III, he responds that it should for a variety of
reasons.

For him, a university that professes to teach all

sciences must teach theology.

The omission of theology im-

pairs the wholeness of knowledge and inhibits the attainment of truth.

Then, too, Newman feels that all sciences

bear on each other to such an extent that it is impossible
to teach all properly unless each science is taken into
account, and that includes theology.

Moreover, the omis-

sion of theology would be injurious to the whole and parts
of knowledge in view of its importance and its pervasive
influence on all sciences.

In Discourse IV, Newman pro-

vides yet another response to the same question.

He states

there that, if theology is excluded from its rightful
place, other sciences will usurp its province and prerogatives.

He employs the major part of the discourse to sup-

port that assertion.
Underlying the examples used in support is Newman's
principle that the dislocation of one important science
from the whole territory of knowledge must certainly result
174
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in the rush of other sciences to fill its place and that
the rush is oftentimes accompanied by hostility.

In Dis-

course IV, he cites repeated examples of such encroachment
and hostility in regard to theology.

Because the examples

given run so distinctively counter to the educational doctrine advanced by Newman in earlier discourses, they merit
our close attention.

In this chapter, I purpose to con-

sider the examples in some detail with a view to showing,
from Newman's point of view, the damage done when secular
sciences exceed their rights and intrude where they do not
belong.

The first injury wrought by such usurpation is the

destruction of the integrity of all knowledge by the practical omission of one of its most important parts.

No less

important is the damage done to the "connected view."

The

action of the usurping science undermines the interdisciplinary grasp of all knowledge that ought to be present.
Such acti6n reflects a myopic view of the "relative disposition of things."

It discounts the value of a real com-

prehensive view and satisfies itself with the illusion of
a partial one.

The most damaging effect of all, however,

is that the usurpation of theology's province jeopardizes
the attainment of truth.
edge is truth.

For Newman, the object of knowl-

Different sciences supply different ap-

proaches to truth.

Theology is the best approach to truth,

in Newman's view, because its proper study is the One Who
comprises the whole of truth.

Theology provides facts to
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other sciences which they, left to themselves, have neither
the capacity nor the means to ascertain.

Thus, Newman con-

cludes that secular sciences need theology if a more complete grasp of truth is to be had.
As well as any of its predecessors and better than
most of its successors, Discourse IV points up the discord
that oftentimes arises between secular science and theology
due to a misunderstanding of respective roles and a fragmented view of the wholeness of knowledge.

It cites re-

peated examples of, if not secular science caught up in a
vortex of defiance of theological science, at least of correlative, sometimes subsidiary and handmaiden, sciences
attempting to usurp the province and prerogatives of theology.1

Newman asserts most emphatically that
••• if you drop any science out of the circle of
knowledge, you cannot keep its place vacant for it;
that science is forgotten; the other sciences close
up, or, in other words, they exceed their pro~er
bounds, and intrude where they have no right.

Discourse IV reflects an acute problem of communications
and recognition between theology and other branches of
knowledge.

It traces the maturation of the seeds of intel-

lectual and educational discord sown and reaped by persons
who do not know the limitations of their own sciences and

1Idea of a University, p. 77. Newman refers to some
Fine Arts as the "special attendants" of Religion.
2

Ibid., pp. 73-74.
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who do not stay in their own fields.

What gives them the

right, Newman inquires; for in his judgment
men, whose life lies in the cultivation of one
science, or the exercise of one method of thought,
have no more right, though they have often more
ambition, to generalize upon the basis of their own
pursuit but beyond its range, than the schoolboy or
the ploughman to judge of a Prime Minister.J
Although, to some extent, the discourse bears out
the need for theology also to maintain its place and not go
beyond its scope, it is entirely consistent with Newman's
aim that the emphasis should fall on secular intrusions in
theological matters. 4 The discourse spells out the wrongs
that theology suffers from the secular scientific world in
which it finds itself.

It af:(irms that "if Theology is not

allowed to occupy its .own territory ••• , sciences which are
quite foreign to Theology will take possession of it."5
If theology is displaced, it further notes,
these foreign sciences will assume
ciples as true, and act upon them,
neither have authority to lay down
appeal to any other higher science
them.6

certain prinwhich they
themselves, nor
to lay down for

Accordingly, the Painter, the Antiquarian, the Philosophic

Jibido

f

Po

76

I

4
Newman's purpose is that no science be excluded
from its rightful place in a university, least of all theology.
5Idea of a University, p. 91.

6Ibid.
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Historian, the Comparative Anatomist, and the Political
Economist will be found exceeding their territorial boundaries and making "enunciations, not of Science, but of Private Judgment."?

This judgment, in turn, will infect

"every science which it touches with a hostility to Theology ...... a If theology is not taught, the discourse coneludes,
its province will not simply be neglected, but
will be actually usurped by other sciences, which
will teach, without warrant, conclusions of their
own in a subject-matter which needs its own proper
principles for its due formation and disposition,9
Discourse IV underscores the damage done by the usurper in
the form of studies fragmented, educational boundaries violated, and legitimate disciplinary rights curtailed.
Underlying the treatment is the harm wrought to the wholeness of knowledge and to a "connected view .. of such knowledge.

If the exponent of one science usurps the preroga-

tives of another science, the usurper de facto shows he
does not recognize the wholeness of knowledge.

Furthermore,

by trying to make his partial, limited view more than it
is, he gives ample evidence of his loss of a "connected
view" of the sciences.
Discourse IV also treats of the hostility often

?Ibid., p. 92.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 9J.
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accompanying this disjointed view of secular and theological boundaries.

It points out that

the hostility in question, when it occurs, is
coincident with an evident deflection or exorbitar.ce
of Science from its proper course; and that this
exorbitance is sure to take place ••• if Theology be
not Present to defend its own boundaries and to
hinder the encroachment.lO
Featured in the discourse are men of various sciences who
do not tolerate, much less respect, other sciences.

Typi-

cally, each has "the obstinacy of the bigot, whom he
scorns, without the bigot's apology, that he has been
taught, as he thinks, his doctrine from heaven." 11 He is
"a man of one idea" meaning "a man of one science." 12 His
view, partly true and partly false, has limited value because it is so partial. 1 3 Re may expound
principles, all of them true to a certain point,
yet all degenerating into error and quackery, because they are carried to excess, viz. at the point
where they require interpretation and restraint
from other quarters and because they are em~loyed
to do what is simply too much for them •••• l
At any rate, the "man of one idea" who tries to make his
limited science the whole of knowledge, or at least, more

10 Ibid. ,
P• 91.
11 Ibid.,
12 Ibid.
lJibid.
14Ibid.

P•

76.
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than it is, plants the seeds of disrespect, discord, and
hostility in what should be a garden of mutually tolerant
and supportive interdisciplinary relationships.

The fruit

is unfortunate for all sciences involved.
It is not difficult to see why Newman finds a useful
example in the Fine Arts.

Modify the proper view and there

can be easily visualized these "high ministers of the Beautiful and the noble" no longer serving as the "plain,
special attendants and handmaids of Religion." 15 Disregard
the wholeness of knowledge and "they are apt to forget
their place, and, unless restrained with a firm hand, instead of being servants, will aim at becoming principals." 16
Instead of ministering to the ends of Religion, they will
subject Religion to their own .limited purposes.

The dis-

cord, the clash between secular and divine science, would
then become readily apparent.

Painting and Gothic sculp-

ture might also be used to represent the struggle subsidiary sciences can wage against that science from which they
oftentimes draw their greatest vigor and sustenance.

The

prudence that sometimes comes with age and experience
might have dictated another course of action for those arts
had they been more wisely employed.

But not being so pru-

dent or wise, their ministers defy what is to them an ill-

l5Ibid., p. 77.
16 Ibid.
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founded convention of religious authority or responsibility and move on to an ultimately groundless scientific
feud.

Is this senseless feud of the Church's making?

Both

sides recognized the province and governance of the Church
at an earlier time.

Why now are the Fine Arts no longer

able to recognize them?

Newman responds that they have

lost their wholeness of view.

The result is the cause of

Religion being subverted, while corrupt nature and the
powers of darkness are being served. 1 7
In the Comparative Anatomist who denies the immorality of the sou1, 18 Newman cites another example in support
of his point that "any secular science, cultivated exclu-

l?Ibid., p. ?8. Inasmuch as Newman displays an unfortunate tendency to identify Revelation, theology, Faith,
and religion, I think his use of these terms should be
clarified. By theology, Newman means the "Science of God,
or the truths we know about God put into a system," (Idea,
p. 65). Revelation would be the major source of these
truths. Faith is the acceptance of Revealed Truth. It is,
moreover, an intellectual act whose object is truth and
whose result is knowledge (Idea, p. 39). Religion, for
Newman, reflects an effort, embracing all the faculties of
a man, to imitate Christ. In line with Harrold's apt description (Harrold, p. ~?), religion for Newman means a total human experience. It is not a matter of mere feeling
or sentiment. It involves "cultivation" of one•s "intellect," "imagination," "will," "moral sense," and "social
sense" to "transform the religious ideal into the real •••• "
I might add that, for Newman, the relation of religion to
Faith and Revelation is one of agenda to credenda. Religion entails the transformation of that which ought to be
believed into that which ought to be done.
18 rdea of a University, p. 82.
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sively, may become dangerous to Religion." 19

This serves

as one more example of discord in the garden of the sciences, a disharmony stemming from a fragmented view of the
wholeness of knowledge.

In this case, the Anatomist does

not recognize the respective roles of medicine and theology.

Once more, Newman discovers an advocate of one sci-

ence attempting to make the whole of knowledge what is but
a limited part and to foster as a
more than a partial one.

who~e

view what is no

This attempt is all the more sur-

prising, Newman feels, in view of the fact that " ••• if
there be a calling which feels its position and its dignity
to

~ie

in abstaining from controversy and in cultivating

kindly feelings with men of all opinions, it is the medical
.
pro f ess1.on
•••• ,.:co

While recognizing the Anatomist's duty

to pursue his calling, Newman does not understand why he
goes beyond his charge by throwing himself
upon his own particular science, which is of a
material character and [allowing] it to carry him
forward into a subject-matter, wliere it [has] no
right to give the law, viz., that of spiritual beings, which directly belongs to the science of
theology.21
Yet the comparative Anatomist is reputed to be a respectable man.

What Newman has heard of him indicates as much.

19 Ibid.

, p. 74.

20.ll2i£.

, p. 82.

~l_,

.

'

~·

I

;l;.

,~2-33

•
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It is just that he lays down the law in cases where he has
no right.
Another

exa~ple

of the encroachment of one science

upon another is to be found in the Anglican dignitary who
wrote a History of the Jews. 22 He appears to Newman a
moral-minded man, but he exceeds his disciplinary boundaries because of poor judgment, insufficient ecclesiastical
authority, and ignorance of his historical position.

His

questionable judgment leads him to an external view of this
history and to a secular adaptation of it.

He does not see

that his view in the matter is limited and that the principles which he employs legitirr.ately in one discipline degenerate into "error" and "quackery" when applied to another.
Another problem is that this author has "no teaching, to
which he

is

bound to defer, which might rule that to be
false which attracted him by its speciousness." 2 J had he

been a Roman Catholic, he might have been saved from this
error.

Had he been more prudent and knowledgeable of the

limitations of respective sciences, perhaps he would not
have been "betrayed into a false step by the treacherous
fascination of what is called the Philosophy of Hist ory ••••

.,24

~ore

interdisciplinary discord is the only

22 Ibid., p.
8J.
ZJibid., p. 8J.
24 Ibid.
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fruit engendered by this effort.

The Philosophy of History

is "good in its place," Newman adds, "but can scarcely be
applied in cases where the Al.rnighty has superseded the
natural laws of society and history." 2 5
Discourse IV strikes a further discordant note in
the case of the Political Economist and his Inaugural Lecture at Oxford.

In this instance, Newman presents yet

another example of a rupture in the theological-secular
scientific relationship, a break resulting from the economist's distorted view and attempt at aggrandizement.

The

lecturer, "a gentlemen of high character," in a university
"removed more than any other Protestant body of the day
from sordid or unchristian principles on the subject of
money-making," 26 advances a theory that extends well beyond
the scope of his discipline.

He does not merely propose

that there is a science of wealth with rules for its acquirement, distribution, disposal, and the like.

Instead,

his object is to recommend the science of wealth " ••• claiming for it an ethical quality, viz., ••• extolling it as the
road to virtue and happiness, whatever Scripture and holy
men may say to the contrary. .. 27 These are not matters, in
Newman's judgment, that pertain to economics.

~5Ibid.

26 Ibid. , p.
85.
27 Ibid., p. 86.

Moreover, if
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he feels theology abused in the other instances cited, Newm~~

especially feels the hurt of the encroachment of eco-

nomics upon theological matters in the setting of a Christian university.

This, for Newman, is a most representa-

tive example of theology falling "prey" to the unwarranted
excursions of a science into an area where it does not belong.

Theology is being "put out of possession;., its sub-

ject matter is being seized by another science too anxious
to exceed its rights.

As a result of this intrusion, vir-

tue and happiness become questions of .,Private Judgment"
rather than of theological science, and they are deprived
of the higher and more heavenly context in which Newman
feels they should be considered.

Whether led to this posi-

tion by an over-zealous preoccupation with his own science
or by error of private judgment, the lecturer has created
discord among the sciences by usurping the subject area of
one of its prominent members, theology.

Any more than the

Fine Arts, Comparative Anatomy, or History, Political hconomy is not to be constitued "the sole exponent of all
things in heaven and earth." 28
In antiquarian and historical research, Newman cites
still another example of the usurpation attempted by some
to the prejudice of theology.

He does not deny that the

"evidence of History ••• is invaluable in its place; but, if

~ 8 Ibid., p. 74.
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it assumes to be the sole means of gaining Religious Truth,
it goes beyond its place." 2 9 Gibbon sees it otherwise. He
"argues against the darkness at the Passion, from the accident that it is not mentioned by Pagan historians •••• "JO
Protestants argue against Transubstantiation and Arians
against Christ's Divinity along parallel lines.

Newman

argues the lack of scientific foundation for such assertions.

In pleading his case before God and man, Newman

reveals his respect for the wholeness of all sciences,
while displaying his love for theology and filial loyalty
to the Church.

Once again, the seeds of interdisciplinary

di"scord and hostility are sown through the agency of those
who assume a larger office than it is their right to undertake.
In all these examples, Newman•s response merits our
respect, if not our agreement.

To be told that theology is

not a science deserving of a Chair in a university would
upset anyone with the kind of loyalty Newman felt for the
Church.

Add to that denial the further dimension of usur-

pation and hostility, and Newman's reaction becomes more
understandable.

So does his concern over the consequent

disunity in the family of sciences.

The right of theology

to function in its area confronts the determination of

29 Ibid., p. 90.
JOibid.
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other sciences to limit or even completely deny that function.

If, in Newman's words, the Church would attempt .. to

determine the orbit of Jupiter by the Pentateuch" or "to
install the Thomist philosophy in the schools of astronomy
and medicine, .. then her efforts would be the root of the
discord.Jl

If, moreover, she would remain silent while

"Divine Science is ostracized" or not defend her boundaries
from the encroachment of Medicine, History, or Economics,
then her weakness and temerity would constitute the source
of the rupture, and the wrongs done her would be self-imposed.32
a~ong

If, on the other hand, she maintains her place

the sciences, while respecting the rights of other

disciplines, the burden of the responsibility for the dis~armony

lies elsewhere.

It lies, to quote from the dis-

course itself, with the Antiquarian who says, "Nothing has
ever taken place but is to be found in historical documents,"33 or with the Philosophic Historian who claims,
"There is nothing in Judaism different from other political
institutions,"3 4 or with the Anatomist who cries, "There

Jlibid., p. 92. Newman fails to mention that the
Church periOdically has intruded where she had no right,
e.g., in the case of Galilee.
J 2 Ibid.
J3Ibid. , p. 91.

34 Ibid., p. 92.
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is no soul beyond the brain,"J5 or with the Political Economist who avows, "hasy circumstances make men virtuous ... J 6
If we allow that the various branches of knowledge are one,
that none can be neglected without prejudice to the rest,
and that any disregard of this oneness can open the door
to usurpation, then the foregoing statements appear ignorant and capricious.
There are many parallels in the examples cited in
Discourse IV.

Each, according to Newman, causes a rupture

in the right relationship that should exist between secular
and sacred sciences.

Each counters the notion, affirmed by

Newman in the previous discourse, that "in order to have
possession of truth at all, we must have the whole truth;
and no one science, no two sciences, no family of

scienc~s,

nay, not even all secular science, is the whole truth ...... J7
Each example, moreover, confirms a tendency not to recognize that
revealed truth enters to a very great extent into
the province of science, philosophy, and literature,
and that to put it on one side, in compliment to
secular science, is simply, under coloyr of a compliment to do science a great damage.J~

35Ibid.
36Ibid.
37Ibid., pp. 72-73·
38 Ibid., p. 73.
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Each displays the hann wrought when "impatience acts in
matters of research and speculation" or "in the case of
every person whose education or pursuits are contracted ...... J9

3y fonnal though counterfeit declaration, each

also affirms its love and devotion to truth.

Unfortunate-

ly, the love of each for the whole truth appears as unfounded as the false judgment and statement by which each
makes its false claim on a subject matter not its own.
Newman points out that
though they speak truth, they do not speak the
whole truth; ••• they speak a narrow truth, and think
it a broad truth; ••• their deductions must be compared with other truths, which are acknowledged to
be truths, in order to verify, complete and correct
them.4-0
Furthermore, each example reflects a measure of blindness,
erring judgment, and haste.

Each lacks insight.

Each re-

veals deception by the exponent of a given science because
that advocate fails to perceive that "the omission of any
kind of knowledge whatever, human or divine is , as far
as it goes, not knowledge, but ignorance." 41 While theology suffers most here from the unwarranted excursions of
secular science into its area, ultimately all sciences
lose, for the encroachment of one science upon another

39rbid., p. 76.

40 Ibid. ,
P• 89.
41 Ibid. , p.
73.
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jeopardizes the territorial security of all.
Discourse IV illustrates well the notion that discord abounds and usurpation follows when there is little
mutual respect and recognition between secular sciences and
theology.

Its examples depict the fragmentation of sci-

ences stemming from a disorder of minds lost in themselves
and out of touch with the rights of other sciences and the
demands of the wholeness of knowledge.

~ith

various ex-

amples, it traces the genesis of the discord to a lack of
charity, humility, and self-knowledge.
discord in intolerance and pride.

It roots scientific

All of its examples run

counter to the principle cited earlier and reaffirmed in
Discourse IV that
the various branches of science are intimately
connected with each other, and form one whole,
which whole is impaired, and to an extent which it
is difficult to limit, by any considerable omission
of knowledge, of whatever kind, and that revealed
knowledge is very far indeed from an inconsiderable
department of knowledge •••• 42
The family of sciences should be a close-knit unit
with a goodly measure of familial affection and respect to
compensate for the different scope of its members' principles and subject matter.

But the bond which characterized

the relationship between theology and other sciences in
former times appears no longer evident.

Theology's hand-

maiden and sister sciences no longer respect "the important

42~.
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influence which theology in matter of fact does and must
exercise over a great variety of sciences, completing and
correcting them." 4 3

The drift of the examples Newman

cites serves only to show how they now begrudge and even
deny this right.

As a result, the bond of unity is gone,

.

and in its place disharmony, mistrust, and hostility prevail.

4 3Ibid., p. 92.

CHAPT:SR. VI
A PHILOSOPHICAL VIE¥/ OF NE·Nrt.AN 'S

GROUND FLOOR IN DISCOURSES

·v

AND VI

Three earlier chapters of this study have considered
the Catholic and secular university issues, the grounds on
which they are treated, and the unity that characterizes
Newman's thematic and structural development of them, with
the Preface and Jiscourses I-IV serving to initiate the
discussion.

University issues, grounds, theme, and struc-

ture, all have been interpreted in terms of Aristotelian
equivocity by reference.

Using Discourses V and VI as a

point of departure, I propose in this chapter to summarize
some of the more significant material of the two foregoing
chapters with a view to its interpretation in the light of
an Aristotelian schematic device.
aim will be to consider:

i';lore specifically, my

(1) the intellectual and educa-

tional context in which Newman offers a "connected view" as
his educational ideal; (2) some Aristotelian notions on
cause and their application to the ''connected view" as a
principle of change; (J) some Aristotelian

~deas

on

~ntity

and their application to the "connected view" as that which
gives Entity to Newman's idea of a university.

The "con-

nected view" as a principle of change and a principle of
192
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~ntity

will be treated after the manner of Aristotelian
equivocity by reference. 1 Equivocity by reference concerns

an order of priority.

Up to this point, this study has ad-

dressed itself to an order of priority in dealing with the
relation of secondary issues, like those of the nature of
a secular university, the grounds of the inquiry, and the
wholeness of theme and structure, to the primary issue of
the nature of a Catholic university.

The study has also

concerned itself with an order of priority in discussing
the relation of Newman's theological grounds to his philosophical ones, and the relation of his wholeness of theme
to a wholeness of structure.

This chapter will deal with

an order of priority in treating that which causes the idea
of a university and gives it Entity.
The treatment of the "connected view" as a principle
of change and as a principle of Entity addresses itself to
two questions.

The first asks how the "connected view" is

involved in the development of mere learning or unrelated
branches of knowledge into the interdisciplinary grasp that
is the idea of a university.

The second considers how it

is that mere unrelated sciences can take on a Being or
~ntity

they themselves do not possess.

Both questions re-

late to previously treated issues, especially that of the

1The material on cause and Entity, along with the
schematic device employed, will b~ j_r~,wn fr't)JT, Jost~I-'h C\it'?"l • s
interpretation of Aristotle.
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fundamental nature of a university, 2 because they ask what
makes the idea of a university to be what it is and why it
is what it is.

While it is true that both questions merit

consideration in that they may serve to clarify

i~ewman

's

educational theme, even more significant, perhaps, is the
fact that their answers require a philosophical explanation
of Newman•s university ideal.

At its core, the question of

what makes the idea of a university to be what it is is a
philosophical one and deserves a philosophical answer.
Then, too, the questions of the cause and Entity of the
idea are appropriate in view of the largely philosophical
nature of Newman's total educational idea and treatment,
e.g., philosophical grounds, philosophical habit of mind,
philosophical wisdom, religion of philosophy, and man of
philosophical habit.

If, from a purely philosophical point

of view, Newman"s treatment of that which causes the idea
and gives it Entity appears to be manifold, some

exa~ina-

tion and interpretation of his multiple presentation may
very well be in order.

But Newman's treatment of the

causes of the idea does appear to be manifold.

Further-

more, Newman•s total educational ideal embraces philosophical and religious elements.

It looks to the intellectually

cultivated Christian gentleman with a comprehensive view of
this life and the next.

Moreover, Newman's manifold treat-

2
This problem is treated at some length in Chapters
I and II, above.
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ment of some causes of the idea must be investigated if the
philosophical element of his whole educational idea is to
be rightly understood.}
That Newman does consider causality and speak of
more than one type in relation to his educational ideal is
evident from the content of Discourses V and VI.

For ex-

ample, in discussing intellectual enlargement, Newman
speaks of "the action of a formative power, reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements ... 4 The rnaterial and formal causal implications here are fairly apparent.

Elsewhere, in the same discourse, Newman provides

a second example of that concern when he wonders "whether
Knowledge, that is, acquirement, is after all the real
principle of the enlargement, or whether that principle is
not rather something beyond it."5

In a third example, New-

man informs his audience of his purpose:

"to show ••• that

the end of a Liberal Education is not mere knowledge, or

)Although, as Martin Svaglic and others have pointed
out (Svaglic, pp. ix, xv, xx-xxiii), the dominance of the
"connected view" as Newman"s idea of a university appears
evident from the start, still the philosophical and theological contexts in which it assumes its dominant position
have not been explained completely. An ideal that has so
many philosophical and theological overtones warrants investigation in the light of those overtones.
4

Idea of a University, p. 120.

5Ibid., p. 118.
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knowledge considered in its matter." 6

For Newman, mere

knowledge is a condition of intellectual cultivation but
not an end of Liberal 2ducation.

Still another example of

:;evr.nan · s interest in formal or final causality is to be
seen in Nev1man' s declaration that "[Libera:D knowledge is,
not merely a means to something beyond it, ••• but an end
sufficient to rest in and to pursue for its own sake ...... ?
Final causality also comes to mind when we see Newman ponder "what is the end of University .education, and of the
Liberal or Philosophical i(nowledge which I conceive it to
.
t •••• ,8 I\ewman supplies additional evidence of his
lmpar
interest in formal or final causality when he affirms that
"there is a knowledge worth possessing for what it is, and
not merely for what it does.

,.C)

In a seventh example, l'iew-

man points out that "Knowledge is called by the name of

Science or Philosophy, when it is acted upon [an~ infor,10 Although there are other examples that could
me d ••••

61"
. d , P• 117.
___2.L_.

'I I bid., p.
97·

tlibid. , pp. 96-97·
9rbid. , pp. 105-106.
10-b'd
LL·, p. 10J.
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be drmvn from the text, 11 the ones cited suffice to show
r;ewman' s interest in causality and his ma...'1.ifold approach
to the causality of his educational ideal.
In contrast to his multiple treatment of cause,
Newman has very little to say directly on that which gives
3eing or Entity to the idea of a university.

At least, he

does not discuss the matter in those terms.

But the inter-

preter of the idea may so discuss it.

In view of

!'~ewman

's

treatment of the causality of the idea, it appears reasonable that the interpreter should follow up a causal analysis of the idea with a correlative interpretation of its
ultimate Being. 12 What matters, however, is that the philosophical scheme employed to discuss the Being of the idea
should correspond to that used to analyze the causality of
the idea.
~ntity,

Aristotle's equivocal treatment of cause ana

as interpreted by Joseph Owens, lends itself to

11 some equally suitable material will be cited later
in the chapter in connection with the interdisciplinary
grasp itself. See pp. 207, 208, 210, 213, 214, and 216.
below. Examples cited on these pages would pertain, for
the most part, to the formal causality of the idea of a
university.
12 For to know the idea of a university, from an
Aristotelian philosophical standpoint, is not merely to
know the causes involved in the movement from unrelated
learning to related learning but also to know that which
gives the idea of a university its ultimate Being. The
~ntity of the idea is the principle of the idea's ultimate
intelligibility. The first approach emphasizes more how
unrelated sciences become the interdisciplinary grasp. The
second concentrates more on why the idea of a university
has its Being.

ooth treatments.

r.:ore than that, it :provides an excellent

~eans of reconciling Newman•s manifold treatment of ca.use. 1 3
~qually i~portant,

this Aristotelian schematic device makes

9ossible a plausible explanation of those elements found in
the chanze

fro~

unrelated sciences to sciences grasped in

an interdisciplinary fashion.

Jeyond that, it offers a

.rlausible means of ascertaining the .Eein:3 of the idea.

l'he

1

system enables one to pursue the ultimate "why" of the
ide2.• 14

.Finally, such an Aristotelian system helps insure

the unity of :·rewman ~ s educational idea and the integrity of
. .~ne
.'
e 1 emen t s cons t.~ t u t.~n~ 1. t • l5

i·Jotwi thstanding the fairly extensive critical commentary on certain philosophical aspects of the Idea, 16 I
do not beli·eve that anyone has attempted to explain the
idea of a university in reference to the cause of its becoming what it is and in relation to the principle of its

lJit does so by enabling one to determine .Primary
secondary instances of causality and the relationship
between secondary instances and the prLnary one.

and

14

Although many readers tend to associate the ulti:nate "why" of something with its final cause, O..,vens makes
the Aristotelian final cause ultimately identifiable with
the formal. For o·,Nens, Aristotle reduces the final to
for:nal.
l5The study of the idea of a university in the li~ht
of its causes and Entity and by ~eans of Aristotelian equivoclty by reference advances the unity of the idea by the integration of those principles and elements that give it its
.
t•~on an d .;:::;el.nz.
-. .
,~. . e t ernuna
16 ·'"'

.,. 9• 45 , aoove.
'
::Jee G,_Jio .i.,
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.Being.

i:io one to my knowledge has tried to analyze what

makes the idea to be what it is and why it is.

Again, in

view of the causal implications of some of the material in
the Idea and in view of the significant role the philosophical element plays in the composition of I'iewman' s total

.

educational ideal, some discussion of that which gives the
idea its determination and Being seems in order.
In the context of the schematic device to be employed in this chapter, "cause" and "Entity" will be treated
as terms equivocal by reference. 17 In the case of both
cause and Entity we will see instances of terms and things
whose definitions show a measure of sameness in difference.
My purpose in this matter will be to determine what are the
primary or fundamental meanings of the terms "cause" and
"~ntity,"

or more precisely, the primary and fundamental

natures of the things signified by the terms as they relate
to what makes Newman's idea to be what it is and why it is
what it is.

It will be my purpose, as well, to locate sec-

ondary instances of the cause and Entity of the idea in
order to determine some proportional relations existing between secondary and the primary instances.

In the process

of locating primary and secondary instances of the cause
and the Entity of the idea, the "connected view" will emerge

l?For a complete discussion of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, as interpreted by Owens, see Ch. I, pp.
57-65, above.
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as the formal cause of the idea and the dominant principle
of its 3eing.

It will reveal itself to be that which makes

the idea to be what it really is.

Only in reference to

this formal cause, a "connected view," will the other
causes of the idea be said to be causes at all.

Only in

reference to the "connected view'' will the idea be said to
have Entity.

Finally, only in reference to this view will

the other causes be said to have

~ntity.

Newman's idea of a university is distinctive for the
type of education it promotes.

This education is liberal.

Its distinguishing characteristic is the "habit of mind" it
p~oposes

to inculcate.

What, in turn, sets the "habit of

mind" apart is its "connected view."
things in an integrated fashion.

'rhis view perceives

It encompasses reality,

the branches of knowledge that reflect reality, and their
interrelations.

It entails an integrated perspective of

science and all things subject to man on a natural philosophical level by a man of intellectual refinement who has
a predisposition to virtue, though he may also have serious spiritual deficiencies.

It is on the foundation of

this temporal "connected view'' that Newman imposes the
eternal comprehensive perspective of science and reality
by a

m~~

of intellectual cultivation whose ultimate purpose

is to become a wholly educated gentleman with the moral and
intellectual attributes of a Philip Neri.

In contrast to

the purely secular goals of the man of philosophical habit,
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the view of the intellectually cultivated Christian gentleman looks to transcendent and supernatural objectives, in
addition to temporal ones.
The "connected view" or idea of a university advocated by Nevman is really a unified philosophical and theological perspective:

philosophical, in that it relates to

reason and the natural; theological, in that it relates to
God and the supernatural.

But this view may just as well

be labeled a humanistic and religious one.

Its humanistic

element looks more to the interrelation of all things as
they are subject to man.

The religious element sees the

interconnection of man and all earthly things as they are
subject to God.

This combined philosophical and theologi-

cal perspective calls for spiritual as much as it"does the
intellectual growth of a man.

It is characteristic of the

development of the whole man whose integrated view, according to its capacity, envelops as many sciences as possible,
with reason its system and Revelation its guide.

The hum-

anistic and religious perspective called for in the Idea
looks to the capacity of the mind for truth and of the soul
for perfection.

It directs its gaze to the End of Truth

and the Source of Perfection that give man and all things
their ultimate significance •
.Because Ne'Nman•s treatment of the "connected view"
is twofold and such a multiple treatment needs to be reconciled, we should determine which view is primary and what
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is its relation to the secondary treatment :~evvman offers. 18
In terms of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, the primary instance of the view advanced is that "connected view"
or interdisciplinary grasp of science by a man of intellectual culture in whom Faith a.YJ.d reason are allied.

'.lhile

such a man cultivates his mind, he just as actively works
to cultivate his soul.

This is the view Sewrnan pursues in

the context of his discussion of the nature of a Catholic
university on theological or supernatural grounds, with the
end product being the Christian gentleman. 19 In the light
of Aristotelian equivocity by reference, the secondary inst~~ce

of the view is an interdisciplinary grasp of the

scie~ces

by a man of purely mental cultivation.

This would

be the view advanced by Newman in the context of the nature of a university considered apart from the Church and
on philosophical or natural grounds.

But my treatment in

this chapter will not focus on the relationship of the primary and secondary instances of the "connected view."
Rather, it will concern itself with the manner in which a
"connected view" can be considered a principle of chan5e
and a principle of Entity for the idea of a university.

18 see Ch. I, pp. 28-32, above, for critical commentary on Newman's twofold approach to this view.
l9For a more extensive development of the "connected
view" in the context of Catholic and secular university issues, theological a.~d philosophical grounds, and worldly
and Christian gentleman, see Ch. VII, below.

20J
The interpretation will restrict itself to an analysis of
the philosophical or humanistic part of Newman•s educational ideal.

It will limit itself to a philosophical explana-

tion of the philosophical elements that give the idea of a
university its determination and Being.
As I indicated in an earlier chapter, any discussion
of the view advocated in the Idea raises the auestion
.

----

whether the view should be labeled "a connected view" or
"the connected view." 20 The former perspective would be
one which sees truth and the interrelation of the sciences
only gradually and in partial steps.

The latter would per-

tain more to the one and only absolutely complete view of
truth and the sciences.

The first is the view gradually

acquired by man in pursuit of truth.
view held by God Who is ·rruth.

The second is the

Ne'Wman's concern in the

Idea and my interest in this study are with "a connected
view."

This perspective entails a more or less complete

grasp of the relation of one science to another and of one
segment of reality to another, as the sciences and the segments mirror the Ultimate Truth Who is their Source and
End.

Here, the perception of truth is gradual and limited

according to an individual's capacity to understand.

Its

scope embraces a relatively unified view of the "relative
disposition of things."

I spoke earlier of Newman's multi-

20 see Ch. I, pp. ~7-48, above.
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the "connected view" as a term equi7ocal by reference, I
pro;;osed that ti1e prLnary instance of view is a blen:l of
intellectual cultivation which centers on man and a spirit..;.al

refineme~!.t

that tends to focus on God, both of which

are to be found in the Christian gentleman.
ar~r

22

As a second-

instance of view, I advanced that interdisciplinary

~rasp

of the sciences characteristic of the man of philo-

sophical habit.

~otwithstanding

the preeminence of a com-

;·lete )hilosophical-theoloi;ical perspective in

l~evJman'

s

sche:ne and this study's, I have decided to concentrate on
the purely philosophical habit of mind, or

seconda~y

in-

stance of "cor..nected view," 2 3 in seekinc; to establish a
_principle of chan::e and a principle of funda1nental .;;eing
for the idea of a university.

In discussing the type of "cor.nected view" a.dvoca ted
b;;--

~·.~evrnla.~,

I d.o not :nean to su.e;gest tha.t tlte 2-cind of vievt

21 see Ch. I,

.'"l

P
-.1::'"

14-15, 19, 27-28, 67-69, above.
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ch. VII of this study will discuss the Christla~'1
blend of spiritual and intellectual cultivation
i::-1 some detail.
;en~leman's

2
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he advances is precisely known.

Newman simply does not

define exactly what he means by such a view, however much
he gives indication of his meaning in Discourse V or elsewhere.

Neither do I mean to assert that Newman, or anyone

e.lse for that matter, has "the connected view."

Material

from the text -- I am thinking, here, as much of Part II
(UNIVERSITY SUBJECTS DI3CU3SED IN OCCASIONAL LECTUR.i:.S AND
ESSAYS) as I am Part I -- does seem to suggest Newman's
moving in the direction of "a connected view."

·tihether he

ever reached a point at which by his own definition he
could say that he himself had developed a "connected view"
we have no way of knowing.

The movement on the part of a

student towards a "connected view" appears largely a matter of groping and of tentatively grasping just how reality .
and the sciences reflecting it hang together.

Il'1ore than

this, the process seems one in which the student views reality, supra-reality, and the sciences that reflect them
with some measure of unity.

Finally, I think one must be

cautious in appraising Newman or anyone else's "connected
view" or in describing, for example, the "connected view"
as a movement from a relatively unformed state to a relatively formed one because such appraisals might suggest
that the interpreter has a "connected view" sufficient to
judge the merit of that view held by another.

Not having

a "con."lected view" does not, however, preclude anyone from
moving in the direction of one.

In fact, I think that is
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the type of lifetime task Newman has in mind for each of
us.

This discussion of view brings us to Newman•s treat-

ment in Discourses V and VI of the educational and intellectual framework within which "a connected view" is offered as .Newman·s educational ideal.
In Discourse V, Newman continues his inquiry into
the nature and scope of a university, focusing now on the
intellectual framework within which and the view by which
one should seek the true meaning of knowledge in a university scheme.

He states that "a university may be consider-

ed with reference either to its 3tudents or to its Studies."24

In separating his treatment of studies and stu-

dents, Newman is really distinguishing two applications of
the same principle referred to previously, the wholeness
of knowledge.

In relation to studies, the principle con-

cerns the subject of a view, that is, the ultimately interrelated nature of knowledge.

In reference to students, the

principle deals more with the mode of viewing, the interdisciplinary manner in which the various branches of knowledge are held. 25 Newman•s governing principle remains unchanged:
All Knowledge is a whole and the separate Sciences
parts of one •••• All branches of knowledge are
connected together; because the subject matter of

24 Idea of a University, p. 94.
Z5The latter application of the principle is the one
being treated here as the formal cause o:!:' Newman's idea.
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knowledge is intimately united in ttself, as being
the acts and work of the Creator.2o
r~ewman

leaves little doubt in the reader's mind of the on-

going role that the principle of wholeness will continue to
play in his deliberations.

He adds:

They (the science~ complete, correct, balance each
other. This consideration, if well founded, must
be taken into account, not only as regards tne
attainment of truth, which is their common end, but
as regards the influence which they exercise upon
those whose education consists in the study of
them.~?

Fortunately for the seeker of truth -- and that is what
Newman would have his university-educated man be -- this
framework-is based on a solid principle, and it reveals a
comprehensive view that reflects an integrated grasp of the
relations of knowledge and the different
this knowledge mirrors.

asp~cts

of reality

This view of ''the relative dispo-

sition of things» appears reasonable because it operates
on a unifying principle, the wholeness of knowledge, and it
reflects a reasonable explanation of reality -- that all
reality is one.

It does not appear to be the kind of il-

lusory perspective that operates on no real, that is to
say, true principles or that functions on apparent superficial ones which merely shadow reality in some way.
Nev~an

proceeds with his treatment of the scope of

26 rdea of a University, p. 94,
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a university education, using a number of elements he feels
necessary.

First is the right academic atmosphere which

conduces to the proper end.

He visualizes:

an assemblage of learned men, zealous for their
own sciences, and rivals of each other [wh~ are
brought, by familiar intercourse and for the sake
of intellectual peace, to adjust together the
claims and relations of their respective subjects
of investigation.2~
The result is a "pure and clear atmosphere of thought,
which the student also breathes, though in his own case
he only pursues a few sciences out of the multitude." 2 9
Newman feels it supremely important that students function
in such an atmosphere if they are to grasp
the great outlines of knowledge,
which it rests, the.scale of its
and its shades, its great points
as he otherwise cannot apprehend

the principles on
parts, its lights
and ~ts little,
them.JO

Such discriminating powers culminate in a "habit of mind •••
which lasts through life."Jl
In discussing the mystique of atmosphere, the essential worth of properly motivated colleagues, and the "habit
of mind" which atmosphere and colleagues promote, Newman
reaffirms his declaration of faith in the university as the

28 Ibid., p. 95.
29 Ibid.
JOibid., p. 96.
31 Ibid.
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primary source of a dynamic intellectual life and his belief in the integrated grasp of the claims, relations, and
outlines of knowledge as the primary test of its quality.
He just as readily acknowledses the university's responsibility for seeing a student through and for enabling him to
survive with academic integrity.

This is "the special

fruit of the education furnished at a University, as contrasted with other places of teaching or modes of teaching."J2

Here is an educational atmosphere in which a stu-

dent can develop his educational potential, one in which he
can learn to rely on his own intellectual resources in the
process of determining the "relative disposition of things."
Given the right atmosphere, colleagues, and that special
"habit of mind, .. he cannot help succeeding.
From a treatment of the academic elements whose
presence he feels essential to a proper educational milieu,
~ewman

proceeds to consider more precisely the goal of a

university education and the liberal knowledge that is its
hallmark.

He has much to say on the subject, and he ex-

presses himself in not a few ways, seeking that one which
perhaps best embodies his meaning.
tion thus:

Newman raises the ques-

"What is the end of University £ducation, and

of the Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge which I conceive

J 2Ibid.
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it to impart ••• [?]"JJ

He responds it is that knowledge
"capable of being its own end. u3 4 According to ~\ewman,

knowledge can be its own end, and it is rightly designated
liberal to the extent that it has no end beyond itself.
The essential value of such knowledge is to be found in
itself.

\/hile this holds true for every kind of knowledge,

it especially applies to what l'\ewman describes as
that special Philosophy, which I have made to
consist i~ a comprehensive view of truth in all
its branches, of the relations of science to
science, of their mutual bearings, and their
respective values.J5
Ee adds that such knowledge is "not merely a means to
something beyond it, ••• but an end sufficient to rest in
6
~
an d t o pursue ror
l. t sown sa.k e •••• .. 3

A few paragraphs

later, Newman observes that the quest for such knowledge
promises "nothing beyond Knowledge itself ... J7

In addition,

he establishes that such knowledge is aptly characterized

JJibid., pp. 96-97. This question relates to the
Catholic and secular university issues treated inCh. II,
above.
34 Ibid., p. 97.

J5Ibid.

J 6 Ibid.

Some correspondences between i'iewman 's
"Philosophical Knowledge" and Aristotle's notion of ''vdsdom" are strikingly evident. The two are not, however,
identifiable. Newman's "Philosophical Knowledge" is more a
matter proper to the Physics; Aristotle's "wisdom" is a
matter proper to the Metaphysics.
J?Ibid., p. 99.
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by the terms "habit of mind" and "refinement or enlargement
of mind."

Newman affirms that it is also suitably called

"liberal" in that it "stands on its own pretensions, ••• is
independent of sequel, and expects no complement ...... 38 He
further notes that such "knowledge ••• is then especially
liberal, or sufficient for itself, apart from every external and ulterior object, when and so far as it is philosophical ...... J9
The passages collected above offer sufficient indication of Newman's answer to the question raised on the
scope of university education.

That answer centers on

"liberal or Philosophical Knowledge."

It takes sharp issue

with those who postulate that all knowledge must have some
purpose beyond itself
itarian.

that it must be practical or util-

It purposes to show the natural and not merely

utilitarian character of knowledge.

It affirms that knowl-

edge can be its own end and that only knowledge worth pursuing for its own sake deserves to be called liberal.
essential value comes from within.

Its

Such is the nature of

that knowledge Newman makes the special end of university
education with its comprehensive grasp of all sciences,
their proper relations, and their respective values.
Knowledge for its own sake, liberal knowledge, "habit of

JSibid., p. 101.

39Ibid., p. 10J.
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mind.," and "enlargement of mind" are equated.

All find

their focus in the "connected view or grasp of things."
He who has this grasp knows the "relative disposition of
things."L+O

Accordingly, the "connected view" is sufficient

reason for its Being.L+l
I-Jevllila.Yl feels he has good authority and is on solid
grounds in following this traditional view of education.
"I a111 stating," he observes, "what is both intelligible in
itself, and has ever been the common judgment of philosophers and the ordinary feeling of mankind. " 42

I~1oreover,

when he applies the word "Liberal" to knowledge and education, he is no more than expressing "a specific idea, which
ever has been, and ever will be, while the nature of man is
th. e same •••• ,.4J Know~edge that exists for its own sake
satisfies a fundamental need in man.

Newman does not deny

the validity of knowledge that has a purpose beyond itself.
Neither does he reject its need or benefit.L+ 4 ne merely

40

Ibid • , p • 1 0 5 •

41 It is sufficient reason for its being because it

is its own end.
42

rdea of a University, p. 97.

L+J Ibid., p. 102.

44Newman's reasoning and pursuit of this traditional
view of knowledge certainly strikes the reader as Aristotelian. This is not at all surprising when we consider
what Newman himself observes in Discourse V (p. 102):
"While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being
Aristotelians •••• "

21J

believes it useless in explaining the proper scope of a
university education that would inculcate a kind of knowledge or philosophy
which grasps what it perceives through the senses;
••• which takes a view of things; which sees more
than the senses convey; which reasons upon what it
sees, and while it sees; which invests it with an
idea •••• Its worth, its desirableness, considered
irrespective of its results, is this germ within
it of a scientific or a philosophical process.
This is how it comes to be an end in itself; this
is why it admits of being called Liberal. r·iot to
know the relative disposition of things is the
state of slaves or children; to have mapped out
the Universe is the boast, or at least the ambition, of Philosophy.45
Any knowledge other than this type Newman does not see as
the proper subject of a Liberal Education or as a substantive element in his university scheme.

For him, utilitar-

ian knowledge belongs elsewhere, perhaps with commercial
or professional education, but certainly not with a liberal
one.
In the process of treating knowledge in relation to
"mere learning,'' Discourse VI confirms many of those ideas
on the scope of university education and the "connected
view" already proposed in Discourse V.

;iv'hile reaffirming

that "the business of a University is to make ••• intellectual culture its direct scope or to employ itself in the education of the intellect ••• , " 46 i\ewma.,"1 does more than main-

4 5Idea of a University, pp. 104-105.
46

I bid • , p • 114 •
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tain Liberal Education to be the scope of a University.
When he observes that

cultivation of the intellect is
an end distinct and sufficient in itself," 4 7 Newman again
asserts more

th~~

Liberal Knowledge.

~the

the fact that Liberal Education promotes
In concluding that "the intellect must

have an excellence of its own," 48 Newman once again suggests more than the view of Liberal Knowledge as an end in
itself.

By the foregoing statements, Newman is, in fact,

reaffirming the more radical thesis that a university worthy of its designation must inculcate a "habit of mind" or
a "perfection of mind" whereby the student sees the ''proper
disposition of things."

Nev-nnan 's university ideal in Dis-

course VI is once more seen to center on the integrated
view or interdisciplinary grasp.

For to be university

trained, to be liberally educated, and to be rightly steeped in Liberal Knowledge is to have that intellect
which takes a connected view of old and new, past
and present, far ~~d near, and which has ~~ insight
into the influence of all these one on another;
without which there is no whole, and no center. It
possesses the knowledge, not only of things, but
also of their mutual and true relations; knowledge,
not merely ponsidered as acquirement, but as
philosophy.LJ-9

47 Ibid., p. 115.
48

Ibid., p. 114.

4 9Ibid., p. 121. Once again, it should be noted
that Newmanadvances "a connected view" rather than "the
connected view." The former view sees truth and the relation of the sciences only in limited, gradual steps.

215
To know in a truly Liberal manner, then, is to know
with a philosophical view.

'J:o

know in a philosophical man-

ner is to know with a "connected view."

That is the funda-

mental thrust of Newman's contention for the scope of university education, outlined in Discourse V and confirmed in
Discourse VI.

For Newman, no justification is possible for

the existence of a university that does not foster this
liberal view of education.

No university can function in-

dependently of its efforts to promote that "cultivation of
intellect," "intellectual excellence," "enlargement of
mind," or "philosophical knowledge," to which a "connected
view" is central.
In correlative material from the
:~ewman

s~~e

discourse,

observes that "the true and adequate end of intellec-

tual training and of a University is not Learning or Ac.
t •••• .. so
quJ.remen

It is not in his words, "mere knowledge,

or knowledge considered in its matter •••• ,.5l

'ilhile such

knowledge is a "condition" or "means" of ''mental enlargement," it is not the end.

For that enlargement consists,

not merely in the passive reception into the mind
of a number of idea hitherto unknown to it, but
in the mind's energetic and simultaneous action
upon and towards and among those new ideas, which
are rushing in upon it. It is the action of a
formative power, reducine; to order and meaning the
matter of our acquirements; it is a making the
objects of our knowledge subjectively our own, or,

50ibid., p. 124.
5libid., p. 117.
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to use a familiar word, it is a digestion of what
we receive, into the substance of our previous
state of thought •••• 52
Such enlargement, accordingly, requires not the passive
reception, but the active comparison, correlation, and assimilation of the

me~~ing

of mere learning.

A few para-

graphs later, Newman further comments:
That only is true enlargement of mind which is
the power of viewing many things at once as one
whole, of referring them severally to their true
place in the universal system, of understanding
their respective vg.lues, and of determining their
mutual dependence.)J
Although Newman touched on these concerns in earlier
a~scourses,

here he comes to grips with the scope of a

Liberal Education and the whole view it purposes to develop.
Academic atmosphere, motivated colleagues, "Liberal knowledge," "Philosophical knowledge," "habit of mind,'' "in tellectual enlargement," all are important watchwords in explaining Newman's university ideal.
the "connected view."

But the key phrase is

It sums up Uewman's idea.

It helps

us ascertain the center of his educational framework.

11:ore

relevant to my purpose in this chapter, the "connected
view" or interdisciplinary gra3p emerges as a viable Aristotelian formal cause -- as that which makes the idea to be
what it is.

It is to the Aristotelian scheme that supplies

the machinery for an interpretation of the interdisciplinary

52 Ibid., p. 120.

5Jibid., pp. 122-12J.
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grasp as a formal cause that I would like now to turn.
·ro understand better the first major application of
Aristotelian equivocity by reference in this chapter, that
is, to the "connected view" as a cause and principle of the
change from unrelated sciences to sciences viewed in an
interdisciplinary fashion, it is appropriate that we review
some aspects of Aristotle's approach to cause as interpreted by Owens.

Even though the first chapter of this

study provides a fairly extensive treatment of the matter,54 I believe some additional review would be useful at
this point.

In an earlier section of his study, Owens

sketches what he calls the "starting-point and procedure
and goal of the Aristotelian philosophy."55

According to

Owens, a good starting point is Aristotle's statement that
"all men by nature desire to know ... 5 6

Such a desire exists

independent of any utilitarian concern. 57

lilian wants to

know the causes of the material world, and he wants this
knowledge for its own sake.

To gain this knowledge, Aris-

totle directs him to an appropriate starting point, sensible

4

5 see Ch. I, pp. 69-72, above.

55 owens,

P• 172.

5 6Ibid., p. 158.

57 Ibid.
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reality.5~

Study of this sensible reality moves man to

wonder what are the elements or principles by which things
of the sensible universe can be made more intelligible.
Aristotle responds that every object in the sensible universe is a union of two ultimate principles:

the material

principle or that out of which something is made, and the
formal principle or that which makes the sensible object
to be what it is.

The union is an internal one in which

that having the potential to become a determinate sensible
thing does become a determinate sensible thing.

Every sen-

sible object emerges from this discussion as a union of
matter and form.
ciples.

They are the ultimate constitutive prin-

Thus, the form or shape of a man informs the mat-

ter of marble to make up the statue of a man.

However, in

speakinG of knowledge of this or any sensible object, Aristotle describes these two internal principles, along with
two external elements in terms of causality, a consideration which leads into Aristotle's scientific explanation of
sensible things.

For Aristotle, to have scientific knowl-

edge of a thing is to know it through its causes.

The

causes which it is the aim of scientific inquiry to discover are four.

Aristotle describes them in the Physics:

The causes are expressed in four ways. Of these we
say that one cause is the .:.ntity, and the what-is
Being ••• ,another the matter and substrate, a third
that from which motion takes its source, and a fourth

5bibid., p. 172.

219
the cause corresnonding to this, the purpose and
the good •••• 59 Aristotle•s goal is the ultimate causes that fully and finally answer the questions about which man naturally wonders.60
rtow does this treatment by Owens relate to my interpretation of the

"co~'lected

of a university?
will be four:

view" as the cause of the idea

The causes studied in this investigation

the material cause or that out of which the

idea of a university is made; the formal cause or that
which makes the idea of a university to be what it is; the
efficient cause or that from which the movement from unrelated disciplines to related disciplines takes its source;
·and the final cause, the end or good for which the idea of
a university exists.

In line with Owens• interpretation

of Aristotle, "cause" will be used as a term equivocal by
reference.

The causes· of the idea of a university will be

expressed in various ways, and they will be denominated
"cause" only in reference to one cause, the formal cause or
"connected view."

The burden of this section of the chap-

ter will be to establish the nature of the four causes, to
locate the instances in which the term "cause" can be applied, and to determine some proportional relationship of
the instances, one to another.

59-b.d

~·· p.

173.

60 Tb.d
.:-L•, p. 172 •
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The primary instance of causality will be found in
the "connected view."

Other principles or elements of the

idea of a university will be denominated "cause" as the
undetermined material of the idea, as that from which the
movement of the idea stems, or as that good towards which
it moves, but they will be treated as secondary instances
of cause.
A few examples may help to clarify my interpretation of the causal implications of the idea of a university from the standpoint of Aristotelian equivocity by reference.

For Aristotle, causes as equivocals by reference

are "said in many ways."

For instance, the sculptor, the

bronze, and the form or shape are causes of the statue in
different ways.

The bronze is a cause through its being

the material; the sculptor, though his being the agent;
and the form through its being the determinant.

Much the

same as with other equivocals of this type, the name is
identical, but the forms or definitions are different.
Accordingly, the things are "said in many ways."

In a

second example, we say that parents, the matter out of
which the child is made and the human form are causes of
the child.
ways:

Again, these things are causes in different

that out of which the child is made through being

the material; the parents through being the agent; and the
human form through its being that which gives the matter
its determination.

Agent, material, and form have identical
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names "cause," bu.t tt.eir forms or definitions are different.
In a third example, we say that the builder, the bricks and
:nortar, and the form or shape of a house are causes of the
house in different ways:

the bricks aJld mortar through

being the material; the builder through being the agent,
that is, the builder building; and the form or shape of
the house through giving determination to the matter of
brick and mortar.

As I understand Owens' interpretation of

Aristotle, the final cause, as the good or perfection towards which the matter strives or points, would have

~o

be,

respectively, the determined statue, child, and house,
Correspondingly, I say that unrelated sciences, the
student connecting, and a "connected view" are causes of
the idea of a university in different ways.

Unrelated sci-

ences are a cause through their being the material out of
which a "connected view" develops.

The "connector" or one

connecting is a cause through his being the agent.

The

form or "connected view" is a cause through its being that
which gives the matter of unrelated sciences its determination.

The final cause, as the perfection or good toward

which the matter of unrelated sciences moves, would ultimately be the appro'priate "habit of mind" or
view" found in the gentleman.

11

Connected

Here, once again, the name

is identical in that they are all denominated "cause," but
their forms or definitions are different.
they are things "said in :nany ways."

Accordingly,

There is unity by
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reference here and a principle of sameness in difference.
~ow

the interpretation of the causes of the idea of a uni-

versity is to be more specifically worked out is a matter
that needs further elaboration.
·The starting point of this investigation is the sensible reality of the branches of knowledge and a sense of
wonder about the nature of their relationship.

The pro-

cedure involves explaining the causes of the idea of a university in a way that affirms their mutual dependence,
while at the same time, confirming their distinctive principles.

The goaL is the causes that fully explain the

idea to the satisfaction of a mind that wonders what principles or elements are involved in the change from unrelated branches of knowledge to sciences viewed in an interaisciplinary manner.
Vlhat, then, are the principles or causes of the idea
that this study seeks to penetrate?
idea intelligible?

How do they make the

In what sense do they depend on the

formal cause for their causality?
of change or sensible movement?

how are they principles
Finally, wherein lies

their equivocity by reference as causes?

These are the rna-

jor questions.
As Newman points out in Jiscourse III, the object of
knowledge is trutn. 61 Truth pertains to facts and their re-

61 Id ea o f a Unlversl
.
. t y, pp. 52-5J.
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lations.

Facts embrace all that exists.

Reality is a com-

plex fact, a whole, which must be analyzed to determine its
respective parts.

Knowledge concerns the apprehension of

these facts in themselves and in relation to each other.
One cannot know these facts whole; he knows them only in
partial views.

The partial views are called sciences.

They are branches of knowledge.

Sciences, then, are logi-

cal abstractions of the whole by which the mind knows larger or smaller segments of reality.

Sciences differ accord-

ing to the amount of truth or enlightenment that they provide.

.

While all sciences have the same subject matter,

they differ in the manner and measure of their view of reality.

The more parts one knows, the closer he is to grasping

the whole.

The better one knows the truth in part, the

greater is his knowledge of the whole truth.

The degree of

knowledge should be measured by the depth of understanding
regarding the relation of one science to another.

The sci-

ences or partial views are comparable to a material cause.
So considered, they appear a suitable starting point for
a discussion of sensible change in Newman's idea of a university.
Standing unrelated, these branches of knowledge can
be viewed as passive knowledge or mere learning.

In that

sense, they constitute the matter, the material cause, of
Nevman's idea of a university.

However, such passive

knowledge does require an actualizing "view" to make it

move towards a total grasp of truth and to attain that
which we consider its formal determination.

This deter-

mining "view" constitutes the form or formal cause of Newman•s idea. 62 Furthermore, the activation or development
of an interdisciplinary grasp of the branches of knowledge
involves a change, a change from unrelated disciplines,
mere learning, or passive knowledge to a "connected view"
of these disciplines.

However, before there can be a "con-

nected view," there must be a matter that is connectible.
'The change here requires that a potentially "connected
view" be actualized.
Such a change may profitable be viewed in the light
of potency and act.

Indeed, this change cannot be explain-

ed, at least in an Aristotelian context, without consideration being given the potentiality involved, in which case,
we are, of course, addressing ourselves to the matter of
the idea, its material cause.

It should be noted that the

matter of the idea has import only to the extent that it
is required for the realization of the form.

For Aristotle,

a thing comes to be from that whicn it is potentially, not
actually.

Mere learning or the sciences viewed independ-

ently are potentially Newman•s idea of a university before

62

rn discussing the material and formal causes of
s idea of a university, we are addressing ourselves
to knowledge-content (studies) or the material to be connected, and to knowledge-view (students) or the mind's integrated grasp of the content.
~,; ewman'
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they actually become so.

That is not to say that mere

learning or passive knowledge which simply does not reflect
the integrated view all at once becomes the integrated
view.

Rather, the point is that in mere learning are to be

found the conditions of the ''connected view."

If that were

not the case, unrelated branches of knowledge could never
be grasped in an interdisciplinary fashion; mere learning
could never become informed learning.

That it does means

there is in mere learning the capacity to be shaped and determined by the right determining "view."

.::.ven more im-

portantly, that it does means that there is present a shaping or determining principle that has caused mere learninG
to pass over into a state of informed learning.

Mere

learning is the undetermined "stuff," if you will, that
must be limited, perfected, or completed by the interdisciplinary grasp that is its form.

To this end, mere learning

or disunified branches of knowledge have the potentiality
of passing from one state to another.
While we need it to explain the change from mere
learning to something more, potentiality alone will not
suffice.

The agency of something actual

also necessary.

of a form -- is

Accordingly, although mere learning has

the potency to become informed learning, it can never
achieve that state without the form that shapes it into
something more than mere learning.

The form of the idea is

the principle of its definiteness, perfection, and determin-
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ation. 6 3

The actuality of this form is prior to the po-

tentiality of mere learning.

The form or actuality of in-

formed learning is logically prior to the potentiality of
mere learning.

For mere learning is not potentially the

"connected view" unless it can come to be the "connected
view" actually. 64 So too, the potentiality of becoming an
interdisciplinary grasp presupposes the actuality of such
a grasp.

Nothing advances from potentiality to actuality

without the agency of something actual.
to potentiality.

Actuality is prior

Accordingly, unrelated sciences are not

potentially related sciences viewed in an interdisciplinary
manner unless they can come actually to be so viewed.
c~~ot

They

come to be so viewed except by the agency of some-

thing already actual, namely, the "connected view."

The

potentiality of the former presupposes the actuality of the
latter.

The potentiality of the former has its roots in

the actuality of the latter.

The actuality of the "connect-

ed view" is the end towards which the potentiality of the
separate unrelated sciences points.
Furthermore, just as unrelated sciences have the

6J Owens,
.
pp. 197, 337, J62.
64

Although the material of the last few paragraphs
may appear fairly obvious to some readers, it must be covered if the causality involved in the development of the
idea of a university is to be adequately explained.
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potentiality of being comprehensively graspect, 6 5 they have
the potentiality of not being so viewed; while the necessary, the permanent and the unchangeable form, the integrated interdisciplinary view, must be.
is perfect and complete.

The .:orm of the idea

It is actual.

There is no ques-

tion of its coming to be and then ceasing to be.
only the case of its being actualized in
ces.

There is

particu~ar

instan-

The actuality of the idea is restricted to the inte-

grated grasp.

That form, view, hold, or grasp is here con-

strued to be completely and perfectly actual.
necessarily and unchangeably is. 66

As form, it

It does not ·begin and

cease to be.
The integrated view or grasp is the specific form
that completes, determines, and shapes the matter of mere
~earning

or unrelated disciplines.

The view is that which

gives the idea the perfection rightfully due it.

~ere

knowledge is a condition of intellectual culture, but it
is not the form or end of that culture.

The passive re-

ception or acquisition of facts is the condition of intellectual enlightenment, not its formal principle.

Isolated

65 Cwens, p. 339.

The most notable characteristic of
the matter of unrelated sciences would appear to be its potentiality.

66 As the form or what-Is-Eeing of the idea of a university, the "connected view" is necessary, timeless and unchangeable. Still the emphasis is on "a connected view ..
rather than "the connected view." Seep. 203, above.
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facts and sciences are the materials out of which mental
enlargement comes, but only the integrated hold of these
materials fulfills and completes them.

The passive acqui-

sition of facts on however many subjects or disciplines
appears not so important as the arrangement, comparison,
correlation, and digestion of facts in a unified, harmonious view.

Such functions represent the true principle or

form of the idea.
"mental

They are part of that "habit of mind,"

enlar~ement,"

Newman refers.

or "intellectual culture" to which

In mere knowledge, that is, the passive

reception of facts, the nature of the "connected view" exists potentially.

For the actuality of this nature, we

must look to the form with which its nature is identifiable,
the view that sees many things "at once as one whole·," that
refers them to their rightful place in the universal system,
and that understands their "respective values," while, at
the same time, recognizing their "mutual dependence."
m~~·s

New-

idea of a university has its nature fully only when

it exists actually-- when its form has been realized.
·,thether this form, the "connected view," be treated in the
context of "Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge," "habit of
:-:1ind," "refinement of mind," "acquired illumination," "inward

or "intellectual culture," it alone distinguishes the idea of a university. 6 7
endov~ment,"

6 7·l.e., as l•t s f orma 1 cause.
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~.:ere

learning, passive knowledge, and independent

sciences do then become the idea of a university because
they are informed by an inte6rated view.

1hey are shaped

into an integrated grasp because a whole view envelops and
actualizes them.

This form or view makes them formally intelligible and educationally mea.Ylingful. 68 T'hat alone is
the inner and unifying principle that makes Nevvman 's idea

of a university one, whole, and actual.
Thus far, we have centered our attention on the
causes or principles necessary to explain

l~ewman

's idea of

a university from the standpoint of sensible change.

·rhe

idea of a university has been shown to require a union of
matter and form.
ing or

unrelate~

The undetermined material of mere learnsciences constitutes the matter; the "con-

nected view," as that determining principle which limits
what kind of Being it is, appears to satisfy the demands of
form.

The union is construed as one of internal principles

or constitutive elements.
~ut

matter and form are not the only physical prin-

ciples or causes necessary, in an Aristotelian context, to
explain knowledge of the sensible change involved in the
development of Nev.rman 's idea of a university.

Two more

causes are required, the efficient and final.

They merit

our consideration as external conditions, while the formal

68

Owens, p. J6J.
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and material are best treated as internal elements.

Like

the material cause, the final and efficient causes must
ultimately be viewed in reference to form. 69
Because, for Aristotle as interpreted by Cwens, the
efficient cause means that out of which movement comes,7°
we would do well to look again to the formal cause, that
is, to the "connected view," for an explanation of the efficient causality involved in the development of the interdisciplinary view.

The initiation for the movement from

mere learning, passive knowledge, or unrelated sciences to
an integrated view of them comes from the form or "connected view."
cause.

This form is already present in the efficient

The efficient cause is able to cause that form in

another matter.
being

cor~ected

The efficient cause of separate sciences
is the person connecting.

The relation is

that of the agent to the thing done or of the producer of
the change to the thing changed.

The immediate origin of

the movement comes from the person who connects unconnected
sciences.

The physical causation of the movement requires

the mutual contact of the mover and the moved.

A student

develops a "connected view" only because he is capable of
having a ''connected view."

Correspondingly, unconnected

sciences must have the potential to become connected.

6 9Ibid., pp. 363-364.
701,
.d ,
___Q_l_.
P•

17J.

Eut
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the efficiency involved appears to lie in the fact that
because a person is connecting unrelated sciences, unrelated sciences are being connected.

'1'/hen the agent and pa-

tient are in the proper relation, a certain effect, namely,
the "connected view" is inevitable.

It is from the acti-

vating source of form that the development of the idea
stems, much the same as it is towards that form, its perfection and goodness, that the development moves for its
proper end and realization.7 1 The movement from unrelated
sciences to an interdisciplinary view comes from within in
the sense that it originates in the formal, constitutive
element or internal principle.

The form has within itself

a beginning of causing movement because it is actual.

Cor-

respondingly, mere learning or unrelated sciences have a
beginning of being moved.

When the agent, the form that

initiates the movement, comes in contact with the patient,
the matter of mere learning or unrelated sciences, the interdisciplinary view or idea of a university results.7 2 In
short and in less ideal terms, it seems fair to say that
the efficient causality here amounts to a student's tentatively grasping, in some unified manner, previously unrelated sciences and the reality which they reflect.

Th·e

form of the idea is once again seen to play a dominant

7libid.
7 2 Ibid., p. 406.
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role.73
In determining the final cause of the idea, we
should bear in mind that the ultimate

explfu~ation

learning depends on the end that learning serves.

of mere
For

Newman's idea, the end is a relatively unified grasp on
the part of the gentleman of all branches of knowledge.
The form of the idea is the end towards which the development of the idea moves.

The purpose of the potency of un-

related disciplines is the act that properly relates them.
They are moved on account of this end.

They strive to be

actually what they are potentially able to be.

The actual-

ity of informed learning in the gentleman is the end towards which the potentiality of mere learning points.

The

. mere acquirement of knowledge strives after the form of
interrelated knowledge.

It strives to reach the perfection

of unified learning.

It attempts to reach out for whatever

perfection is due it.

In so doing, it is really striving

to approximate the divine life -- to share in the immortal.74

The "connected view" affords it that proximity be-

cause, as form, it alone provides that which is necessary,
unchangeable, and permanent in the idea.
In the treatment of the final causality of the idea,
the form of the idea has become identifiable with act; the

'13 Ibid., p. 359.
7'+ Cwens, p. 461.
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matter, with potency.

Now the potency to be acted upon

differs from the potency of actins upon something else. 75
According to this difference, act is distinguishable from
movement.

The form of the idea of a university is act in

the more perfect sense that it does not seek an end out-

.

side of itself.

The form of the idea has a perfection of

its mm which does not need to lead beyond itself.

'I he

"connected view" is knowledge that is its own end.

It is

whole and unified in itself.

Moreover, as liberal knowl-

edge, the interdisciplinary grasp of sciences need not be
a means to something else.
cient to rest in.

It constitutes an end suffi-

So considered, the end or purpose of the

idea of a university is the "connected view" engendered in
the gentleman.

The form or act of the integrated view is

the purpose intended in the development of the idea.

In

the context of Owens' interpretation of Aristotle, one
must look to the form or "connected view" for an explanation of final causality of the idea of a university, not
only as that which does not seek an end outside of itself,
but also as that goodness and perfection towards which the
matter of unrelated disciplines strives.

3ecause the for-

mal cause stands preeminent in the interpretation employed
in this study, it is more exact to say that the final cause
of the idea of a university is the "connected view" or,

75Tb·,....

~·'

,

l'•

;u'l·)

-rv .J •
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iliore precisely, the appropriate habit of mind found in the
gentleman than it is to say that the final cause is the
gentleman in whom the "connected view" has been fostered.
As a formal cause, the interdisciplinary grasp that distinguishes the gentleman does not strive toward anything
else.
In the foregoing statements, the final cause of the
idea reveals itself to be reducible ultimately to the formal cause.

It also shows itself to contain, much the

s~~e

as the efficient cause, some measure of imperfection and
incompleteness.

Both final and efficient cause depend on

form, as the initiator or end of their movement.

Both

must be described in reference to form for their actuality
and knowability.

In sum, the final cause of the idea has

its ultimate actuality in the form or act of the "connected
view."

'rhe end or purpose of Newman's idea of a university

emerges as the realization of its form in the gentleman
since everything necessary for the complete attainment or
realization of the idea is found in the form.

The priority

of act confirms the preeminence of form in this treatment
inasmuch as form and act coincide.
:lihat has the interpretation thus far revealed about
the cause of the idea of a university?

The main burden has

been to establish the nature of the four causes involved in
the development of mere learning or unrelated branches of
knowledge into the informed learning or the integrated
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grasp that is :'Jewman 's idea of a university.
are

~he

four causes of Aristotle's Physics.

cal principles, and they are real.

These causes
They are physi-

The procedure has in-

valved naming the instances in which the term "cause" can
be applied and establishing some relationship of these instances, one to another.
having sought out the elements or principles of the
idea that can be labeled "cause," having found them

~o

be

four, and having located and defined their instances, I
can now proceed with my treatment of them as equivocals by
reference.

As I indicated previously, the true nature in-

valved in such a type equivocal is to be found only in the
primary instance.7 6 Accordin~ly, the nature of causality
is found in the first instance alone.77

The primary in-

stance of causality in the idea is located in the formal
cause, the "connected view."

The form of the idea primarily

deserves the name "cause" because it answers the ultimate
"why" of th.e ~·de a. 7B

It constitutes the necessary and un-

changeable element in the thing.

Other principles or con-

ditions of the idea designated by the term "cause" have

7 6 see p. 199, above.
7 7 cwens, p. 178.
78 rbid., pp. 176-177• According to Owens, "the words
of Aristotle ••• suggest that in some sense every type of
causality finds its ultimate explanation in the form."
Owens adds that various commentators acknowledge ttis point.

2J6
their owr,_ definition as the undetermi!l.ed material of the
idea, or as ttat out of which the development of the idea
stems, or as that toward which it moves, but these causes
in themselves are not properly the primary cause of the
idea.

They are secondary instances of cause.
The formal cause, then, is the primary instance of

causality in the idea.

Final, efficient, and material

causes need the formal cause for their clarification.

On-

ly in reference to the formal can the other types be denominated "cause" at all.

The material cause is reducible

to the "connected view" potentially.

For scientific knowl-

edge, they must be explained in reference to form.

The

idea of a university is not knowable and neither does it
come to be because of its matter, though the idea cannot
be without the matter.
form.

It comes to be only because of its

I•:ere learning is significant in a causal sense

merely because the form requires it for its realization.
So considered, the material cause is a secondary instance
of cause.

The efficient cause appears equally dependent

upon the formal.

Again, all that is scientifically knowable

in the efficient cause is the form.

Form is the mover that

initiates the movement whereby the idea achieves its complete development.

The form of the idea brings over the

mere learning, which is able to be the idea of a university,
into the state of being the idea of a university.

Viewed

in this manner, the efficient constitutes another secondary

237
instance of cause.
The final cause must also be considered a secondary
instance of cause.

No less than the two previously consid-

ered, it is reducible to the formal in an Aristotelian context.

It is dependent on form.

The final cause of the

idea is the end of the production or movement involved in
the idea's coming to be.

That end is the "connected view"

to be found in Newman's gentleman.

Furthermore, the end

of the idea is to attain the perfection typical of it.
That perfection is found in the form.

Form makes possible

the realization of that perfection rightfully due the idea
of a university and the gentleman in whom it is engendered.
In sum, as the source, the end, and the determining principle in the movement of undetermined

mat~er

to the per-

fection of determined matter found in the "connected view,"
the formal cause is duly designated the cause of the idea
of a university.

As the principle of its complete attain-

ment, actualization, or realization, it is properly called
the primary instance of causality.
The second main application of Aristotelian equivocity by reference in the chapter will focus on the "connected view" as that which gives Entity to Newman's idea
of a university.

But this effort requires some elabora-

tion of Aristotle's idea on Entity as interpreted by
Joseph Owens.

Although Aristotle's treatment of Entity
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was covered to some extent in Chapter I,79 it bears some
elaboration here.
whatever is.

According to Aristotle, Being signifies

As such, it is a concept or common predicate.

3ut Owens sees a problem in the translation and correct
interpretation of what Aristotle precisely means by Being.
Aristotle's use of the word ousia seems to have various
meanings, even in its primary significations. 8
For exam-

°

ple, it means the primary instance of Being.
other Being has some dependence.
in things.

Upon it all

It is the cause of Being

It often signifies something concrete, and it

often refers to

some~hing

individual.

Owens chooses not

to use ousia to express Aristotle's concept of Being.
Neither does he wish to employ "substance" or "essence,"
two other possibilities. 81 Instead of these Owens opts for
"Entity" as that term best able to describe the equivocal
notion, or more precisely, the equivocal nature of the sensible things Aristotle treats. 82
According to Owens, if one is to understand Aristotle's treatment of Being, he must look to the equivocal
term "Entity" by which Being is expressed in various ways

79see Ch. I, pp. 73-B~ above.
80 owens, p. 1)8.

e1Ibid.,

e2 Ibid.,

p.

14e.

p. 153· Entity is capitalized by Owens to
indicate that it is being used to render the Aristotelian
ousia.
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but always in reference to something one or in reference to
one form.
ing.

For Owens, Entity is the primary instance of Be-

It has within itself the true nature of Being, and

only in reference to Entity are all other things said to
have Being.

In the context of equivocity by reference,

Owens sees Aristotle treating different sensible things
with reference to the nature of their primary instance, or
secondary instances in relation to primary instances.
Entity, moreover, conveys the primary and secondary instances of the Being of sensible things in their right relation.

It serves as a guide to the things denoted.

It

also assumes the meaning of all instances encountered.

In

the context of Owens' interpretation: "Entity" appears as
a comprehensive equivocal term that expresses the ultimate
principle of unity and permanence in concrete things.

It

is the permanent, foundational principle of their Being.
As the principle of sameness common to everything that is
Being, Entity remains permanent notwithstanding the changes
something undergoes.

The primary instance of Entity in a

sensible thing is located in that thing's form or What-IsBeing.

Such a form expresses that which is timeless, es-

sential, and necessary about the thing.

The What-Is-Being

expresses, as well, the formal intelligible perfection of
the thing.
is known.

As such, the form is that by which the thing
In relation to Newman's idea of a university,

"Entity" will be treated as a term equivocal by reference.
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Its primary instance will be located in the formal cause,
the "connected view."

Other causes of the idea will be

said to have Entity only in relation to the formal.
Just how "Being" as a term equivocal by reference
extends to all things may be shown in the light of an example involving a thing and its attributes or characteristics.

In the realm of changeable things, Entity is the

primary instance of Being.

All other instances of Being

refer immediately or ultimately to Entity.

The nature of

Being as such -- Being gua Being -- is to be found only in
Entity.

Returning to the attributes or characteristics of

a thing as .an example, we say that the attributes do not
possess the nature of Being in themselves.

The nature by

which they are Being is not their own nature.

The nature

according to which they are Being is the Entity of which
they are attributes.

For example, when I say "the man is

tall," it is the man alone that really is, and it is the
man who is tall.

The tallness by itself and apart from the

Entity of which it is the attribute cannot be said to be in
a primary sense.

Tallness is only in the sense that the

nature of tallness relates to the nature of the man who is
tall.

Accordingly, we say that the primary instance of

Entity would be in the man; the secondary instance, in the
tallness.

From this discussion, man and tallness emerge as

having Being but not in the same way.

Because both man and

tallness have Entity, the name "Entity" is identical as
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applied to both, but the forms or definitions of those
things having Entity are different.

Just as in all equivo-

cals of this type, we observe here sameness in difference
and a unity by reference.
As I indicated above, this example may be used to
shed some light on the manner in which Being extends to the
causes of the idea of a university.

The primary instance

of Entity in the idea of a university is the What-Is-Being,
"connected view," or formal cause.
idea's Being.
something.

It is the cause of the

It makes the idea of a university a definite

It possesses the nature of Being in itself.

The material cause, or that matter of unrelated sciences
out of which the idea of a university develops, does not
possess the nature of Being in itself.

Neither does the

efficient cause, as that from which the development of the
idea stems, possess such Being.

Nor does the final cause

possess the nature of Being in itself.

The nature accord-

ing to which they have Entity is the Entity of the formal
cause to which they refer and to which they may be reduced.
Accordingly, the material, final, and efficient causes cannot be said to have Entity in a primary sense.

They have

Being or Entity only in the sense that their natures as
efficient, final, and material causes relate to the nature
of the formal cause.

The Being or Entity as such, then, is

that of the formal cause.
erence.

The rest have Being through ref-

Thus, we say that the primary instance of Entity
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in the idea of a university is to be found in the formal
cause or "connected view."

Secondary instances are to be

found in the other causes.

They are through and in the

Entity of the formal cause.

All the causes of the idea

have Being, then, but not in the same way.

The proper

question to be asked here is why the matter of unrelated
sciences is something.
"connected view."

The answer is the formal cause or

That is the cause of Being.

If the idea of a university is to be known at all,

it will have to be known after the manner of Entity.

Aris-

totle himself points out that to know anything is to know
it as Entity. 8 3 If that is so, then to know the idea of a
university is to grasp its form, What-Is-Being, or Entity.
Knowledge of the idea of a university requires a reduction
of knowledge to Entity because in seeking the Being of the
.d
.
k.
. t ~ t. t 84 The Entity of the idea
~ ea one ~s see ~ng ~ s ~n ~ y.
of a university is identifiable with the "connected view."
Furthermore, in seeking to explain the Entity of the
idea of a university, we should bear in mind that the fundamental question concerns why the matter of mere learning
or unrelated sciences is something. 8 5 The answer, of

SJibid., p. 321.
84 Ibid.
S)Ibid., p. 337.
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course, is the formal cause or ·lihat-Is-Being.

86

According-

ly, we must look to the form for the Entity of the idea.
The idea of a university has Entity or 3eingness only because of its form.

In the foregoing context, the four

causes are conceived in much the same way as before.

Only

now they are being treated not so much as physical principles of change, but rather, as principles of the idea's Being.

Once again, material, efficient, and final causes are

absorbed in a study of the formal cause since it alone constitutes the primary instance of Entity.

It alone is the

primary cause of the idea's 3eingness.
Mere learning, the simple acquirement of knowledge,
or unrelated sciences can take on a Being or
.themselves do not possess.

they

~ntity

They do so in the composite Be-

ing of unrelated disciplines and the integrated view of
them.

This composite is not a sum of material parts.

The

form in this composite is not just another material element.

The form that gives £ntity and 3eing here is a nec-

essary, permanent, and timeless element.

It provides the

determination that makes the idea of a university a "what,"

e6 owens

. 1'lzes t h e "ls'
.
caplta
to emphaslze "tlme 1 ess
Being." A review of some distinctions made earlier might
also be helpful here. In general, the What-Is-Being pertains to the form; the What-Is to the matter. So too, matter and form, strictly speakin5, pertain to the internal
constitutive principles of indetermination and determination. However, when we speak of a scientific inquiry into
the nature of something, we employ the terms "material
cause" and "formal cause."
I

•

•
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a 3eing determined and distinguishable from other things.
Form takes the unrelated sciences, which may or may not be
grasped in an integrated fashion, and determines them to be
so integrated.

Form, as the principle of definiteness and

permanence within the idea, makes the idea a definite abiding something.

Being has been reduced to intity.

More

specifically, it has been reduced to the formal cause, the
primary instance of Entity in that which we call the idea
of a university.
There is, then, only one cause of the idea that is
cause in the complete sense and that has Entity in the complete sense.

That is the formal cause.

All others are de-

nominated "cause" and are said to have Entity only in relation to it.

The term "Entity" extends to the material, ef-

ficient, and final causes of the idea only through the formal.

Again, the formal cause is identifiable with the

What-IS-Being of the idea.

The what-IS-Being expresses the

timeless Being and formal necessity of the integrated view.
It expresses the formal intelligible perfection of the
interdisciplinary grasp in relation to the matter of mere
learning or unrelated sciences, the what-Is, or the principle of contingency and change.

The what-IS-Being of the

idea of a university also suggests that the "connected
view," as the form, expresses the primary Being of the idea.
Any other elements in the idea are called "Being" or secondary instances of Being solely in reference to that form.

In
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that context, the form of the idea constitutes its necessary and unchangeable Being, in contrast to the what-Is,
the matter of mere learning which is neither necessary nor
unchangeable.

The what-Is of the idea conveys the idea of

a university as matter, as form, or as a composite.

Each

can be used to express what the idea is, but only the whatIS-Being expresses the sense in which the idea of a university essentially and necessarily is Being.
Although the Entity of the idea of a university, as
an equivocal by reference, can be expressed in various
ways, our primary concern with it is in relation to form
and substrate.

In reference to substrate, the Entity of

the idea is the form or "connected view,'' the matter or unrelated sciences, and the composite.

The form is prior to

the other two because it is the primary instance of Entity
in sensible things.
sense:

The form as Entity is primary in every

in definition, in knowledge and in time.

It is

primary in definition because Entity appears in every predication of Being; in knowledge, inasmuch as we know something
more fully when we know what it is; in time, because, of
all the categories, Entity is the only separate one.

ooere

learning and the composite, on the other hand, are Entity
only through the form.

¥li thin

the composite of the idea,

form is the primary instance of Entity.

The composite of

unrelated disciplines and of the integrated view of these
disciplines, i.e., that which makes up a specific, deter-
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mined idea of a university, has Entity and derives its
Entity primarily from the form. 8 7 The composite would be
considered a secondary instance of Entity.

It is the form

within the composite of a specific university idea that
provides determination.

In reference to substrate, the

Entity of the idea may also be viewed as the matter.

This

matter, however, must also be considered a secondary instance of Entity.

Again, it is the form that gives the

matter of unrelated sciences whatever Being and determination it has.

Form is the reason the matter of mere learning or the matter of unconnected sciences is. 88 Form
shapes and determines.

Unconnected learning, considered

potentially as the "connected view," is undetermined and
unknowable precisely as the "connected view." 8 9 Mere
learning contains nothing as such to account for the form
since it supplies neither determination nor knowability.
The form alone provides these.
Also in reference to Entity and substrate, it should
be pointed out that the matter of mere learning has the
capacity to become a "connected view." 90 If matter is a

87 Owens, p.
JJ5.
88 Ibid. , p.
JJ?.
89Ibid. , p.
JJ8.
90ibid., p. JJ9.
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principle that can be according to a form, then unrelated
learning, not yet the "connected view," is capable of becoming an interdisciplinary grasp.

Unrelated disciplines

or mere learning is the matter or potency of the interdisciplinary grasp, even after this grasp has been realized
and has come into Being.

Furthermore, mere learning should

be considered the "connected view" and one with the form in
the sense that mere learning is the "connected view" as
potency.

Moreover, when we say that mere learning express-

es the Being of the idea and when we speak of its telling
what the idea of a university is, we are expressing the Being of Newman's idea as potency. 91 However, when we address ourselves only to the "connected view," we are expressing the idea of a university as act.9 2 Unrelated disciplines, then, appear as the integrated view potentially.
Mere learning, correspondingly, is Entity, but only potentially.93

The interdisciplinary view is Entity actually.

The matter of the idea emerges as a secondary instance of
Entity.

Matter has been emphasized here because, in the

final analysis, substrate means matter, and matter suggests

9libid., p. )41.
92Ibid.
93Ibid.
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indetermination.9 4

Substrate too appears to be only a

secondary instance of Entity.

In short, whatever Entity

the matter or substrate of the idea has comes from the form,
the interdisciplinary grasp, which provides the principle
of determination, knowability, and Being for the idea. 95
Again, the question underlying much of the foregoing
treatment has been how the material element acquires a Being it does not have.9 6 The recurring answer has been the
form of the idea, a form which provides definition, determination, and permanence -- that which makes the idea a
definite, abiding something.97

The Being of the idea ~as

been reduced to intity or the formal cause, the primary instance of Entity in the idea.

~hile

the focus has been on

the material cause of the idea, it is no less important to
note how the final and efficient causes also depend on the
formal for their Being and Entity.
The efficient cause of the idea appears identical
with the formal cause in the sense that the form of the
"connected view" initiates the movement of mere learning
or unrelated sciences to the interdisciplinary grasp of

94 Ibid., p. 345.
95Ibid.
96 Ibid. , p. 316.
97 Ibid., p. 376.
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them.

The form of the idea provides the shaping, constitu-

tive element.

It is the principle of knowability.

The

efficient cause of the idea is known and has Entity only
in terms of form because form alone provides Entity or
what-IS-Being.

Of itself, the efficient cause has neither
Being, Entity, Act, what-IS-Being, nor knowability.9 8 For
any one of them, the efficient cause of the idea must be
reduced to the form.

This is not to say that the efficient
cause is deduced from the form. 9 9 But to be scientifically

knowable and to be understood as Entity, efficient causality must be viewed in reference to formal causality. 100
So considered, the efficient cause of the idea constitutes
a secondary instance of the idea's Entity.
Furthermore, the idea of a university does not come
into being because of its final cause, any more than it
does because of its material and efficient, though it cannot be without them. 101 The idea comes into being and has
Entity because of its form.

It is toward the realization

of the "connected view" found in the gentleman that the
matter of unconnected sciences moves for its completion.

98 Ibid., P• 359.
99Ibid., p. J64.
100 Ibid.
101

Ibid., p. 375·
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The final cause of the idea does not serve as the inner,
shaping principle, the principle of Entity or the intelligible component.

But the final cause of the idea is

identical in some ways with that form which does provide
these.

Everything necessary for the complete attainment

or realization of the idea-- of its Being and Entity
is
to be found in the form. 102 Again, it is toward this goodness and perfection of the form found in the gentleman that
the matter of unrelated disciplines reaches out.

The final

cause of the idea emerges as another secondary instance of
the idea's Entity.
Entity means 3eingness.

Entity is the common nature

found in all things treated as beings.
all beings not as a

ge~us

Entity extends to

but as an equivocal by reference.

The idea of a university has Being by its reference to
Entity.

The Entity of the idea is to be found in that per-

manent, shaping, inner, vital principle that we have described as a "connected view" -- the formal cause.
vides the foundation for the idea's Being.
Entity only because of this form.

It pro-

The idea has

Considered in the fore-

going manner, the formal cause of the idea is the primary
instance of the idea's Entity or Beingness.

Entity em-

braces the material, efficient, and final causes of the
idea, but only as they are secondary instances referring to

102 Ibid., p. 407.

251
the primary instance, form.

Thus, the material, efficient,

and final causes of the idea can be said to have Entity but
only in a secondary sense.

The primary instance of Being-

ness and of Entity in the idea of a university remains as
its formal cause, the "connected view."
This concludes a rather extended treatment of the
"connected view" as a principle of change and as a principle of Being.

The form of the idea or "connected view"

emerges as the primary instance of cause and the primary
instance of Entity.

This primacy is clarified by the use

of "cause" and "Entity" as terms equivocal by reference.
Accordingly, the true nature of the cause of the idea is
located in its primary instance.

So is the nature of En-

tity in its applfcation to the idea to be found there.
That is not to say that the other causes of the idea -- the
material, efficient, and final -- are not causes or that
they do not have Entity.

Having their own natures as prin-

ciples or conditions, they are causes and they do have
tity, but only in a secondary sense.

~n

They are not in them-

selves causes of the idea; they do not in themselves have
Entity.

They are denominated "causes" and are said to

have Entity according to the different relations they bear
to the formal cause.

In the foregoing context, the dom-

inance of the "connected view" or interdisciplinary grasp
as the idea of a university rests assured from the particular Aristotelian point of view employed in this study,
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just as it may appear dominant from some other not so
philosophical context in which it has been considered.

CHAPTER VII
THE HEIGHT, OF THE :SUILDING ANlJ THE NkrURE 01<,

ITS RESIDENTS -- DISCOURSES VII, VIII, AND IX
In Discourses V and VI, we saw that Newman's idea
of a university is notable for the type of education it
promotes.

That education is liberal.

As such, it pursues

knowledge for its own sake --as an end in itself.

Its

distinguishing characteristic is the "habit of mind" it
purposes to inculcate.
one's life.

This "habit" endures throughout

Elsewhere, it is elaborated upon in terms of

"cultivation of the intellect," "intellectual excellence,"
"enlargement of mind," and "philosophical knowledge • .,
"Philosophical knowledge" applies not to mere instruction,
simple learning, the passive acquisition of knowledge, or
the plain accumulation of facts about unrelated sciences.
It relates to the action of a shaping power.

It involves

the "mind's energetic and simultaneous action upon and towards ••• new ideas." 1 The mind orders mere learning and
makes it more meaningful.

.3ut what truly sets the culti-

vated mind apart is its "connected view'' of the matter of

1rdea of a University, p. 120.
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mere learning or its interdisciplinary grasp of the matter
of unrelated sciences.

This formal grasp enables the mind
to see the "relative disposition of things" 2 and to view
··many things at once and as one whole. ,J
It is to the man who possesses the "habit of mind"
that we now turn in this chapter.

.

?or that man is Newman's

gentleman.· ·.;hen considering Newman's idea of a gentleman,
we will do well to keep in mind Discourse VIII, the one in
which his idea is nominally defined.

But we must look to

the Preface and other discourses, as well, for substantive
materials that clarify his definition and provide grounds·
for our interpretation of it.
two major questions.

This chapter will deal with

The first asks whether Newman's def-

ini tion of a gentleman sh·ould be taken as a serious expression or not.

The second considers whether

i~ewman'

man is primarily of a worldly or Christian nature.

s gentleBoth

questions relate to a fundamental problem raised in Chapter
I, namely, the nature of Newman's gentleman.
In response to the first question, I propose that
Newman's statement is not the ironical one some have suggested.4

The issues Newman discusses in the earlier dis-

2 I' . d
_Q.!_., p. 105.

Jibid.' p. 122.
4
culler, McGrath, and others advance
derogatory interpretation.

a."l

ironic or
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courses bear out this assertion.

so does his treatment of

material in Discourses VII, VIII, and IX seem to support
the need for a more serious interpretation.

I submit, in

answer to the second question, that while all discourses
show more or less that Iliewman is discussing the na-cure of
a gentleman in both university and Catholic university contexts, overall they reaffirm the latter one as the primary
context.

On a natural, philosophical, "university-in-the-

abstract" level, I';eV'rrnan proposes as his ideal the man of
philosophical habit who has at least a predisposition to
virtue, though he may well be a sinner.

On a supernatural,

t:r..eological, or Catholic university plane,

i'~ewman

is ad-

vancing as his idea of a gentleman the man of philosophical
habit whose ultimate purpose is to become a saint with intellectual and moral characteristics not unlike those of a
Philip

;~eri.

Critical commentary on these issues reveals agreement on some significant points and marked disagreement on
others. 5

3oth areas are significant for the light they

shed on critical reaction to the fundamental nature of ;,-ewman's gentleman.

'I' hat :'Jewman 's gentleman is the ideal

human product of a university education critics tend to

5The forthcoming review of criticism pertinent to
the questions stated above will be drawn for the most part
from a more thorough review of criticism relevant to the
Idea presented in Chapter I of this study.
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a~ree,

Jessain, for example, labels him "the ideal prod-

uct of a university." 6

Earrold also vS..ews hiLn as such.

'I'r.en there is .3uckler, who SiJeaks of him as "education's
best e.:1d product."?

Culler, too, describes him as an ideal.

-.
•
•
t, a t th e en Q- of Discourse V
Jr
...; _.,.~.::o. . ln
rea_,_+~+'_,_l• rm>=>~ •.''l ewr.1an I s' poln

that
man.

~iberal

~ducation

makes nothing else but the gentle-

That >lei'iman' s idea of a university finds its embodi-

ment in the gentleman sor:1e few critics also 6rant.
perhaps,

stan~s

Culler,

foremost i.:l declaring that the sentleman is

"the living embodiment of

i~ewman'

s conception of knowl-

e d 6- e. ,.8

Correspondingly, critics, for the most part, concede that Newman speaks with two voices on the nature of
the gentleman, much the same as he does on the·nature of the
university he advocates, the grounds he employs, and the
"connected view" he advances.

In the main, critics ac-

knowledge that, alt:r_oussh Newman proposes the man of cultivated intellect with his comprehensive view as the ideal
product of a university, he undercuts the total worth of
such a man by assigning him a significant number of spiritual defects.

For instance, }.arrold affirms that

h
~Jessain,

p. 104.

71ictorian Prose, p. 1J9.
3

Culler, p. 190.

i~ewman'

s
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liberal

educatio~

aims not at moral improvement so much as

at general cultivation of the mind.9

Yet, ~arrold cites

Newman to the effect that a purely liberal education promotes only pride and self-centeredness.
tivation alone is not enough.
~atter

is not much different.

Intellectual cul-

Culler's position in the
McGrath also takes a similar

stand, even while he holds for no real distinction between
intellectual and moral training in the education of the
university • s human product. 10 It should be noted, hmvever,
that although critics admit to hearine; two voices in l·Jewman's response to the nature of the gentleman, they do not
determine which voice speaks louder.

I'\ei ther do they sup-

ply a means to reconcile two opposed voices offered in the
context of one educational scheme. 11
Now, while most of the

foregoin~

material points

~o

areas of critical agreement on the nature of Newman's
gentleman, critical commentary on other fundamental issues
of the Idea 12 correlative to the Christian or secular

~a

ture of the gentleman show some substantive areas of dis-

9Harrold, p. 105.
10-,. , tt...a, p • 174 •
ll'lCura
1

1

.

w1ll propose Aristotelian equivocity by reference as a means to effect a reconciliation of the two
voices.
- I

12 .

1.e., Ca th o1"1c and secular university issues,
grounds, theme, and the like.
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agreement.

These tend more to reveal fundrunentally differ-

ent critical estimates of the gentleman's nature.

These

estimates are characterized by radical disagreement and
some moderate agreement.

In the matter of the Catholic or

secular university issue, controversy centers on whether
Newman's university is a place for the humanistic or Christian development of man.

Positions taken on the issue

range from Corcoran's, which excludes the possibility of
the university as a place for any religious development at
all, to Dale's, which precludes the likelihood of any development other than that type in Newman's university. 1 3
Between these extremes are Harrold, dise, McGrath, and
others who recognize the university as a place for humanistic development but who also acknowledge it as a"place for
religious training.

Which type of developillent is primary

and what is its relation to the secondary type they do not
determine.
On the question of grounds, critics focus their attention on whether the nature of a university education
designed for a certain type of human university product is
to be sought on theological or philosophical grounds.

Once

again, there is some agreement in that critics tend toreject one set of grounds.

Harrold sees Newman approaching

lJSee Ch. I, pp. 21-23, above, for an extended
treatment of criticism relevant to this issue.
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his subject from many angles, the two chief ones being the
humanistic and Roman Catholic. 14 r.:cGrath adds that the
inquiry follows philosophical lines through the fifth discourse but in subsequent lectures pursues a combined philosophical and theological approach. 1 5

Culler also confirms

Newman's use of humanistic and religious grounds. 16

How-

ever, which type of grounds stands preeminent and its relation to other grounds are matters left unresolved.

Given

the unity of Newman•s educational ideal, the likelihood of
his using integrated grounds to pursue it, and the relationship of the educational.ideal and the grounds to the
type of gentleman advocated, I think these are matters that
ought not to be left unsettled.
The nature and relation of the Idea's temporal interdisciplinary grasp of knowledge for its own sake to a supernatural interconnected view of knowledge for the sake of
something more provides a third area with some significant
critical disagreement.

The question is pertinent to the

nature of the gentleman because it involves Newman•s whole
educational scheme and the role of the university-educated
man within that scheme.

Does the "connected view" advoca-

14Earrold, p. 115.
pp. 281-2S2.
16 culler, p. 227. See Ch. I, pp. 25-28, above, for
other criticism on Newman·s grounds.
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ted in the Idea embrace only the intellectually cultivated
man's view of this world, or rather, does it encompass a
perspective that looks beyond to
well?

and tte next life, as

~od

Corcoran, once more, appears at one end of the crit-

ical spectrtun; 0ale, at t:r..e other.

According to Corcoran's

position, the interdisciplinary grasp advanced by Newman
appears ill-suited to God's purposes.

In Dale's view, it

would seem unfit for any purpose other than God's.

Harrold,

J:;:cGratL, Culler, and Svaglic, among ot.r.ers, assume positions
somewhere between these extremes.

Some of them tend to

asree with Harrold's point that general cultivation of the
mind, to which the "connected view" is central, does not
reflect Iiewman 's whole educational ideal.

Some of them

would also grant, with Svaglic, that "intellectual curiosi ty and achievement" must be united with the "humility a.Yld

charity of the truly religious person ... l7
The problem of the religious character found respectively in the man of philosophical habit and in the saint
offers still another area of critical disagreement.

'I' he

religion of philosophy concerns man in relation to ma.Yl.
The religion of the saint places man in relation to man and
God.

Which characterization better describes

versity-educated man?

l'~ewman

's uni-

As well as the discussion of any

17 svaglic, XXll. See Ch. I, pp. 29-J2, above, for
additional critical commentary on this issue.

'1
2 c.

other issue, critical reaction to this problem is rich in
nat~re

the diverse critical estimates it provides on the
:,; ew:man' s gentleman.

of

Corcoran s basic position that ;,-evrman
1

irreparably severs the link between intellect and virtue
indicates one extreme.

Jale's case for "religious exclu-

siveness and Church control of university education" offers
a counter-perspective.

Harrold marks the line between the

spurious reli;ion of the man of philosophical habit and the
•
•
• t • 18 I n T.ue
•
5enu1ne
re 1•1g1on
or~ t-he saln
rormer, ne o b serves
1.--

n

'

a false religion of sentiment; in the latter, the true reli;ion of the sound Christian spirit.
similar in a way.

Culler's position is

Ee notes the ambivalence in i,!ewman s
1

thought re~arding the religious make-up of the gentleman. 19
Yet, Culler leans more to the development of the university-.
educated man as a gentleman than to his growth as an intellectually cul ti va ted saint. 20

~.:c:rath, on the other r1and,

holds more for a close alliance between intellectual culture

spiritual perfection in the education of the university student. 21
a~d

One other area of critical disazreement remains.

It

1~D
.:arro_ld , pp. 111
. -_._1 .J.~2 •
10'Cu ll er, p. 22,.J.
n
20 r'·d

- Ol

21

•

1

D•

~

2r-1
:J

•

~cGrath, p. 170. 3ee Ch. I, pp. 35-78, above, for
other critical reaction to this issue.
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concerns whether Newman's treatment of the gentleman is
serious or not.
tations.

Critics differ sharply in their interpre-

Some, like Harrold, Vargish, ar1d Griffin, advo-

cate a serious presentation on Newman's part.

Culler,

r,!cJ.rath, and Buckler, among others, advance an ironic or
derogatory interpretation. 22

Culler's interpretation holds

special interest in view of the position on
tleman this study will propose.

Ne\~an's

gen-

According to Culler, hew-

man, for want of a better name, calls his gentleman the
"man of philosophic habit." 2 3 Ee is an "idealized type"
and reflects an "unattainable ideal."
"inspirational." 24
the intellect.

his value is largely

His char,;:;e is to seek the perfection of

His range of studies should be neither too

narrow nor his mastery too superficial.

Culler is impa-

ti ent with the "man of philosophical habit" because i''iewman
subtracts an "impossible number of vices" from him. 2 5
Newman, Culler feels, ends up making the university-educated man a "Jack-of-all-trades." 26

Culler points out further

how ironic it 1s that I'fewman's portrait of a gentleman

22'""'
;:)ee Ch • I, pp. J8-42, for additional commentary on
this question.

2 3culler,
24

Ibid. , p. 189.

25r 'd

~··

26

P• 190.

p. 191.

Ibid., p. 19J.

26J
"should be taken as a serious expression of Newman's positive ideal." 2 7
In view of Culler's position that the humanistic and
religious views in combination render a man able to complete
his nature and to present that nature, fully developed, in
the service of God, 28 his ironical interpretation of Newman's gentleman appears inconsistent.

Culler equates the

gentleman with the "ma..Yl of philosophic habit."

He forms,

in Culler's view, one-half of Newman's positive ideal, a
Christian humanistic one.
philosophic habi t

11

If the gentleman or "man of

forms one half of

~iewman

's ideal, why

should Nevvman 's delineation of him not be taken seriously?
Culler further observes that some of Newman's finest commentary on the religion of philosophy is contained in the
portrait of the gentleman.

If that is so, would Nev;man

wish such a commentary to be viewed in less than serious
fashion?

Not to take this commentary seriously is to un-

dercut a religious view most characteristic of one type of
university-educated man.

It is difficult to believe that

Newman would go to such great lengths in formulating the
nature of a secular university on philosophical grounds,
for the sake of fostering a temporal "connected view" with
a specific type of natural religious orientation, for a

27Ibid., p. 2J8.
28Tb"d

~··

p. 242.
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university-educated man he does not wish to be taken seriously.

It would be equally difficult to imagine hewman's

developing the nature of a Catholic university on theological or religious grounds with a view to advancing more of
an eternal "connected view" and appropriate supernatural
religious orientation for a Christian gentleman he wished
to be interpreted ironically.

For Culler to treat

Ne~tvrnan

•s

celebrated portrait of the worldly gentleman less than seriously is to eliminate a constitutive element of what
Culler himself describes as
ideal.

Ne"~ovrnan

's Christian humanistic

Such an approach leaves only the Christian part of

the ideal, important as that may be.
What does this review of criticism reveal, and how
does it·bear on the purpose of this chapter?

Among other

points, the summary indicates that critics tend to recognize Newman's two voices on the nature of the gentleman.
They recognize that he addresses his efforts to the development of a worldly human product of a university, even
while he advocates the development of a more Christian gentlemanly ideal.

They acknowledge the fundamental distinc-

tion he makes between the religion of reason found in the
man of philosophical habit and the religion of Faith observed in the Christian humanist.

Critics discuss this

distinction in general terms, but their overall reaction to
the problem leaves some serious difficulties unresolved.
The most obvious one is that they have not yet found a
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means of reconciling two dramatically opposed concepts of
the gentleman within what appears to be a unified educational scheme.

They do not unify

~~ewman

's two voices.

some unification and reconciliation must be made if

Yet

i~ew

man's presentation of the gentleman is to be aligned with
the type of education advocated, the grounds employed, the
"connected view" advanced, and the type of religious character promoted.
someone.

Is he

Newman's educational ideal exists for
~he

man of philosophical habit who with his

comprehensive view sees all things as subject to man?
rather, is he the man of

philo~ophical

Or

and religious habit

who with his temporal and eternal perspective sees man and
every other thing as

subjec~

to God?

Correlative to that

issue is the question of how seriously Newma."l intends either treatment of the gentleman to be taken.

Disa&reement

among critics on this matter is as pronounced as any one
will find in the corpus of criticism pertinent to the Idea.

The earlier chapters of this study have dealt with
I~ewman'

s issues overall and some specific questions, like

those of grounds, wholeness of theme and structure, the
cause of the idea, and the principle of its Entity, according to an order of priority.

Newman's manifold approach to

the nature of a university, the grounds of the inquiry, and
the "connected view" has been explained according to primary
and secondary instances of terms and things viewed as equivocals by reference.

In this chapter,

Ne'>'~man's

twofold ap-
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preach to the nature of a gentleman will be interpreted in
much the same manner.
what constitutes

:L'he purpose will be to ascertain

~ewman's

primary statement on the nature

of a gentleman and what comprises his secondary position.
Once again, the critical apparatus employed will be equivocity by reference.
to

Nev~an's

To understand better its application

treatment of the gentleman, it may be useful to

review some key aspects of the doctrine and to indicate how
they will be employed in this chapter.
In this

~ype

of equivocity, things are expressed in

various ways but always in reference to one nature or form
that is the primary nature or form of the thing.

Although

differences are overshadowed by some degree of sameness,
the differences are still present, and the true nature of
the term or the thing signified is to be found only in the
primary instance.

Equivocity by reference, then, involves

primary and secondary instances of terms and the things
they signify.

The true nature of the thing is signified

by the primary instance of the term.

Correspondingly, a

secondary instance of the form is signified by a secondary
use of the term.

Each secondary instance of the term or

thing signified has a special independent relation to the
primary term and thing.
In the context of this schematic device, "gentleman"
will be treated as a term equivocal by reference.

l\iewman

will be interpreted as expressing his idea of a gentleman
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in more than one way but always in reference to something
one, that is, in reference to one type of gentleman that
is primary in meaning.

The worldly gentleman and the

Christian gentleman will emerge as instances of terms and
things whose definitions show a de5ree of sameness in difference.

The primary or fundamental meaning of the term

"gentleman," or more precisely, the primary or fundamental
nature of that signified by the term, will be found in the
intellectually cultivated Christian gentleman.

A secondary

instance of the term will be located in the worldly gentleman, the man of philosophical habit, and some proportional
relationship will be established between the secondary and
primary instances.

The worldly gentleman will be deter-

mined to have form·or meaning only in reference to the
Christian gentleman.
The burden of the chapter, then, will be to support
two claims.

First, using Aristotelian equivocity by ref-

erence as the major schematic device, I assert that the
primary instance of Newman's idea of a gentleman is the
Christian gentleman and that the secondary instance is the
secular gentleman.

Second, I propose that Newman's idea of

a gentleman should be interpreted as a serious statement,
whatever the instance considered.

The primary instance

reflects the true nature of "gentleman" as Hewman uses the
term.

It refers to the man of "intellectual cultivation"

whose mind is also imbued with Christian principles and

2U3

ideals.

Ee is no mere "English Gentleman" or stock nine-

teentt-century character.

Rather, he appears a distin-

5uished man of cultivated mind whose human goals are har;r.oni zed with transcendent, supernatural ones and v.ihose
human conduct is reconciled with supernatural
7he secondary instance of

1~ev. man

~otivation.

• s gentleman shows tf:e pro-

file of a worthy man drawn in the context of purely human
goals and natural aspirations.

The worldly model r;ewman

treats as a gentleman in a secondary sense has many redeeming human qualities, but he is not the type of gentleman
,'-Jewman and his university wish primarily to advance.

r.;a-

terial drawn from the Preface and from all the discourses
will be used to support this assertion.
·,/hat some may allege to be the a'nbivalence 29 of
I'iewman' s thought resarding the nature of a <::Sentleman is
reflected as early as the Preface and Discourse I of the
Idea.

It should be pointed out, however, that as one stud-

ies the Preface and succeeding discourses more closely,
and as he applies Aristotelian equivocity by reference to
tr.e scope of a university, its grounds, and its "view," he
senses a more definable position and

the~atic

statement on

the meaning and seriousness of Uev.rman 's gentleman.
lence gives way to clarity.

.Ambi va-

The seriousness of xewr:an's

statement on the ideal surfaces, and the picture of the

29 vU
,-, ll er, p. 22Q..; •
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Christian gentleman with an integrated grasp of the meaning
of this life and the next comes more sharply into focus as
the university's preeminent human product.3°
Although he defines the gentleman in a later discourse, 3l r,;ewman really initiates the discussion of the
nature of a gentleman with his statement on issues in the
Preface.

There, he presents a university groping for the

realization of its proper goal.

In seeking that most fun-

da.rnental to the nature of university education, he appears
to be dealing with the natural form of a university, but
the evidence of the Preface suggests his ultimate concern
to be the nature of a Catholic university. 3 2 l'ievvman readily admits that the charge handed him by the Holy See and
the Irish Hierarchy is the founding of an institution that
would serve the "interests of f{evealed Truth'' and that
would operate "for the sake of .rteli[;ion. ,.33

Iv:oreover, he

wonders aloud whether the goal of such an institution ought

3°The premises used in this chapter to support my
conclusions on the nature of Newman's gentleman and the degree of its seriousness are based on a core of evidence
developed in earlier chapters of this study. This earlier
treatment the reader should also note in judging the validity and soundness of the arg~ments presented inCh. VII.

31.1.e.,

.

~1scourse

VIII.

3 2 see Ch. II, p. 91, above.
Preface.
33Idea of a Gniversity, p. 6.

See also pp. 6-7 of the
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not to be more than the development of just an "English
Gentleman."

The Preface reveals that, not unlike the aim

of the Church, ;-rewman • s purpose in establishing a uni versity must ultimately be judged in the light of Calvary's
meaning. 34 Furthermore, I\r ewrnan' s personal beliefs and constant awareness of God's Presence seem to confirm the nature of his ultimate educational goals, even while he cites
the university as a place for "universal knowledge."

i~ew-

man never wavers on the need for moral growth in the overall picture of man's educational development.

Not for a

moment does he doubt the traditional Catholic alliance of
intellectual and religious instruction.
infuse a religious spirit.

A university must

It must respond to the need for

an omnipresent spirit of religion in university matters.
'>'lhile Newman respects intellectual vigor and solid reasoning, he feels it is spiritual and moral vitality that
crowns the image of the rational man.

A cultivated, well-

educated laity who exert their intellectual and moral influence constitute his university goal, not a group of religious isolationists.
In seeking to reconcile Newman's emphasis on the
natural scope of a university with his concern for its
supernatural and religious foundation, I repeat that the
reader must bear in mind the point of view on issues that

34 =--L··
Tb.d

p.

?.
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;:ewrr.an assumes at a given tir;-:e.

Alle,sedly contrauic-co:cy

. .
15 a conflict between natural and supernatural
posltlons,J
6
objectives, and an apparent conflict of basic issues3 can
be ex:)lained in terms of pri:nary aEd secondary instances.
~his

is a

~atter

for interpretation by Aristotelian equiv-

ocity by reference.37

The na-cure of a Catholic university

with its emphasis on the Church, theology, and intellectual
and moral development emerges as the primary issue of the
Idea.

'Ji th this •.;.ristotelian apparatus we ca::i reconcile

.':ewman' s t·No fold approach to the nature of a university .
.·iithout it, Sevvrnanqs tvw voices tend to appear dissonant
and ur.mana;eable because there is no principle in evidence
to unite them in one integrated educational
If one concedes the

funpa~ental

sche~e.

role of the Catholic

'.::h'J.rch &'1d the imi)Ortance of spiritual values in dewr:1an 's
university scheme as outlined in the Preface, and if one
acknowledges the primacy of the Catholic university issue,
then it is difficult not to concede, as well, that the man
of "philosophical habit," the man for whose intellectual

J5i.e., like those of Corcoran and ~ale in disc~ssinJ
the role of the .:;hurch an:i reli;gion in :~evnnan 's development
of university education.

6

J see the review of criticism in this chapter and
also that of Chapter I.
J7See C::h. II, lJ• 104, above, for a discussion of
lssues in that context.
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cultivation the university exists, should be taken as a
serious model, rather than as a "Jack-of-all-trades," as
Culler makes him out to be.

From a natural or philosoph-

leal point of view, Newma11's Preface reveals that a university should aim at developing a student whose intellectual
refinement sets him apart from other men.
response to the secondary issue.

That is :·rewman's

But even more signifi-

cantly, the Preface proposes that a university should produce an otherworldly man whose broader view includes eternal verities as well as temporal scientific realities.3 8
That is i:(ewman' s response to the primary issue.

Newman

extends himself too far, and he spends too much time and
effort to reveal the lines separating the product of a
university abstractly considered from the product of a
university considered in reference to religious principles
for one to believe that the product is merely an ironic
caricature.

If the primary issue of Newman's Idea is the

nature of a Catholic university, then the primary instance
of the man educated in this university is a Christian gentleman.
~iscourse

I is also rich in clarifying material

about the nature of :1ewman' s gentleman.

In treating the

JBidea of a University, p. 6. i/ith the Vicar of
Christ, Newman feels that "achievements of the intellect"
ought to be contemplated "simply [but not onlyJ in their
relation to the interest of Revealed Truth."

27J
subject and goal of a 1;.:1iversit;;r education, tLe discourse
moves from the Catholic vs. secular university issue raised
~o

in the ?reface

the question of the grounds on which the

inquiry is to be conducted.
pernatural.

Sev~rnan

The lines are natural and su-

's primary and secondary use of these

i:rounds will be employed to justify the statement that ?\ewman's definition of a gentleman is a serious one and that
his gentleman is primarily a supernaturally oriented one.
2ven while tiewman affirms "hunan wisdom" and "human reason"
to be the grounds of the inquiry,J9 the presence of other
evidence supports the thesis that the subject is not

bein~

pursued along merely philosophical or non-sectarian lines. 4
!~evrman

?

feels the discussion should be conducted under the

sanction of the Church.

The principles considered are sig-

nificant "for Catholic objects" and lend themselves to "a
Catholic treatment. ,.4-l
authority.

UltLnately, r~evnnan invokes Church

He focuses on the aim of a "University, of which

Catholicity is the fundamental principle. " 42
"hie:h theological view of a Fni versi ty. ,,__,"J

~:e demands a
?or i\ewman, the

J 9Ibid. , p. 24.
40
41

Ibid., p. 27.

see also Ch. III, pp. 1J2-1J5.

rdea of a University, p. 20.

42_, .

j
.iOl<. ,

4 Jibid.

1

p.

27 .
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main burden of the discourse is to underscore the issue
that dominates his university concerns and to delineate the
primary and secondary grounds on which he will ascertain
the nature of his university product.
fi ewman

~ow,

the product of

's university is the gentleman along with the habit

of mind or character of soul that distin5Uishes him.

.For

us not to take the result of these efforts seriously ap})ears, indeed, to do a grave injustice to

1~ewman

's in ten-

tion and efforts.
~sing

Aristotelian equivocity by reference as our

guide, we see that the nature of a Catholic university
emerges from the pages of Discourse I as the primary instance of issue; the supernatural and theological, as the
44
.
.
t ance
.
pr1.mary
1.ns
o f groun d s.

tion of the

r;hur~~-"'

I'J"ewman Is call for the sane-

"a Catholic treatment," "Catholicity"

as the basic principle, and his invocation of ecclesiastical authority 4 5 confirms our interpretation of his priorities.

:i/e observe that such an order leaves the nature of a

university considered apart from Revelation and Theoloey
as a secondary instance of issue in Newman's Idea and abstract philosophical lines as a secondary instance of
grounds.
This treatment of the Preface and Discourse I

4L~

See Ch. III, pp. 1)8-140, above.

45 Idea of a unl.versltJ, pp. 26, 28.
p

•

0

,.

su~-
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tleman and its interpretation as a serious or less than
s2rious ex)ression is appro_priate if we are to :irasp i·few~an's

idea of a university.

U!1d~r::-:tani

It proposes, further, that to

,J.nd interpret rightly Hew:nan's statement, we

must reconsider the fundamental issues that evoked Newman's
definition and that we

~ust

assign a

on which he responds.

Cur exarnination reveals that .iewman 's

~riority

to the

~rounds

expla.na"!;lOn of the relationsLip between a Catholic universi ty ar:.d a university "ir. . the abstract

11

clarifies the na-

ture of the relationship between the Christian gentleman
anJ his worldly counterpart.

It points out that

.?~ewman

's

theolo.:;ical and philosophical groun:is a.."1d issues are gerl.la:J.e to a discussion of the relati·ve merits of the Christian vs. the v·;orldly man of "philosophical habit.

11

Obser-

vation suggests that the temporal powers of reason, noble
as they are, must be subordinated to the demands of .Fai tr.,
Revelation, and Scripture.
Ey delineating issues and assigning grounds, !\e\"iillan

addresses himself·to the Christian gentleman who would meet
the challenges and come to grips with a secular world without becoming its slaYe and without compromising his spiritual integrity.

In reference to the matter of a secular

university and philosophical grounds, it should be noted
that Jevrma:n feels the search for tr.e ;oal and product of a
liberal education must be expressed in terms of temporal
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efforts.

So he formulates the nature of a gentleman on a

temporal plane.

In dealing with the nature of a non-sec-

tarian university on natural philosophical grounds, Newman
provides for the human dimension of a liberally educated
man.

Such a man's "cultivated intellect" and personal

search for intellectual truth move him well along toward
some important goals of human existence.

But this human

approach is only a prerequisite to a more Christial'l doctrinal approach to man's educational .goals.

For mal'l and

the world he lives in must be reconciled with
scendent supernatural realities.

som~

tran-

That is where I-Iewman' s

emphasis on the nature of a Catholic university and his
use of theological grounds come in.

'l1 hey set the stage

for the development of a gentleman on a supernatural plane.
This formulation looks to the supernatural dimensions of a
liberally educated man and his realization of the goal of
a supernatural life, namely, Christian perfection.

The

potentiality of the natural man with his cultivated intellect can only be realized ultimately in the perfection of
the Christian gentleman.

In the development of this Chris-

tian ideal, the lines between Catholic university issue and
secular university issue, between natural and supernatural
grounds, and between natural and supernatural men of intellectual refinement run closely parallel.

But from the

standpoint of equivocity by reference, one issue, one
set of grounds, and one type of gentleman must stand
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out. 46

If :-;ewman 's emphasis in the Preface and Discourse I

is on the nature of a Catholic university ai-Jd hence on the
supernatural man of philosophical habit, however much he
later discusses his counterpart, and if he shows in Jiscourse I that the primary grounds of the inquiry are supernatural,

I~ewman

's statement on the nature of the gentle:nan

must be taken as a serious expression.
vlise

:o believe other-

to assume that i,lev.rman takes hi3 Catholic university

lS

,

.

.

issue and supernatural grouno.s :..n ·,r;::nn.
Jiscourses II and III provide additional material to
help clarify our understanding of the role ;;e\A1I1la:n assigns
the ;entleman and to help us measure :r.is seriO'J.sness on the
subject.

In the discourses l·;ew:nan 's fore;nost concerns are

the establisr.rnent of theolo6y as a science and its "be'aring" on other branches of knowledge. 47 Thematically, he
pursues both concerns by advocating the principle that all
knowled(;e forms a whole.

4Q
v

'rhi s principle points up the

interrelated nature of all sciences and the interdiscipli::tary manner in which they must be viev1ed.

Newman also pas-

tulates the existence of an Omnipotent ;:;.od as the .source of

46

i.e., in the primary instance of the terms "issue,"
ar~d "ge::ttle.:nan."
Only there will the true nature of each be found.
"grour~ds,"

47

Idea of a Universit¥, pp. JJ-34, 51-52.
Ch. IV, 144-146, above.
48
rctea of a University, p. 57.
p. 144, above.

See also

See also Ch. IV,
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the branches of knowledge and as their ~nd. 4 9

In the same

discourses, he formulates questions whose answers lead back
to the source and whose responses move toward Truth.
Apart from their thematic and structural implications for the whole of the Idea, Discourses II and III

.

point out that the true meaning of Newman's gentleman and
the degree of its seriousness ought to be measured in the
light of that important assumption, the existence of God.
For the assumption illuminates the interrelated nature of
the knowledge the gentleman, the man of philosophical habit, should

~eek,

and it also clarifies the integrated

manner in which he grasps such knowledge.5°
existenc~

To admit the

of a personal God is to admit an all-encompassing

fact that cannot be dismissed without fragmenting the whole
of knowledge whose grasp Newman says it is the charge of
the gentleman to seek.5l

The weight of the assumption, the

nature of the charge, and the obligation it imposes make it
difficult to accept an ironical interpretation of the man
on whom the assumption, charge, and obligation weigh most
heavily.
Furthermore, if we accept Newman's assumption that

49 Idea of a University, pp. J7, J8, 46, 57, 62.
also Ch. IV, p. 145, above.

See

50idea of a University, P• 57.
5lidea of a University, p. 57.
156, above.

See also Ch. IV, p.
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God exists and his premise that God's "presence," "provldence," "impression," and "influence" bear so strone;ly on
other sciences that to apprehend them is in some measure
to apprehend Him,5 2 then it appears that we must concede,
as well, that the man of philosophical knowledge who views
these sciences and integrates them in an harmonious manner
ought not to be considered merely as the worldly gentleman
who perceives the "relative disposition of things."

As-

sumption and premise dictate that he be treated as a man
with a mind capable of comprehending God to some degree in
this life and a soul capable of union with Him in the next.
If the development of a Christian gentleman is not Newman's
preeminent concern, and if this idea of a gentleman is not
to be construed as a serious expression, then neither
should the type of liberal education he advances, the
wholeness of knowledge he stipulates, nor the existence of
God he postulates be taken seriously.
Although Discourse IV does not offer so much support
as some other discourses for a serious interpretation of
Newman's gentleman or the assertion that the Christian man
of cultivated mind is the primary instance of Newman's gentleman, it does provide material that can be used analogously to clarify the relation between the Christian and
secular gentleman.

Discourse IV reveals the discor-d be-

2
5 Idea of a University, p. 57.
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tween secular and sacred sciences stemming from pride and
lgnora.nce. 51~
0

It develops representative samples of secular

sciences' attempts to usurp the rights and prerogatives of
'i4

theology.-

The discourse states, from one point of view,

that people who do not know their own limitations or the
bounds of their ovm disciplines create discord in what
should be the harmonious relationship of the sciences.
In the right relation between secular and sacred
sciences, a relation i'iewman ·defines by examples to the contrary,55 there may be found parallels to the proper relationship that must be established between the worldly and
Christian gentleman.

Just as secular sciences are rendered

more meaningful by God's "presence," "providence," and· "influence" upon them -- to such an extent that to know them
is to know Him -- so may the worldly gentleman's intellectual goals in this world assume a more meaningful dimension
by his realization of some higher spiritual ideals.

Unre-

lated branches of knowledge cannot be considered whole unless viewed in reference to all of trutn.5 6

For to possess

these partial views of truth ultimately is to know God,

SJibid., p. ?6.

54lQll.,
55see Ch.

P•

v,

74.
pp. 180-186, above.

5 6 rdea of a university, pp. 72-7J.
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their source and End.

To know God more or less fully is a

matter of personal spiritual perfection.

Just as the total

view of knowledge takes into account more than secular
branches of learning, so the picture of the whole gentleman
must provide for more than earthly intellectual pursuits.
The human goal of intellectual culture must be merged with
the divine goal of Christian holiness.

Otherwise, the nat-

ural gentleman, left to his own pride and selfishness, may
live a life counter to the realization of Gospel ideals,
even while he appears to seek intellectual truth.

His sit-

uation would then be analogous to that of a purely secular
science which, in the advance of its own interests, works
against the truth of theology and Revelation by treating a
limited, true perspective as if it were the whole truth.
'ile

must acknowledge the limitations of the worldly man of

philosophical habit much the same as we admit to the necessarily restricted limits of secular sciences.

Not to do so

is to ignore the supernatural dimension of man and the ultimate interests of the wholeness of knowledge.
In Discourses V and VI Ne't'ilnan goes on to show that
"Philosophical Knowledge," which it is the purpose of the
university to inculcate, is an end in itself.57

The intel-

lectual cultivation of Nevvman's gentleman demands a compre-

57-b·d
.L ]_ . ,

p.

97 •

See also Ch. VI, pp. 210-211, above .
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hensive grasp of truth in all its parts and an integrated
~s

hold on the relationship of one science to another.J
eral knowledge, or knowledge for its
with a gentleman's knowledge.

o~n

Lib-

sake, is equated

Newman's gentleman emerges

as a·man university-trained, liberally educated, steeped
in Liberal Knowledge, and as a man with an interdisciplinary view.

If there is no possible justification for the

existence of a university that does not foster that view,
and if no university can operate independently of its efforts to promote the "habit of mind" to which that view is
central, then it would appear that one must take Newman's
idea of a gentleman seriously.

For the "connected view'' is

the hallmark of the university-educated man, Newman's gentleman.

If one chooses not to take seriously Newman's

statement regarding him, he ought just as well to disregard
the interdisciplinary view by which the university-educated
man, the gentleman, attains truth while he seeks to grasp
the wholeness of knowledge.

3ut to cast aside this view is

to dismiss that which, in brief, expresses Newman's university ideal.59

Newman designs his university as a place for

the development of someone.
cation.

His education is liberal edu-

His knowledge is liberal knowledge.

5 8 Idea of a University, pp. 92-9J.
pp. 206-207, above.
59see Ch. VI, pp. 215-216, above.

His view is

See also Ch. VI,
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an interdisciplinary grasp.
seriousness of

~\;ewman'

One should not dismiss the

s statement on the ma.YJ. any more than

he should disregard the education, the knowledge, or the
view that characterizes the man's purpose in attending the
university.
Having discussed "Liberal or Philosophical Knowledge" as an end in itself, Newman moves on in Discourse VII
to the "utility" of this knowledge. 60 If pressed hard
enough, he can show the usefulness of the liberal knowledge
that is properly the gentleman's.

Ee begins by reaffirming

that truth is the object of the intellect, _that it is
crasped in part, not intuitively as a whole, and that the
inteTlect discerns truth by a mental process which is both
a matter of training and a matter of rules.

Liberal educa-

tion, or the education of a gentleman, emerges as that
process of training, by which the intellect,
instead of being formed or sacrificed to some particular or accidental purpose, some specific trade
or profession, or study or science, is disciplined
for its o~n sake, for t~e percep~i?n of its own
proper obJect, a.YJ.d for ~ts own n~gnest culture •••• 61
.Newman adds, however, that while "intellectual culture is
its o1rm end, ••• what has its end in itself, has its use in
itself also." 62 He cites the principle that "though the

60 rdea of a University, pp. 142-144.
61

Ibid., p. 1.35·

62rb·
.
__l:.Q.' p. 142.
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useful is not always sood, the good is always useful."
UevnnaYl

adds that "good is not only good, but reproductive

o f goorj ••• • Gooa,

•
lS

pro 1 l. i l C . •,61.,.,
n•

reduced to various syllogisms.

•,Jewman 's argument can be
For one, he

ar~~es

that

wnich is its mvn end has its own use; intellectual culture
is its own end; therefore, it has its own use. 64 Correlatively, Newman contends that what is good is useful; liberal
education is 60od; and therefore, it is useful.

3y analo,;y,

dewman argues that
as the body may be tended, cherished, a..Yld exercised
with a simple view to its general health, so may
the intellect also be generally exercised in order 6 ~
to its perfect state; and this is its cultivation. )
Bor

~Jevrman,

usefulo

then, the cultivation of the mind is good and

Correspondingly, liberal education is a good and

useful thing.

It is so not in the sense that liberal edu-

cation prepares a student for "some art, or business, or

p. 14Lt-.

64 rbid., pp. 144-145. ;,·\ewman supports the assertion
that intellectual culture has its own end and use by an
analogy. :.;uch the same as bodily health, general culture
of the mind is good and useful even though it does not effect ''any definite and distinct work or production." For
Newman, intellectual cultivation serves as an aid to professional and scientific studies of all kinds because it
provides intellectual qualities necessary to take up a..Yly
one of them. In I\ewman 's words, intellectual culture is
useful inasmuch as it constitutes "the best and highest
formation of the intellect for social and political life"
(Idea, P• 183).
65Ibid., p. 145.
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.t:'

•

pro~ess~on,

d
or t rae,
or worK' ••.• .,66

~,:hat

the "cultivated

intellect" does do, "because it is a good in itself," is
to bring "with it a power and a grace to every work and
occupation which it undertakes ...... 67
3ut what is the point of this discussion in reference
to the nature of Newma.Yl' s gentleman and the seriousness of
his expression concernine him?

Again, so very much hinges

on the premise that the man who acquires

r~·ewman

's liberal

education a.nd who undergoes the intellectual cultivation is
r.;ewman' s gentleman, a point so many critics grant aJl.d one
which other readers must also if the
sense at all.
l~ewman'

~

is to make any

If such an identification is made, then

s gentleman emerges as
the man -who has learned to think and to reason and
to compare and to discriminate and to analyze, who
has refined his taste, and formed his judgment, and
sharpened his mental vision, who will not indeed at
once be a lawyer, or a pleader, or an orator, or a
statesman, or a physician, or a good landlord, or
a man of business, or a soldier, or an engineer, or
a chemist, or a geologist, or an antiquarian, but
he will be placed in that state of intellect in
which he can take up any one of the sciences or
callings I have referred to •••• 68

If liberal education and intellectual cultivation are 5ood
and useful in themselves, then the knowledge of the univer-

66 Ibid. , p. 144.

67Ibid., p. 146.
68 Tb"d
.::.-1:.....·, p. 145 •
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sity-trained man is good and useful.
for just about any calling.

tor it prepares him

1\:oreover, if the university-

educated man and ;jewman is gentleman are one, then the knowledge of a gentleman is also good and useful.

Liberal educa-

tion then promotes in the gentleman
a clear conscious view of his own op~n~ons and
jud~nents, a truth in developing them, an eloquence
in expressing them, and a force in urging them. It
teaches him to see things as they are, to go right
to the point, to disentangle a skein of thought, to
detect what is sophistical, and to discard what is
irrelevant. It prepares him to fill any post with
credit, and to master any subject with facility.
It shows him how to accommodate himself to others,
how to throw himself into their state of mind, how
to bring before them his own, tlow to influence them,
how to come to <;.n understanding with them, how to
bear with them.69
If :._Jewman is serious here on the go.od and usefulness of
liberal education and intellectual cultivation and if the
university-educated man is newman's gentleman, then
is also serious about his definition of a e;entleman.

~~ewman

The

em:)hasis here centers on what liberal education and university training give the man.
The

~aterial

in Discourse VII emphasizes the mental

attitudes liberal education provides a gentleman, attitudes
which make it possible for

hi~

to take up learning any job.

As such it merits attention as an extension of Newman's
statement on the nature of a gentleman, and it helps .neasure
the extent of its seriousness.

69I--2.l._·,
.. d
pp. 1.54-155·

The following discourse,

287

while providing some measure of seriousness, concentrates
more on how liberal knowledge, in close alliance with Grace
and religious principle, must promote the development of
the Christian gentleman and his eternal interests.

Left

alone on a natural level, the gentleman has too many selfimposed limitations.
In the three previous discourses, Newman has shown
that liberal knowledge is its own end, that it is not the
~ere

passive reception of knowledge or of unrelated sci-

ences but rather the active interdisciplinary grasp of
them, and that such knowledge is good and useful in that
it prepares a man with the attitudes necessary to follow a
variety of professional occupations.

In Discourse VIII,

he pursues more specifically the relation of liberal knowledge and the "connected view" that characterizes it into
the area of religion.

The intellectual refinement of

Newman's university-educated man -- his gentleman -- can be
a help or a hindrance to religious cultivation.

In Newman's

own words, it can be "at once a defence yet a disturbance
to the Church ••• , at one time in open warfare with her,
at another in defensive alliance ... 7°

The educated mind is

a blessine insofar as it is in a sense religious, that is,
"it has what may be considered a religion of its own, inde-

70 Ibid. , p. 157.
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. . •••. "71
pen d en t o f Ca th o1 lclsm

It may cooperate with the

Church ''in the conversion of man and the renovation of his
nature, ••• and also in

his rescue from that fearful subjection to sense which is his ordinary state ... 7 2 Intellec-

tual culture also works to replace the joys of the sense
with those of the intellect, and it draws man from harmful
ideas to more rational ones.73
Furthermore, while intellectual culture does not
produce virtue, it does e;ive the mind a natural indisposition to the excesses of evil.

For such knowlede;e, "the

discipline by which it is gained, and the tastes which it
'
. d •.•• .. 7 4
f Ol~s, nave
ana t ura 1 t en d ency t ore f'lne th e mln
This refinement ''will often or generally be lively enou,5h
to create an absolute loathing of certain offences, or a
detestation and scorn of them as unc:;entlemanlike ...... 75
In addition to a scorn and hatred for some kinds of vice,
intellectual refinement creates "an irresolution and inde. .
.
d .
clslon
ln
Olng wrong •••• ,76 Finally, cultivation of the

71-,
.d
.J:..QL•
72-b'd
L.L_., P• 160.
7 3I.Ql£. , p. 16L
74_, . d

~··

75Ibid.
76 rbid.

P• 162.
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intellect makes the soil of man's moral nature more adaptable to virtue.
Yet there is something in such mental refinement
that may also make it a threat to the Church.

There is,

according to Newman, a fundamental difference between intellectual culture and genuine religion, in spite of any
apparent similarities.

?or the distaste which the culti-

vated mind feels for some kinds of vice has
religious in it.

nothin~

truly

.L·.ioreover, the conscience of such an edu-

cated mind may "tend to become what is called a moral
sense."77

Then, "the command of duty is a sort of taste;

sin is not an offense against God, but against human nature."7S

Virtue becomes a matter of purely subjective cri-

teria-- "nothing more than the graceful in conduct ... 79
3ut making conscience a matter of taste places the focus on
self, not on God.

The "right thing to do" is substituted

for true conscience and objective

~oral

standards.

Newman's present discussion turns on the difference
between "mental refinement" and "c;e:nuine religion."

In a

sense, so does our treatment of the difference between the
worldly gentleman and the Christian gentleman hinge on this

??Ibid., p. 165.

78 rbid.
'19 Ibid., p. 167.
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point.

I~Jewman

's discussion points up the fact that al-

though the goals of the gentleman, considered on a natural
level, are worthy ones and his moral attributes are often
commendable, these goals and attributes are insufficient to
make such a man the desired product of a university.

There

is something more needed -- a supernatural orientation and
perspective.

If there is merit in the claim that the gen-

tleman, the natural man of philosophical habit, must have
a supernatural dimension to be a whole university-educated
man, then there is substance in our assertion that Newman's
idea of a gentleman is fundamentally, that is, in the primary instance, his idea of a Christian gentleman.

That

distinction leaves us with the worldly man of philosophical
habit as a secondary instance of the term and what it represents.

·dhether we speak of primary or secondary instance,

we must take both instances seriously.
By providing further clarification of the distinction between intellectual culture and genuine religion,
!~ewman

supplies us with additional support for our conten-

tion that the Christian gentleman stands preeminent in
Newman's university scheme.

Por while the intellectual

cultivation of the gentleman, considered apart from any religious principle, may bring him "half way to Heaven," 80

SOibid.,
.o. 160.
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v;hile it may free him from the bonds of his senses, 81 vvhile
it may aid in "rescuing the victim of passion and selfwill, .. b2 and while it may refine the mind of the ;entleman
and predisposes his soul to virtue, 8 3 it may also culminate
for the

rna~

of mental refinement

in ••• insensibility of conscience, in ••• ignorance
of the very idea of sin, in ••• contemplation of his
own moral consistency, in the simple absence of
fear, in ••• cloudless S8lf-confldence, in ••• serene
self-possession, and in ••• cold self-satisfaction •••• 84
r;ewman adds that the intellectual culture of the "mere
Philosopher" may ultimately result ir. a "godless intellectualis;n" vvhich begins by "repelling sensuality" but "ends
by excusing it."b5

Unfortunately, mental refinement too

often displays a wiJ.l of its own

a~d

goes its own way.

Reason is too ready to pursue its own direction and nature,
its own course.
?or IJevvman, the major problem with intellectual culture and the morality stemminG from it is that each deals
with the exterior, the surface of things.

81 Ibid.
82 rb'd
--1:.:..·' p. 161.

83r 'd
--.£L·, p. 164.
84 Ibid.

I

p. 169.

S5Ibid.

I

p. 173·

True morality
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and supernaturally oriented mental culture, on the other
1.'
•
nan:J,
alm
at regenera t.1ng

. ...._erlor
.
... e 1n
-- t'ne ,near t •

t~

~,jere

intellectual cultivation cannot effect this spiritual rejuvenation because, in Newman's words,
it does not supply r~ligious motive; it is not the
cause or proper antecedent of anything supernatural;
it is not meritorious of heavenly aid or reward; •••
it does not raise us above nature, nor has it a~y
tendency to make us pleasing to our ~aker •••• 86
In short, the university-trained man -- the gentleman -- needs more than mental culture.
he needs Faith.

the gentleman.

He needs Grace, and

'l'hese qualities form Newman's composite of
~hey

provide the profile of the Christian

gentleman, the primary instance of Newman's idea of a gentleman. Grace provides· for the .. ruined state of man." a?
It addresses iiself to the gentleman's .. utter inability to
.

gain Heaven by anything he can do rums elf....

,.88

The Cath-

olic doctrine of Grace reaffirms the moral certainty of a
gentleman•s "losing his soul if left to himself ...... B9

It

allows for "the simple absence of all rights and claims on
the part of the creature in the presence of the Crea-

86 rbid., p. 161.

87I'
.d
...EU:._·,
P• 1.59 •
88Illi·

P9 Ibid.
.J
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tor ...... 9°

It asserts the "illimitable claim of the Crea-

tor on the service of the creature" and the "imperative and
.
.
.
f orce o f th.e voJ.ce
ob 1 J.gatory
o f conscJ.ence
•••• ..9l

It

teaches that no man gains Heaven except by means of it and
a "regeneration of nature ... 92 .aut Faith also is necessary
for the gentleman to gain Heaven..
please God.

'tli thout it, he cannot

Faith teaches that "the heart is the seat both

of sin and of obedience," that "charity is the fulfilling
of the Law," and that "incorporation into the Catholic
Church is the ordinary instrument of salvation ... 9J
concludes:

Newman

"These are the lessons which distinguish Cath-

olicism as a popular religion, and these are the subjects
to which the cultivated intellect will practically be tur'

ne d • • •• •• 94

These are also the subjects, in the light of

.which the true nature of Newman's gentleman must be established.
There is ample evidence here to support at least
three contentions.

For one, if these are the proper sub-

jects to which the cultivated mind of the university-edu-

90-b"d

~·

91 Ibid.
92 rbid.
9 3rbid.

94Ibid.
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cated man must practically, and, in view of the extended
discussion, I would say ultimately, be turned, then Newman's idea of a university is fundamentally his idea of a
Catholic university.

The subject matter of a university

considered .apart from any religious principle apparently is
not enough.
jects

mus~

Then too, if the man who turns to these subhave Faith to guide and Grace to support him,

then he is no mere philosopher.
man.

Ee is a Christian gentle-

The mere gentleman tends to follow the demands of his

ovm will, nature, and reason rather than accede to the requirements of Faith and the persuasion of Grace.

?inally,

whether !·Iewman 's gentleman is considered as a man of intellectual culture or whether he is viewed as a man in whom
Faith, Grace, and intellectual culture are combined, he deserves to be treated in a serious

~anner,

for the subject

areas in which his role is delineated are dealt with seriously by :,revvrnan.
In the last paragraph of Discourse VIII, i{ewman observes that Basil
schools of Athens.

~~d

Julian were both students in the

Basil became a saint and supporter of

the Catholic Church; Julian, her scornful and resolute
enemy.

There is little doubt in the mind of the reader

which model Newman would have his university-educated man
resemble.

A university considered in the abstract

~'1d

a

cultivated mind viewed apart from religious principle are
insufficient to explain Newman's idea of a university and
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his idea of a gentleman.

At the very least, such a mind

and university setting may all too easily result in a "godless intellectualism."

At the very worst, the result may

be a "future Anti-Christ," a "pattern-man of philosophical
virtue" --a Julian.95
Thus far, this treatment has presented the reader
with the slov,r and difficult birth of a response to a vexing
question -- the nature of Newman's gentleman and the degree
of its seriousness.

~while

the response could have been

shaped only in reference to Newman's definition in Discourse VIII, it was not because his definition there does
not supply material adequate for a total response.

Its

complete form has to be drawn from Newman's treatment of
various issues, grounds, theme, assumpti"ons, and the like
in earlier discourses.

As a result, I have formed a res-

ponse primarily in relation to the nature of a Catholic
university, in relation to theological grounds, in relation to the wholeness of knowledge and an interdisciplinary
grasp, and in relation to the existence of a personal God.
I have also shaped the answer in reference to

I~ewman

's

equation of liberal and a gentleman's knowledge and in reference to the intellectual cultivation that must be reconoiled with Grace and Faith.

Perhaps the most significant

element, however, in forming a response has' been a desire

95rbid •• p. 181.
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to integrate Nev1111an' s idea of a gentleman with his idea of
a university, that is, to develop a "connected view" of
their right relationship.
foregoing

re~ations,

Developed in the context of the

the resp<:mse affirms that Newman pri-

marily advances the development of a Christian gentleman in
a Catholic university context and that he advocates secondarily the advancement of a cultivated gentleman in a university considered apart from any religious principle.

3oth

contexts demand that i'{ewman be taken seriously.
Discourse IX supports the art;,-uments that Newman's
statement on the gentleman is a serious one and that the
Christian gentleman reflects Newman's primary use of-the
term.

Its conclusion on the fundamental nature of r'iewman • s

university shores up these arguments.

The discourse also

helps clear up the duality of Nevvman 's gentleman, while,
at the same time, it answers decisively the question of the
scope of a university raised in the Preface and Discourse
In the sense that_it sums up the duties of the Church towards knowledge and the university, it might be said to
serve as a "theological center" of the discourses.

Struc-

turally, the discourse effects a clarifying resolution to
Newma.n' s argument on the ultimately Catholic nature of his
university.

It serves a similar purpose for my argument.

If one compares this discourse with previous ones,he notes
how well Discourse IX sums up the formal role of the Catholic Church in Newman's whole university scheme.

r.
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In discussing the duties of the Church towards knowledge, Newman links the theological and religious declarations of earlier discourses on the nature of a university,
grounds, theme, .and disciplinary boundaries with a more
explicit and definitive statement of the Catholic form or
spirit that must characterize the institution and knowledge
around which grounds, theme, and disciplinary limits center.
His argu."'lent proposes, in part, that
if the Catholic Faith is true, a University cannot
exist externally to the Catholic pale, for it cannot teach Universal Knowledge if it does not teach
Catho1ic theology. 1'his is certain •••• 96
Only one point needs to be made here.
~~d

If a Catholic spirit

form should characterize the institution, then should

it not also formally stamp the human produc.t of the institution?
From there, Newman's are;-ument is unfolded in a
series of contrasts between a truly secular and sacred
scope, liberal knowledge and Revelation, mere philosophy
and supernaturally oriented dogma, and especially, between
institutions materially and formally Catholic.

~he

first

terms of each pair account for the failure, in Newman's
judgment, of a university education not organically related
to spiritual realities.

The second terms represent a whole

educational view that places heavenly demands and earthly

96Ibid., p. 184.
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goals in perspective.

.Prom the contrasts drawn, it appears

fairly certain that Newman's ideally educated man is a seriously treated Christian gentleman who seeks to learn the
"relative disposition of things," both temporal and eternal.
In the first example,

Kev~an

points out that even

though a university has
ever so many theological chairs, that would not
suffice to make it a Catholic University; for
theology would be included in its teaching only
as a branch of knowledge, only as one out of many
constituent portions, however important a one, of
what I have called Philosophy.97
•

He feels something more is needed -- "the direct and active
jurisdiction of the Church ...... 98 In a second example,
- Newman contrasts liberal knowledge and Revelation.
former, he feels, tends to place self first.

The

It "exerts a

subtle influence in throwing us back on ourselves, and
making us our own center, and our minds the measure of all
things ... 99

Newman adds that liberal knowledge or reason

clashes first with precept, then with doctrine, and finally, with the very principle of dogma. 100 He further

97 rbid.

-

99Ibid., p •. 186.
100 Ibid.
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states that mere reason can effect two dire results: 101
one, it can ignore Theological truth; two, it can adulterate the spirit of catholicism altogether.

Revelation, on

the contrary, with its emphasis on "grace, its mystery of
the Godhead, its preaching of the Cross, its

de~otion

to

the Queen of Saints, [an~ its loyalty to the Apostolic
see," 102 places God before man and temporal concerns. In
another significant contrast, iiewman distinguishes formally
Catholic institutions from their materially Catholic counterparts, like the Spanish Inquisition.

In speaking of the

latter, Newman says that "considered 'materially,' it was
·nothing but Catholic; but its spirit and form were earthly
and secular ...... lOJ

Correlatively, he adds that the "whole

of Catholic theology" is not sufficient guarantee of the
"Catholicity" of a university. 104 According to his view,
a university will not have a Catholic spirit and form
unless the Church breathes her own pure and unearthly spirit into it, and fashions and moulds
its organizations, and watches over its teaching,
and ~~its to~ether its pupils, and superintends
its action.1v.5

101~ •• p. 187.
102:..b.d
k...J:._o
l03Ibid., p. 18.5.
104Ibid.
l0.5Ibid.

JOO
That Newman wants the breath and spirit of Catholicism to
formally mark his university there can be little doubt.
That he would have the same spirit formally stamp the product of his university appears equally true.

If Newman

wants his university imbued with Catholic principles, if
he wishes it Catholic formally, and if he believes that no
university can exist outside "the Catholic pale," then it
is more than likely that he also desires the universityeducated man, the product of this formally Catholic univer- ·
sity, to be more than a mere philosopher.

He must be a

Christian gentleman.
This interpretation of Newman's gentleman, emphasizing as it does the primacy of Newman's Christian gentleman,
is not meant to negate the importance of

Newman'~

more

worldly model developed in a university considered apart
from its relation to the Church.

Neither is it meant to

undermine the seriousness of Newman's statement on the gentleman in that context.

What the interpretation does pur-

pose to do is place the divine and human dimensions of the
man of philosophical habit in their right perspective.
Newman sees his university as a place in which natural and supernatural levels of activity must be harmonized.
The human dimension of the worldly gentleman has to be
reconciled with the supernatural dimension of the Christian
gentleman, intent on pursuing his Divine destiny.

Thus,

the Christian gentleman actively pursues intellectual
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truth by an interdisciplinary grasp of the sciences, but
he does so in the broader context of a search for spiritual
perfection.

Newman grants that the philosopher's search

for the wholeness of knowledge can move him well along toward worthwhile human goals.

Eut human goals, worthy as

they may be, are insufficient for a man delegated to pursue
Christian ideals.

The pride, the selfishness, and the

willfulness of the man of mere intellectual culture may all
too easily impede his attainment of supernatural goals.
His evil tendencies, left alone, may work against his participation in the kingdom of God on earth.
trange him from God in this world.
may cause his

da~nation

in the next.

intellectual culture is not enough.
Grace and Faith.

They may es-

But worst of all, they
Newman concludes that
It must be allied with

Purely human goals must be aligned with

transcendent ones.

In short, intellectual culture must

find its meaning and fulfillment in union with a dynamic
spiritual life.

Discourse IX states that Faith, Grace,

Revelation, and Dogma are the means to the gentleman's becoming a worthy son of God.
Much of the material in this study has been treated
in terms of Aristotelian equivocity by reference. 106 That
has been the key schematic device employed.

Earlier, spe-

cific issues, like those of grounds and "connected view,"

106
above.

.
For examples, see pp. 106, 139, 162, and 192,
.

)02

w·ere explained according to their primary and secondary instances.

Now, because

i~ewman

's gentleman appears to lend

itself no less readily to the same approach, it too has
been treated as an equivocal by reference in this chapter.
From that treatment, the Christian man of philosophical
habit emerges as the primary instance.
~evMa~'s

His development,

university --at its core a Catholic University

seeks to advance.

In him I locate the true nature of the

term "gentleman'' as Newman employs it.

He

is the Chris-

tian gentleman whose intellectual culture has been tempered
by ::;.ospel ideals.

The Christian gentleman is the primary,

formal instance of what Hewman's idea of gentleman is.

.he

represents a primary, formal supernatural instance of human
and supernatural traits that take precedence over the secoadary collection of human qualities and goals that characterize the worldly gentleman.

For the secondary instance

of Newman's gentleman, we must turn to the secular model
whos·e mind has been cultivated in a university considered
apart from any religious principles.

But this instance is

a true picture of .Newman's gentleman only to the extent
that it relates to the primary one.

My treatment has not

allowed for a less than serious interpretation in either
instance because the gentleman in both contexts appears
to play too important a role in tr.e development of Newman's
v:hole educational ideal.

Whether Newman speaks of the man

of intellectual culture in a university abstractly consid-

JOJ
ered or whether he speaks o.f the Christian man of philosophical habit cultivated spiritually in a Catholic University, he speaks seriously.

3.6L.CC1'ED EIELIOGRAPEY
'.Yorks of Newman
Apologia pro Vita Sua. ed. ~artin J. Svaglic.
Clarendon Press, 1967.

Oxford:

The

Certain .:Jifficul ties Felt b'. An,.,.licans in Catholic Teachin.;,·.
vo s. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., b97·
Jiscourses on the Scope and I\ature of TJniversi ty .6ducation
Addressed to the Catholics of London. Dublin: J.
Duffy, 1852.
An issay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. ed. Charles Frederick
Earrold. Hew York: LongmanS.Jreen, 1947.
?ifteen Sermons Preached before the Universit of Oxford.
London: Longmans, Green, and co., o9b.
Eistorical Sketches.

London:

3.

~.

Pickering, 187J •
.
ed. I. T. Ker. Oxford: The

The Idea of a University.
Clarendon Press, 1976.

The Idea of a University. ed. ,v:artin J. svaglic.
~~inehart and Company, 1960.
T ectures

on the Present Position of Catholics in
2nd ed. London: .aurns and Lambert, 1851.

Jew York:
~nc:·land.
s, a

Letters and Correspondence of John Eenry i·Iewman. ed. Anne
;,;ozley. 2 vols. London: Longmans, :J.reen, an:i Co.,
1898.
The Letters and Diaries of John Henr Newman. ed. Charles
stenhen Dessaln. Vo s. Xl-XXll. London: T. Nelson,

196i-1972.

Loss and Gain: ?he Storl of a Convert.
3urns and Oates,8?4.
Ca~Pai~n

in Ireland.
pr1nte4J, 1S9b.

ed • .-1. Neville.

304

6th ed.

London:

London: [privately

305
Parochial and Plain Sermons.
Green, and Co., 1891.

8

vols. London:

Longmans,

London:

Longmans,

sermons Preached on Various Occasions.
Burns and Oates, 1874.

4th ed. London:

The Tamworth Reading Room.

z,1ortimer, 1841.

London:

J.

Other .Sources
Artz, J. "Newman as Philosopher." International
Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1976), 263-287.
Bigg, Charles.
Oxford:

The Christian Platonists of Alexandria.
The Clarendon Press, 1968.

.Ble-hl, v. F.

''Newman, the Fathers, and Education."
45 (1970), 196-212.

Thouzht,

3oekraad, Adrian. The Argument from Conscience to the
Existence of God. Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1961.
Bouyer, Louis. Newman, His Life and Spirituality. 'I-rans.
J. Lewis May. London: Burns and Oates, 1958.
3remond, Eetiri. The IVIystery of Newman. ·rrans. H. C.
corrance • London: vlilliamsand Horgate, 1907.
.Brickel, Alfred. "Cardinal Newman's Theory of Knowledge."
American Catholic Quarterly Review, 43 (1918), 507-518.
Cameron, J. John Henry Newman.
and Co., l956.

London:

Longmans, Green,

Copleston, Frederick. A Histor;t; of Philosonhy.
IV:d.: The Newman Press, 1955.

w·estminster,

Corcoran, Thomas. Newman's Theor~ of Liberal £ducation.
Dublin: [Privately prlnte
1929.

·a ,

Cronin, J. F. Cardinal Newman: .Eis Theor;y of :r:nowled~.
Washington, D. C.: The Catholic Un1versity of
America, 1935·
Culler, A. Jwight. The Imperial Intell§ct, A Study of
Newman's Educationa-l Ideal. I·.Jew Haven: Yale
Un1vers1ty Press, 1955.

306
Jale, J?. A.
"Newman's '':'he Idea of a University': ·:he
Da."'lgers of a Gniversi ty E:ducation." Victoria.Yl
3tudies, 16 (1972), 5-J6.
Javis, H. F. ":\Tev,rman. on .educational ;,·:ethod; jducating for
Real Life." Dublin Review, 230 (1956), 101-113.
DeLaura, David J. hebrew and hellene in Victoria.'/. ~n..;land:
>revnnan, .Arnold, and Pater. Austin: university ofrrexas _ress,
p
1069
-/ •
ed. Victorian Prose: A Guide to
2esearch. ~-.:ew York: ·rhe .,iodern La."lguae;e Association
of America, 1973·
:Jessain, Charles Stephen.
r-:elson, 1966.

John I-ienry :'i evvma.J.',l.

----~--:---'"="'!~.....,..~~·

"r: ewman and Oxford • "

~eview,

~ondon:

237 (1963), 295-302.

·;;is ema:1

Faber, Geoffrey. Oxford Apostles.L A Characm S~lldY-21.
the Oxford Move:nent. London: Faber and l''aber, 1933.
Guitton, Jean.

.

La Philosophie de Newman.

1933·

Paris:

u

•

.

.uO~VJ..n,

:-~a.rrold,

Gharles F. John :tenrf :;ev1man: An Expository and
::!ri tical Stud' of ai s .1.1nd ':i:'hou~:r.ht and Art. i\ ew
::ork: I.,onc.mans, Green, and Go., l9Lij.
•

"Newman and the Alexandrian ?latonists."

---------------~--~~
r.;odern J?hiloloc-,;y,

Eu:;hes, P.

37 ( 1940), 279-291.

":·rev.,!'nan and Eis Aze."

111-136.

R.

"The Conservative

60 (1952), 659-676.

;~:ind

Juhlin F:eview, 217 (1945),
of :;ewman."

~nee

Review,

:.:;cGrath, Fergal. ~·Jewman 's University: Idea and Reali tv.
London: Lon,~ans, Green, and Co., 1951.
~,~ci~eon,

Richard. 'The r,asic 'Jorks of Aristotle.
York: Random house, l941.

ed. New

aobert D. l'iev~rnan at Cxford: His Religious
Develonment. London: Oxford University Press, 1950.

~iddleton,

~·iurray,

Placid, ed. ~;ev;man the Oratorian: Eis l;npublisted
Oratory Papers. .Juhlin: Gill and I.:acii:illan, 1969.

J07
~

:;edcncelle, :viaurice. La Philosophie Religieuse de Jor~'1
Eenr¥ I·revr.:na.'1. Strasbourg: 3ociete 3trasbour~eoise
de L~brairie, 1946.

Cwer:s, Joseph.

The Doctrine of Jein' in the Aristotelian

·~.~ataphysics'.
2nd ed. S::oronto: Pontifical
Ir:stitute of ~edieval Studies, 196J.

Przywara, Erich. II. ~·Tev.rman ,3ynthesis.
Jard, Inc., l9Jl.

~;ew

York:

Sheed and
i.)uo1in

"Spiritual Life of Jo.b.:..'1 Eenry Nevvman."
Reade, ?. '1,
Review, 217 (1945), 99-111.
Rickaby, Josepn. Index to the dor~s of J, E. Newman.
York: Longmans, Green, and co., l914.

I~ew

?tyan, John K., and i~dward :Jarvil 3enard, _eds. AmericS:!:Q
Essays for the 01ew:nan Gente:1.nia.l. 'ilashington: :Lhe
Catholic University of America Press, 1947.
Sillem,

~dward,

E enry

1970.

ed.

:·r ev.rman.

The Philosophical
2 vols. Lou vain:

of John
:·\auwelaerts, 1969-

:.;oteboo}~

Ta.rdi vel, ?ernande. La ?ersonR.li t~ :Li tt~raire de ~'iewman.
Paris: 3eauchesne, 1937·
Tl"1irl~vall,

J. C.
"C;ardinal l;~ev~man' s L_.i tera. :cy l~referetlces."
:.;odern Lan.::;ua~e Notes, 48 ( 19JJ), 2J-27.

Trevor, I\:. Sew:nan. 2 vols. Garden City,
Doubleday and co., 1962-196J.
Tristra:n, henry. l';ewman and Eis Friends.
Lane, 19JJ.
---~=----,.--'

London:

:~ew

York:

London:

John

ed. John :nenry Nev~man Centenary :essays.
Oates and ',lashbourne, 1945.

Vargish, T. Newman: The Contemnlation of
The Clarendon Press, 1970.

~:ind.

Oxford:

~.ialgrave,

·

Jan. I·Jewman the Theolor;ian: The i~a ture of 3eli ef
and Doctrine as Exemplified inH~s L~fe and ·tlorks.
Trans. A. V. Littledale. London: G. Chapman, 19g0.

•lard, r1:ai si e.

19'+B.

Youn~

Iiir. Newman.

:Sondon:

Sheed and ·,iarc.l,

J08
~·iard,

.'lilfred.
Lon~~a~s,

Life of Cardinal Sewman.
Green, and co., 1912.

2 vols. London:

"Two Views of Cardinal Fewman."
Rev1ew, 141 (1907), l-15.

Dublin

Jeatherby, I-1.

Cardinal :rewman in Eis .:i.a;e: Eis ?lace in
!'.ashville:
Vanderbilt University Press, 1973.
~n~lish 'fFie"Olo£pr and Li terat~.

,.,rhately, Jane. Life and Corresnondence of ~=tichard :d:r..ately,
J.J.
2 vols. London: Long;rnans, Green, and Co.,
U~66 •
./hat ely, ?.ichard.

1844.

;:::le:nents of -:-.o;dc.

London:

;.; • Fellowes,

J09

.APPROVAL SEEET
The dissertation submitted by Mark w. Haley has
been read and approved by the following Committee:
:Jr. l\Iartin J. Sva.glic, Chairman
Professor, ~nslish, Loyola
Dr. Francis J. Catania
Jean, Graduate School, Loyola
Dr. John R. Nabholtz
Associate Professor,
Loyola

~nglish,

The final copies have been examined by the director of
the dissertation and the siL~ature which appears below
verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been
incorporated and that the dissertation is now given
final approval by the Committee v1i th reference to
content and form.
~he

dissertation is therefore accepted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the desree of
Doctor of Philosophy.

